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From Avicennian Epistemology to Ashʿarī Theology: Al-Rāzī on the Ontological Status of Mental Existence

Kamil Öktem

This paper explores the intellectual genealogy and transformation of the concept of *mental ontology* (*al-wujūd al-dhihnī*) from Aristotle to Avicenna and finally to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. Originating in Aristotelian reflections on the relation between thought and being, the idea that mental representations possess a mode of existence distinct from external reality was systematized by Avicenna, especially in works such as *al-Shifāʾ* and *al-Ishārāt wa-l-tanbīhāt*. For Avicenna, *mental existence* explains how universals and non-existent entities can be known and discussed without entailing contradictions – thus offering a crucial epistemic and metaphysical category mediating cognition and ontology.

Al-Rāzī inherits this Avicennian framework but subjects it to intense scrutiny. In philosophical works such as *al-Mabāḥith al-Mashriqiyya* and *al-Mulakhkhaṣ fī al-ḥikma*, he questions whether mental entities truly "exist" or whether they merely function as conceptual designations (*iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyya*). Yet, in his *kalām* writings, he strategically employs the notion of *mental existence* to solve theological problems—most notably in articulating the status of the divine attributes (*ṣifāt Allāh*). By positing that such attributes exist in the mind rather than in external reality, al-Rāzī safeguards divine unity (*tawḥīd*) while preserving the meaningfulness of theological discourse.

The paper argues that al-Rāzī's engagement with Avicenna's concept of mental ontology reveals both his critical independence and his integrative method, blending Aristotelian logic, Avicennian metaphysics, and Ashʿarī theology. Through this tension-filled dialogue, al-Rāzī transforms *mental ontology* from a purely philosophical construct into a theological instrument – bridging the domains of thought, being, and divine discourse in post-Avicennian Islamic thought.

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The Unitary Aspect: Fanārī's Henological Approach to Knowledge

Safi Rehman

This article examines Mullā Muḥammad b. Ḥamza al-Fanārī's (d. 834/1431) theory of the unitary aspect (*jihat al-waḥda*) explicated in the prolegomenon to *al-Fawāʾid al-Fanāriyya*, his commentary on Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī's *Īsāghūjī*. Fanārī opens with the claim that every seeker of a manifold must apprehend it from its unitary aspect, and that this aspect must be known prior to inquiry. More than a methodological observation, Fanārī's thesis concerns the very nature of knowledge: multiplicity is only intelligible insofar as it is ordered by unity.

Fanārī builds upon a foundation of Aristotelian-inspired Avicennian theory of science, which defines each science by its subject matter (*mawḍūʿ*), principles (*mabādī*), and objects of inquiry (*masāʾil*) by introducing a further dimension: that the internal multiplicity of a science becomes intelligible only through its *jihat al-waḥda*. This unitary aspect, which he divides into essential and accidental modes, serves as the criterion for distinguishing per se attributes (*ʿawāriḍ dhātiyya*) from per accidens attributes (*ʿawāriḍ gharība*), thereby grounding the demonstrative structure of a discipline.

The article situates Fanārī's thesis in the post-Avicennian logical tradition, examining its reception by glossators such as Gūl Aḥmad, al-ʿImādī, Kānqarī, and Kara Khalīl. These engagements highlight both the technical role played by the unitary aspect in defining the subject matter of logic and its broader implications for the organization of the sciences.

This study makes a twofold contribution. First, it rehabilitates a neglected conceptual innovation in the Ottoman logical tradition, showing how Fanārī extends Avicennian concerns with subject-matter unity into a distinct philosophical thesis concerning the conditions of knowledge.

Second, it argues that Fanārī's articulation of unity as a precondition for science provides a henological alternative to the taxonomical and procedural emphases that dominate many accounts of post-classical intellectual history. By foregrounding ontological unity rather than enumerative order, Fanārī reorients scientific inquiry toward metaphysical coherence as its principle.

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Wonder and Discovery in Sufi Commentary on Sufi Verse: ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī's (d. 1731) Lumaʿat al-nūr al-muḍiyya on ʿUmar ibn al-Fāriḍ's (d. 1235) Khamriyya

Jawad Anwar Qureshi

Commentaries on Arabic mystical poetry is a genre that has received little attention from scholars. In The Zephyrs of Najd, Jaroslav Stetkevych offers a reading of such commentaries that characterizes them as "functional anti-poetry," seeing them as an instantiation of medieval distrust of poetry as a vehicle for meaning. Scholarship in recent years has foregrounded the notion of wonder in thinking about Islamicate systems of knowledge. Lara Harb's Arabic Poetics considers wonder as a basis for Arabic literary criticism and argues that wonder is at once an emotional as well as cognitive experience, an effect of poetic speech which conveys meaning in a manner that moves the soul and requires discovery. This paper foregrounds wonder in reading both Sufi verse as well as Sufi commentaries, complicating Stetkevych's otherwise learned characterization. Reading the Khamriyya of ʿUmar ibn al-Fāriḍ (d. 1235) and the commentaries thereon by ʿAbd al-Ghanī al-Nābulusī (d. 1731), I show how wonder underscores the very the logic of the poem itself. I then turn to Nābulusī's commentary on the poem (Lumaʿat al-nūr al-muḍiyya) on seven verses from the wine-ode to show how his gloss too functions as a result of wonder at Ibn al-Fāriḍ's ode and his gloss seeks to discover meaning through drawing on the cosmology of the school of Ibn ʿArabī (d. 1240) to explain these seven verses.

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Taking a Theological Anthropology Seriously, A Kalam-based Argument

Aiyub Palmer

A theological anthropology of the soul/spirit is addressed by early Ash'ari Kalam in discussions around what constitutes man or the mukallaf (Shihadeh, 2012) in terms of a physicalist ontology of man. This is in contrast to the Avicennan dualism that dominates the school post-Ghazali, becoming standard by the 6th Islamic century. Both views of the Ash'ari School exist within a continuum between two poles that we can call an Aristotelian ontology and a Cartesian ontology respectively. The Avicennan argument can be described through his 'flying man' thought experiment. Generally, the notion of the immateriality of the spirit/soul rests on the notion that self-consciousness exists independently of the world. This argument does not address the notion of agency, which I argue is a basis for connecting the early Ash'ari position with the Avicennan ontology. This paper seeks to argue that agency can be a basis for understanding the spirit/soul as a substance that is not from the material world, but which enters the material world and hence may be described as immaterial. The argument begins with empirical studies that indicate the ability of consciousness to exist distinctly from the body. The next part of the argument involves the postulate that consciousness necessarily implies agency. If agency and consciousness are two distinct properties of what we will call the spirit/soul then the spirit can know with certainty its causal agency as subjective. If the knowledge of causal agency exists as a subjective reality then all other causal relations must in fact be correlative except for the first cause that produced the material universe. This would be the only objective cause from an epistemological point of view. While objective causal agency and subjective causal agency are completely different in scope and effect, they both indicate a similarity in that both can be known as agents of causation. Therefore, we can assume that the subjective causal agency has a source outside of the material created universe because of what is shares in terms of its property. The paper will then explore the relevance of this argument for how Muslims understand the prohibition of cremation in Islam.

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Rooted Relevance: Reflections on Elmalılı and Jackson's Applications of Rational Theology Amid Radical Change

Mahmut Sami Ozdil & Kevin Marshall

This paper explores how Sunni theology can maintain its intellectual and moral vitality amid radical social transformation by examining two thinkers who stand at parallel thresholds of the Sunni theological tradition's engagement with modernity: Elmalılı Hamdi Yazir and Sherman A. Jackson. One writes from the ruins of an Islamic empire; the other from a minority religious community's next stage of indigenization. However, both sustain the intellectual and moral vitality of their theological scholarship through the same rational theological grammar of wisdom, justice, and divine purpose.

For his part, Elmalılı, in the Dīʿbāce of Metālib ve Mezāhib, reconstructs rational theological praxis in the aftermath of a collapsing Islamicate intellectual order. Centering on ḥikmah (divine wisdom), ʿaql (reason), and wijdān (conscience), he formulates a teleological order in which divine power is purposive and just rather than arbitrary. His statement "Perpetuity within renewal, renewal within perpetuity…depends on the union of the intellect oriented toward permanence and the feeling inclined toward change. At the point where intellect and sense meet, the self-possesses a conscience" expresses this vision vividly. Here, Elmalılı constructs a "middle field" (orta alan), a reflective space mediating between reason and emotion, permanence and change, eternity and history which is at once rooted in renewal and equilibrium.

Whereas Jackson, in Islam and the Problem of Black Suffering, employs the analytical lenses of the Sunni theological tradition's historical schools of thought to the Blackamerican community's experience of systematic oppression and prejudice within the particularly American intellectual and social expression of modernity. While earlier studies of Islam and the Black experience have remained largely historical or sociological in nature, Jackson re-theologizes this lived experience of Black suffering through the principles of ḥikmah and moral reason, transforming the problem of suffering from being either the result of passive fate or divine injustice into a sphere of reconciling human suffering and moral agency, on the one hand, with divine wisdom and justice on the other. All this, amidst the radical social change experienced by this young indigenous Sunni minority on account of: a) the expanding social and religious authority of recently-immigrated American Muslims, and b) the growing number of members of this ethnic religious community's Third Resurrection taking on traditional Islamic literacy and scholarship as principled means of forging bonds of religious equity between themselves and their demographically-dominant American co-religionists. Despite their differing histories, both thinkers converge on a living Sunni theology that links divine wisdom to lived human experience and human responsibility. Thus, theology avoids both dogmatic rigidity and sociological reduction in the midst of radical social transformation by way of inhabiting a "third space" in which revelation, intellect, and lived experience intersect—a site of renewal grounded in conscience, justice, and divine purpose.

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Why Theological Inquiry Needs Prophets: Rereading Ibn al-Nafīs for Sunni Kalām Today

Omar Qureshi

Philosophical inquiries have taken on diverse discursive forms across the various schools of Kalām, Falsafa, and Sufism. From the expansive summas like Avicenna's al-Shifā, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's al-Maṭālib al-ʿĀlīya to the concise teaching manuals (mutūn) of al-Abharī's Hidaya al-ḥikma with its various commentaries and marginal glosses, a vast range of metaphysical and theological questions has been explored and debated. Given this rich intellectual tradition, it is quite easy for one to take these manuals and their modes of discourse as the total horizon and the sole way of all Islamic philosophical inquiries and to seek within it all answers to philosophical questions.

Yet, when one looks within the Islamic tradition, one encounters a variety of literary works engaging in philosophical and theological themes. This paper examines one such work: the theological tale al-Risāla al-Kāmiliyya fī al-Sīra al-Nabawīyya composed by the Syrian Asharite theologian Ibn al-Nafīs (d. 687/1288). Ibn al-Nafīs lived under the Ayyubids and later under the Mamluks in Cairo. He was a Shafite jurist and a well-known physician, with notable contributions to the field of medicine particularly his challenge of Galen's conception of pulmonary transit of blood.

In al-Risāla al-Kāmiliyya, Ibn al-Nafīs presents an account of the intellectual and spiritual development of Kāmil. Written as a counter to Ibn Ṭufayl's (d. 1185) Ḥayy ibn Yaqẓān, Ibn al-Nafīs's philosophical tale depicts Kāmil as acquiring knowledge of his person, the natural world, the cosmos and God from a distinctly Sunni theological perspective. Through the account of Kāmil, themes such as the nature of sense and rational knowledge, the extent to which unaided reason can yield truth, the nature of man and human social organization, the existence and attributes of God, and the necessity of revealed knowledge and prophethood are addressed.

This paper focuses on Ibn al-Nafīs's underlying argument that for one to attain knowledge of things as they truly are, revelation, and hence prophets, is a necessary condition. This contrasts with Ibn Ṭufayl's account not only of what truths reason and spiritual illumination can deliver, but additionally in how both authors view the place and role of religion as it relates to the knowledge of God, humans, and the cosmos.

Building on this postulate, I argue that, while one can arrive at certain fundamental theological realities outside revealed knowledge, per Ibn al-Nafīs, theological inquiries beyond this point must be informed by revealed knowledge known through prophets. Religion and revealed knowledge, in this account, take on a fundamentally different role than merely being confirmatory, as in Ibn Ṭufayl's conception, to revealing truths inaccessible to unaided reason and spiritual illumination. Given this, I will explore how our current work in the area of theology, such as teaching, research, and the development of educational programs, reflect this necessary role of revelation as an epistemological source?

Impossible Worlds and Kalām: Non-Vacuous Counterpossibles in Islamic Theology

Safaruk Chowdhury

This paper applies recent work on impossible-world semantics to classical Islamic kalām arguments that use counterfactuals with theologically impossible antecedents. Examples include: "If there were gods besides God, disorder would ensue" and "If God could lie, revelation would lose its authority." Standard possible-worlds semantics treats such conditionals as vacuously true, undermining their explanatory and polemical force. To address this, I adopt a non-vacuist semantics for counterpossibles, introducing impossible worlds - structured scenarios that minimally violate core theological constraints - into the evaluation space. I propose closeness policies that preserve essential divine attributes (omniscience, omnipotence, justice) while introducing only the deviation required by the antecedent. This ranking allows us to assess which impossible worlds are "closest" to actuality and to evaluate the truth of these conditionals non-trivially. Two case studies illustrate the approach: (1) whether multiple deities (āliha) necessarily entails cosmic disorder, and (2) whether divine deception would undermine revelation's authority. The resulting models expose the underlying bridge principles - about individuation of omnipotent wills and the epistemic role of divine veracity - that give these arguments their force. This framework offer a different dimension of logical depth to kalām reasoning to Qur'anic verses while avoiding the triviality imposed by classical possible-world accounts.

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The Coherence of Creed

Souhayl Maronesy

This paper employs a tripartite hermeneutical model—integrating revelation, linguistic integrity, and rational coherence—for interpreting the divine attributes of God. Its central contribution is the explicit systematization of the linguistic and ontological underpinnings of the classical theological tradition, principles often left implicit. These underpinnings are presented as seven foundations in the paper. The paper then demonstrates how the founders of all mainstream Sunni schools of thought adhered to these principles. Lastly, it analyzes Ibn Taymiyyah's radical departure from this orthodox framework on language by highlighting the three out of the seven foundations that he rejected and his alternative foundations to them. It demonstrates that his rejection of established semantic and ontological principles, while philosophically problematic and resulting in an inadequate theory of language, was a deliberate theological strategy. This strategic deviation allowed him to simultaneously affirm the literal meaning of scriptural attributes and negate any likeness between God and creation (tashbīh), thereby positioning his method as a solution to a perceived hermeneutic crisis. By applying the layered model to this historical debate, the study achieves two objectives: first, it provides a clear framework for understanding the internal coherence of the mainstream Ashʿarī-Māturīdī tradition; and second, it offers a novel analysis of Ibn Taymiyyah's theology, re-framing his linguistic project not as a simple return to tradition but as a foundational reconstruction aimed at providing a rationally sound response to the Ashʿarī criticism of the anthropomorphic positions of many Hanbalite scholars.

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The Logical Pluralism or the Logic of Pluralism: Al-Juwaynī and the Logic of Legal Dialectics

Muhammed Komath

Since the 2000s, the idea of logical pluralism has generated a substantial literature in the field of logic on the question of how multiple systems of logic can each be correct. Logical pluralists assume that, though different systems of logic can disagree on which arguments are valid, all of them can be getting things correctly. Yet, while pluralists admit a diversity of systems of logic, they typically assume that validity remains monotonic and internally uniform within each system of logic – two opposing viewpoints cannot be justified within one system of logic. This paper inverts that premise by exploring the possibility of a 'logic of pluralism' or the possibility of justifying two contradictory conclusions within one system of logic. Drawing on the Islamic tradition of Jadal (dialectics in legal theory), I argue that within a single logical system, it is possible to justify multiple, even contradictory, conclusions - provided each is dialectically justified (backed and defended) according to shared procedural norms. Working primarily with al-Juwaynī's al-Kāfiya fī al-jadal, I show that his dialectical framework anticipates a grammar of pluralistic reasoning internal to one logic, rather than between distinct systems. The paper thus offers an alternative conception of logical pluralism, one rooted in the Islamic dialectical tradition rather than in contemporary structuralist accounts of logical diversity.

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One Self, Many Moments: Diachronic Identity in Ṣadrā

Agnieszka Erdt

This paper asks how Ṣadrā's ontological commitments reshape the structure of diachronic persistence. My claim is this: by allowing motion to operate at the level of substance, Ṣadrā relocates persistence from a static essence-based model to one grounded in flowing existence, and that shift reconceives the role of time in personal identity.

Under Avicenna, persistence is endurance of quiddity: the *what-it-is* remains the same while accidents and successive existential instantiations occur in time, with time serving as a measure of change. Ṣadrā changes this. He grants ontological primacy to graded existence and models the persistence of the embodied self on the flowing nature of corporeal substances (*ṭabīʿa*): each successive stage constitutes a renewed actuality with changing forms and species, yet the self persists as a unity despite such transformations. Consequently, in strict existential terms nothing remains numerically identical; continuity is effected by successive actualities that preserve and perfect their predecessors.

Formally the position resembles perdurantism in denying a timeless core, yet it is ontologically distinct. Where perdurantism posits co-present temporal parts, Ṣadrā insists that successive moments are numerically distinct but asymmetrically integrated, guided by a teleological flow: each later actuality existentially depends on and subsumes earlier ones. Crucially, for Ṣadrā temporality is constitutive rather than merely a measure of motion: 'earlier' and 'later' mark gradations in intensity of being — modes of existence that ground the self's unity.

I conclude that Ṣadrā offers a kind of four-dimensionality: not of spatial-temporal extension but of existential gradation where one existential individual is constituted by many temporal moments. This model preserves continuity without either numerical and formal sameness or co-presence, and reshapes how we should theorise the diachronic persistence of the embodied self.

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If Dualism Doesn't Work, How About Trialism? A Solution to the Mind–Body Problem from Islamic Philosophical Theology

<center>Macksood Aftab</center>

The mind–body problem in Western philosophy originates with Descartes and remains tinted by Cartesian terminology even as modern advances in neuroscience attempt to solve this dilemma. The dominant contemporary answer, physical monism, seeks to explain human subjectivity entirely in terms of brain processes. This stands in contrast to Cartesian dualism, in which the soul is defined as a "thinking substance," making thought its defining feature.

Although Cartesian dualism is largely considered obsolete, the existence of subjective human experiences—namely, consciousness—continues to challenge physical monism. Works by philosophers such as David Chalmers and Thomas Nagel have illustrated these challenges, prompting many neuroscientists and philosophers to reconsider alternative ontologies, including revised forms of dualism or at least non-reductive physicalism, to account for the ontologically distinct status of consciousness.

Body–soul dualism has long been an established doctrine within the Islamic tradition. However, this dualism differs fundamentally from that of Descartes or from modern scientific non-reductionism. The meanings of "soul," "body," and "dualism" in the contemporary Western tradition differ significantly from how a medieval Muslim theologian would have understood them. Mapping the Islamic (kalam) theological framework of human nature onto the modern philosophy-of-mind spectrum is thus challenging, given the divergence in terminology and their ontological underpinnings.

In this context, I argue that the kalam framework for understanding human nature is best described as a trialism consisting of three distinct ontological categories. Drawing on the classical kalam tradition of thinkers such as al-Ghazālī and al-Taftāzānī, this model interprets human existence as a synthesis of the material substance (jism), the subtle immaterial substance (jawhar al-laṭīf), and the contingent attributes or accidents (ʿaraḍ), with their causal interaction grounded in Divine will and power (occasionalism).

In this framework, the human soul is not merely a "thinking substance," as Descartes proposed; rather, in kalam thought, thinking is an accident or attribute distinct from the underlying substance of the soul itself. The soul, moreover, is a different type of substance from that of the human body. This view avoids the pitfalls of Cartesian dualism by delinking thought from soul, thus preventing the conflation of two separate ontological entities. It also aligns with advances in neuroscience that closely associate mental states with the brain's physical states. It also avoids the combination problem that plagues panpsychism and other forms of non-reductive physicalism. Furthermore, it sidesteps Kant's critique of the Cartesian soul by distinguishing between the soul and human subjective experience.

This Islamic trialist ontology, rooted in Islamic theological thought, provides a conceptually coherent framework that remains compatible with both rational inquiry and contemporary neuroscience. This model, presented as a trialism, also allows for more robust engagement of the Islamic tradition with contemporary philosophy of mind and neuroscience.

Izetbegovic Between Kant and Hegel: Can Islamic Aesthetics Exist?

Ahmed Elbenni

In the conclusion to Islamic Aesthetics: An Introduction, Oliver Leaman writes that "if the arguments in this book have been successful, then they show that there should not be books entitled 'Islamic aesthetics.'" Leaman thus concludes his introduction to Islamic aesthetics by revealing that there is nothing to introduce, as the subject in question does not and cannot exist.

In this paper, I argue that Leaman's denial of the very possibility of "Islamic" art is the typical result of engaging it via the prism of the modern category of "aesthetics." The conception of aesthetics as an attitude of "disinterested judgment" inherited from Kant, paired with an ideal of artistic autonomy also implicit in Kant but further developed by Hegel, can easily foreclose the very possibility of "Islamic aesthetics" by ruling out in advance any intermixing of aesthetics and "interest" i.e. moral or practical aims. Thus the post-Kantian and post-Hegelian trajectories of "aesthetics" seem to posit its necessary incompatibility with "religion."

Enter Alija Izetbegovic, a Muslim philosopher and the first president of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Izetbegovic's metaphysical system broadly operates within the same post-Kantian aesthetic paradigm as Leaman and yet uses its conceptual resources to marry rather than divorce art and religion. Izetbegovic's crucial intervention lies in how he draws on Kant (and to a lesser extent Hegel) to redefine the moral, the religious, and the aesthetic in terms of each other as distinct but synonymous pathways to "freedom." In so doing, I argue, Izetbegovic is arguably more faithful to Kant's aesthetics than other interpretations which overlook its deep interest in morality. Ultimately, Izetbegovic's ability to arrive at a fundamentally religious understanding of aesthetics through Kant and Hegel shows that aesthetics, in its modern sense, is not inherently exclusive of religion.

However, the same Kantian framework that enables Izetbegovic to formulate a generally religious aesthetics frustrates his ability to formulate a specifically Islamic one. In other word, he is able to use Kantian resources to redefine art and religion in complementary rather antagonistic terms, but unable to take the second step of developing a specifically Islamic aesthetics for the same reason. Izetbegovic's Kantianism allows him to redeem aesthetics for religion only at the steep cost of disqualifying most historical Islamic art from consideration as "art."

I conclude by considering whether any attempt to theorize Islamic aesthetics will need to abandon the concepts of "art" and "aesthetics" bequeathed to us by Kant—and indeed, Izetbegovic seems to come closest to developing a distinctly Islamic aesthetic idea when he openly embraces "interest" as a valid aesthetic attitude. However, our journey through Izetbegovic's thought also reveals that Kant did not empty aesthetics of moral concern, but in fact made the aesthetic a key to genuine morality. This suggests that the attempt to develop a theory of Islamic aesthetics within a Kantian framework, while unsuccessful in the case of Izetbegovic, may someday yield precious philosophical fruit—though it is unlikely to do so without reconsidering the place of freedom in Kant's moral philosophy.

Ibn Sīna vs Ibn Rushd vs Acquinas – Ibn Sīna's Bipartite Imagination and the Incoherence of Ibn Rushd's Early Internal Sense Doctrine

Ahmad Talal Ahdab

Ibn Sīna (Avicenna) established five internal sense powers, dividing imagination into two distinct faculties based on fundamental a priori principles, notably that activity and passivity are mutually exclusive. The passive retentive/formative imagination (alkhayāl) stores images received by the common sense. The active compositive imagination (al-mutakhayyilah) manipulates and combines these images and intentions to form judgments about objects. Ibn Rushd's (Averroes) early doctrine only posits four internal senses, eliminating Avicenna's compositive imagination. This results in an account described as hopelessly incoherent. Ibn Rushd assigns the core function of joining images and intentions to the cogitative faculty and also to the memorative faculty during human recall. Since two distinct faculties end up performing the identical task of composition, Ibn Rushd's doctrine lacks internal consistency. This paper will contrast the three philosophers' model and concludes with a comment on as to who's model the mutakallimūn (kalam theologians) are more likely to either accept or less criticize.

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Reviving Modern Islamic Philosophy
Taha Abderrahmane under the Shadow of al-Ghazali?

Monir Birouk

Taha Abderrahmane is purportedly the foremost philosopher of ethics in the Arabic intellectual scene today. Despite the wide scope and the pedantic breath of his oeuvre, his influence on the Arabic intellectual landscape has, until recently, remained quite modest. One reason for this belated recognition might be his systematized pedantic thought and relatively inaccessible argumentative style. A more plausible factor, however, is the nature of his project which re-invokes the spirit of the medieval Muslim scholar Abu Hamid al-Ghazāli, a ghost which the mainstream contemporary Arabophone intellectuals have sought strenuously to dispel at any cost. To stake out this claim, my paper falls into three sections. In the first, I try, albeit briefly, to circumscribe the epistemological friction zones between the modernist project in the Arab thought and Taha Abderrahmane's plain Islamic thought. In the second section, I trace the presence of *hujjat al-Islam* in Abderrahmane's thought, arguing that what the latter invokes and re-appropriates is not so much the ideas of al-Ghazali as the theo-philosophical spirit of his project. In the last section, I argue that such cautionary appropriation led him to maintain a critical distance with regards to the Ghazalian project. As afar as I am concerned, this critical stance does not only deflate the modernist Arab intellectuals' accusatory claims that Taha Abderrahmane thought merely cloaks the medieval Ghazalian theological project in modern garbs, but also highlights certain aspects of his thought, namely in its latter phase, as much more progressive than the quietist Arab modernist project.

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Sa'id Foudah and the Contemporary Revitalization of Ash'ari Kalam: A Theological Response to Late Modernity

Yacine Lakhdar Bennaceur

The contemporary Islamic intellectual landscape is marked by a renewed engagement with the classical tradition of speculative theology ('ilm al-kalam). This resurgence is not merely a historical exercise but a direct response to the pressing epistemological and ethical challenges of late modernity. Among the most significant figures leading this revival is the Jordanian theologian Sa'id Foudah. This paper argues that Foudah's project represents a sophisticated revitalization and redeployment of Ash'ari theology, moving it beyond a purely defensive apologetics against Salafism to offer a constructive and coherent theological framework for engaging with the foundational philosophies of the post-Enlightenment West. While often viewed primarily through the lens of his intra-Muslim polemics, Foudah's intellectual contributions offer a deeper critique of the materialist and instrumentalist reason that underpins much of modern and postmodern thought. This paper will analyze Foudah's methodology, which re-centers classical tools of logic (mantiq) and rational demonstration (burhan) to deconstruct the core assumptions of secular modernity. Through a textual analysis of his key works, such as Al-Kashif al-Saghir 'an 'Aqa'id Ibn Taymiyyah and his commentaries on classical texts, I will demonstrate how Foudah utilizes the Ash'ari framework to address three critical areas:

1.   Epistemology: His critique of empiricism and materialism, reasserting the role of revelation and reason as complementary sources of knowledge.
2.   Causality and Metaphysics: His defense of the Ash'ari understanding of divine omnipotence and its implications for a non-deterministic, God-centered worldview, standing in direct opposition to scientific materialism.
3.   Political Theology: His analysis of the Western modernist concept of the state, arguing that its philosophical underpinnings are incompatible with an Islamic conception of sovereignty and divine law.

By examining these themes, the paper will show that Sa'id Foudah's work is a crucial case study in the contemporary application of kalam for what I term "civilizational construction." It aims not only to preserve tradition but to actively shape a viable Islamic intellectual response to the challenges of the 21st century. This study contributes to the academic understanding of contemporary Islamic theology, illustrating the dynamism and continued relevance of the Ash'ari school in navigating a world defined by profound philosophical shifts.

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Which *Kalām* Should Be Reformulated? A Comparison between Two Different Approaches on *Kalām Jadīd*

Choirul Ahmad

In their sustained engagement with the challenges posed by modern philosophy and science, a number of contemporary Muslim scholars intentionally turn to *kalām* as their central point of departure. This choice is not incidental, for *kalām* is frequently regarded as the original and most distinctly intellectual tradition that emerged organically from the theological framework of Islam itself. The broader attempt to reinvigorate *kalām* in response to these challenges—an initiative that began decades ago—is often referred to as *kalām jadīd*. Notably, the scholarly engagement with *kalām* has also taken on new forms and approaches. A scholar such as Basil Altaie deliberately draws on both classical Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī traditions, with a particular focus on extracting their natural philosophical theories (*daqīq al-kalām*). Others, such as Shoaib Malik and David Solomon Jalajel, turn to Sunnī *kalām* to formulate a shared set of metaphysical principles (*jalīl al-kalām*) encompassing Ashʿarism, Māturīdism, and Atharism. This study compares these two distinct approaches within *kalām jadīd* which can be classified as follows. The first, *kalām* as Natural Philosophy is represented by Basil Altaie; the second, *kalām* as Metaphysics, is developed by Shoaib Malik, David Solomon Jalajel, and Nazif Muhtaroglu. These approaches illustrate how scholars reformulate the *kalām* tradition according to their distinct epistemological frameworks. The first approach tries to integrate the scientific elements of classical *kalām* with modern physics and cosmology, while the second rearticulates its metaphysical dimensions to underscore their enduring relevance.

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Substantial Motion and the "Deed Of History": Mullā Ṣadrā and Polish Nineteenth-Century Historiosophy

Tomasz-Łukasz Stanowski

This paper proposes a precise metaphysical bridge between Mullā Ṣadrā's al-ḥikma almutaʿāliya and nineteenth-century Polish historiosophy—above all August Cieszkowski's philosophy of the "deed" (czyn) and Józef Gołuchowski's wisdom-centered anthropology. I argue that Ṣadrā's primacy of existence (aṣālat al-wujūd), the gradational unity of being (tashkīk al-wujūd), and substantial motion (ḥaraka jawhariyya), as synthesized by Hādī Sabzavārī's scholastic pedagogy, furnish an ontological grammar of process that can render with greater exactitude the Polish teleology of history (mission, fulfillment, and practical transformation). Conversely, Cieszkowski's transition from contemplation to action—his thesis that speculative reason must culminate in a collective, world-transforming praxis— supplies a criterion for articulating the practical and political horizon of Ṣadrian process metaphysics.

Methodologically, the paper stages a controlled, non-anachronistic "translation" across traditions by aligning three loci: (1) Process and Ontology—from Ṣadrā's account of existence as graded act and intrinsically self-intensifying motion of substance, to a reconstruction of historical becoming that is more than external succession; (2) Teleology and Fulfillment—from Ṣadrian final causality internal to being's motion to Cieszkowski's eschatological orientation of history toward realized reconciliation; (3) Mediation and Agency—from the ethicalintellectual perfection implied by ḥikma (as unity of knowing and virtue) to Polish models of moral and civic formation that make "deed" the mediator between metaphysics and social order. Gołuchowski's "wisdom" (as formative unity of intellect, character, and coexistence) functions here as a hinge concept, enabling a bidirectional illumination: ḥikma specifies the normative anthropology presupposed by Polish historiosophy, while the latter explicates how wisdom's perfection scales into institutions and collective action.

The novelty of the paper lies not in a facile parallelism but in a worked-out processual schema: (A) being as graded act (Ṣadrā) → (B) intrinsic teleology of intensification and form (Ṣadrā/Sabzavārī) → (C) historical deed as the practical visage of ontological motion (Cieszkowski) → (D) wisdom as the integrative habitus aligning intellect, virtue, and polity (Gołuchowski). On this basis I make two claims. First, the Polish category of czyn gains a nonvoluntarist foundation once read through substantial motion: history becomes neither sheer will nor passive waiting but the historical articulation of being's inner dynamism. Second, Ṣadrian process philosophy, often construed as purely contemplative, acquires a determinate account of its civic-ethical telos without collapsing into political theology: the normative passage from ontology to praxis is mediated by hikma as a perfection of persons and, through them, of orders.

Contribution to ASIPT. The paper places a core problem of Islamic metaphysics—primacy of existence and substantial motion—in a genuinely comparative frame with an original European interlocutor outside the well-trodden German canon, thereby promoting Polish philosophy as an equal partner in process-metaphysical debates. It delivers close readings and

a portable lexicon for sustained dialogue, and it sketches avenues for collaborative textual work (Ṣadrā/Sabzavārī ↔ Cieszkowski/Gołuchowski).

Companion Research Note (agenda). Why did these traditions not meet? A brief, linked note maps the nineteenth-century Polish "blind spots" regarding falsafa/kalām despite active orientalism (Sękowski, Chodźko) and the Tatar manuscript tradition (kitāb/tafsīr). It proposes a comparative corpus (edited excerpts and parallel glossaries), an edition pipeline, and conceptual "bridges" (e.g., primacy of existence ↔ deed/historicity) to anchor sustained, institution-level collaboration across Islamic and Polish studies.

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Between the Fawātiḥ and Futūḥāt: Akbarian Permeations in Mughal India

Noah Taj

This presentation explores remarks, of a specifically spiritual order, made by Baḥr al-ʿUlūm (d. 1225/1810) in his commentary Fawātiḥ al-raḥamūt on the Musallam al-thubūt of Muḥibb Allāh al-Bihārī (d. 1119/1707). The Musallam was amongst the culminating texts in one's study of uṣūl al-fiqh in the Dars al-Nizāmiyya, a curriculum inaugurated and championed by the scholars of Farangī Maḥall and Khayrabād. The text finds itself in a longstanding tradition that sought to synthesise between the approaches of the fuqahāʾ and mutakallimūn in legal theory, and was preceded by the likes of Badīʿ al-Niẓām by Ibn al-Sāʿātī (d. 694/1295) and the Taḥrīr al-Uṣūl by Ibn al-Humām (d. 861/1457). In the Fawātiḥ, Baḥr al-ʿUlūm addresses topics beyond the ilk of legal theorists, thereby directing the commentarial space into unchartered territory. One aspect of the commentary is its exemplary problematization of the supposed bifurcation between the paths of scholarship and spirituality. The paper will primarily be descriptive insofar as it will trace a number of key passages throughout the Fawātiḥ which admonish those who trivialize the significance of inspired knowledge, and convey a narrative from Baḥr al-ʿUlūm which impresses upon the reader the absolute importance and centrality of spiritual authority.

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The Afterlife of Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya in India: A Study of Its Commentaries and Glosses by Indian ʿUlamāʾ

Safiyulla H

The rational sciences, such as logic, philosophy, and kalam, occupied a central place in the madrassa curriculum, particularly within the Dars-e-Nizami framework of the Farangi Mahall scholarly tradition. Among the principal theological texts studied in this intellectual milieu was al-Nasafī's al-ʿAqāʾid, along with its renowned commentary, Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid by al-Taftāzānī. The text played a crucial role in imparting theological instruction in Indian madrasas across the northern and southern regions of the subcontinent. The matn (al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya) and its sharḥ by al-Taftāzānī gained wide acceptance throughout the Muslim world, inspiring a vast corpus of commentaries, glosses, and translations composed on both the base text and its commentary.

This study explores the intellectual legacy of Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya in India by analysing the commentaries (shurūḥ) and glosses (ḥawāshī) composed by Indian scholars in Arabic, Urdu, and Persian languages between the seventeenth and twentieth centuries. Through this commentarial activity, Indian ʿulamāʾ not only preserved kalām but also adapted its discursive forms to their specific intellectual and historical contexts. Notable contributions, to name a few include Ḥāshiyat al-Siyālkūtī ʿalā Ḥāshiyat al-Khayālī ʿalā Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya by Muḥammad Bāqir al-Siyālkūtī (d. 1656), al-Nibrās by Allāma Muḥammad ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Farhārī (d. 1824), Al-Jawāhir al-Bahiyya ʿalā Sharḥ al-ʿAqāʾid al-Nasafiyya by Shaykh Shamsuddīn al-Afghānī al-Swatī (d. 1978), and Tawḍīḥ al-ʿAqāʾid: Sharḥ Wajīz ʿalā al-Nasafiyya by Shaykh Muḥammad Ḥanīf al-Dahmatūrī. These works exemplify the sustained engagement of Indian ʿulamāʾ with post-classical kalām over the centuries.

Through textual and contextual analysis of commentaries, super-commentaries, and glosses, the study demonstrates how Indian ʿulamāʾ engaged with the global kalām tradition, not only preserving it but also actively producing their own interpretations and explanations of theological arguments and methods. By highlighting this continuous intellectual activity, the study challenges the prevalent decline narrative of Islamic scholarship, arguing that post-classical Sunni theology in South Asia represented a creative and dynamic engagement rather than a period of passive stagnation.

The Universal Philosophy of Avicenna

Allan Back

Avicenna claims to have a coherent, general program for his philosophical enterprise. He says that he has concealed it. By his own admission, he has not finished the project in what he has left to us: for example, details of the hypothetical syllogistic remain to be worked out; the moral and political parts appear to have been largely undone. Avicenna cross-references his discussions in different areas of philosophy at times, but leaves it unclear how to connect them up. He says that he has done so deliberately, so that only the worthy few will proceed so as to make the connections.

Avicenna follows in the tradition of the Second Teacher, al-Fārābī, who sees the course of a universal philosophy moving from culture to culture. Yet more than following Fārābī, Avicenna follows the First Teacher, Aristotle, not in a Neo-Platonist way, but in the more orthodox Aristotelian way of those like Alexander of Aphrodisias and John Phloponus.

To focus this general discussion of Avicenna's philosophical system, I shall concentrate on his views about determinism and contingency. He insists upon the distinction between necessary and contingent being, but also upon everything following necessarily from the activity of the divine Necessary Being. It puzzles many how Avicenna can then leave any room for contingency. I shall show that, if we follow out his metaphysical hints and pointers to his logical theory, we can see the outlines of his general philosophical program.

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God, the Universe and Man in Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's Philosophical Theology

Ayse Betul Donmez Tekin

Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī's (d. 672/1274) views on the relationship between God, the universe and man shed light on the formative period of Islamic philosophical theology. Al-Ṭūsī managed to synthesize different theological schools while inheriting Avicennan philosophical tradition. To situate al-Ṭūsī's position, this article is focused on three main points: (1) the proofs for the existence of God and His attributes, (2) God's relationship with the natural world, and (3) human nature, free will and morality. Al-Ṭūsī's thought on these topics is mainly explored in his seminal work Tajrīd al-Iʿtiqād where he integrates theology and philosophy. The purpose of this article is to show God-universe-man relationship from the perspective of al-Ṭūsī's philosophical theology by discussing his views in connection with Ibn Sīnā (d. 428/1037), Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī theological schools. To prove the existence of God, al-Ṭūsī follows both the Avicennan argument from contingency and Kalam cosmological argument. On the attributes of God, al-Ṭūsī generally holds to the Ashʿarī theologians' view. God has essential attributes which are power, knowledge, life, and will, but these are not added to His essence. His position on the divine actions is similar to Maturidī view, which emphasizes the wisdom of God. His divine action model is like concurrentism. All actions in the universe including miracles, which confirm the prophethood, occur by God's will according to the natural laws of the universe. God acts through natural laws. For al- Ṭūsī having soul and intellect is what make humans unique. Al-Ṭūsī supports the Avicennan view of the human soul that it is immaterial and has the capacity for perfection. Also, he has a balanced view of human agency, taking a moderate position between determinism and free will. As for the source of morality, al-Ṭūsī has a Mutazilī approach, maintaining that human reason can know moral truths and values which are intrinsic, in other words, good and evil are objectively knowable by reason. However, he does not affirm that God cannot do evil. Using al-Ṭūsī's case, this study provides a framework to understand the extent of transformation in the conception of the relationship between God and the universe which evolved during the period of philosophical theology.

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Can the Theory of Kasb Accommodate Human Freedom and Moral Responsibility? A Philosophical Analysis of al-Māturīdī's Views in Kitāb al-Tawḥīd

<center>Aysenur Unugur Tabur</center>

The debate over whether al-Māturīdī's theory of kasb can accommodate genuine human freedom and moral responsibility hinges on two interrelated philosophical conditions within the framework of Islamic occasionalism: (1) whether the human act of choice (ikhtiyār) is directly caused by the agent, not by God; and (2) whether this mental act bears a causal relation to the ensuing physical action. The former condition concerns the reality of human freedom, while the latter concerns the grounding of moral responsibility. If human agents cannot choose freely, their actions cannot be morally evaluated. Conversely, even if free in intention, an agent who lacks the power to realize their choices in action cannot be held morally accountable for them. In this paper, I argue that Māturīdī's nuanced theory of kasb, as articulated in Kitāb al-Tawḥīd, satisfies both conditions through his employment of two distinct notions of power (istitāʿa) and a multi-tiered causal framework that includes divine, agent, and mental causation.

Māturīdī distinguishes between two senses of istitāʿa. The first (istitāʿa 1) is a general capacity that precedes action and encompasses intellectual and volitional faculties. This power is foundational for moral obligation (taklīf), as it enables human beings to recognize divine blessings and to act upon rational moral imperatives. It grounds human freedom by positing a stable capacity in the agent that is not subject to constant divine recreation, thus resisting full-fledged mental occasionalism. The second (istitāʿa 2) is an action-specific power that coincides with voluntary acts and is necessary for their realization. While this power is linked to God's creative act at the moment of physical execution, it is causally rooted in the agent's intention and effort, thus preserving a link between the mental and physical realms without collapsing into deterministic creationism.

By drawing a clear distinction between mental and physical acts, Māturīdī seeks to preserve the causal autonomy of the former while admitting divine creative causation in the latter. Mental acts, including choosing and willing, arise from istitāʿa 1 and are not constantly recreated by God. Instead, they operate through what Māturīdī calls amr al-nisbi—a relational mode of existence that allows for mental causation without violating divine omnipotence. This enables a model of mental continuity and intramental causation necessary for a coherent sense of self and deliberative agency.

Moreover, kasb, in Māturīdī's account, functions as a third form of causation—agent causation—bridging mental acts and physical outcomes. While the physical act is created by God, the human agent "acquires" it through this unique causal linkage. This allows the agent to own their action without being its metaphysical creator, thus maintaining the integrity of occasionalism while securing moral responsibility.

In contrast to Muʿtazilite theories that locate moral responsibility in the creative power of the agent at the moment of action, Māturīdī shifts the locus to a stable and enduring mental capacity. This move allows him to preserve accountability even in an occasionalist framework. Ultimately, Māturīdī's dual-power theory, combined with his threefold causal model, provides a sophisticated theological framework that upholds both divine omnipotence and meaningful human agency.

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Taftāzānī-Jurjānī Debate on the Definition of `Ilm al-Kalām: A Balanced Synthesis Through the Hermeneutical Strategies al-Dawwānī

Mohammed Farooq H

The intellectual rivalry between the later luminaries of ilm al-kalām, Sa'd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī and al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī, is well-documented, particularly regarding their divergent interpretations of critical theological issues. A prime example of this scholarly disagreement is their debate over the definition of ilm al-kalām as formulated by `Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī in his seminal work, al-Mawāqif. The core of their dispute lies in whether or not the fundamental beliefs of Islam should be explicitly included within definition of ilm al-kalām. Subsequent scholars have extensively sought to defend the positions of both giants, producing a rich corpus of commentary. A prominent figure in this endeavour was Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawwānī, who composed an independent treatise dedicated to explicating al-Ījī's definition. This paper examines the nuanced undertones embedded within al-Ījī's definition, with a specific focus on al-Dawwānī's detailed commentary. It analyses the hermeneutical strategies al-Dawwānī employs to navigate the Taftāzānī-Jurjānī divide. In its concluding section, the study moves to propose a balanced synthesis, aiming to reconcile the two seemingly opposed approaches through a comprehensive methodological framework.

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Reconstruction of the Moral Status of Artificial Intelligence in Light of Mulla Sadra's Philosophy of the Soul

Saeed Karimi

Moral status denotes the degree to which a being merits moral consideration for its own sake, such that its interests, welfare, or flourishing are ethically relevant and must be accounted for in moral deliberation. Determining which entities possess moral status—and on what grounds—is central to both classical and contemporary ethical theory, and has become increasingly salient in the context of artificial intelligence (AI). The present study examines the question of AI moral status through the lens of Mulla Sadra's (Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī) philosophy of the soul (ʿilm al-nafs), offering a metaphysically grounded framework that contrasts with prevailing materialist and functionalist approaches in AI ethics.

Central to Sadra's metaphysics is the principle of corporeality in origination and spirituality in subsistence (jismaniyyat al-huduth wa ruhaniyyat al-baqa'). According to his doctrine of substantial motion (al-ḥaraka al-jawhariyya), the soul originates as a material entity inseparable from the body yet undergoes continuous ontological transformation toward immateriality and intellectual perfection. This transformation is not merely cognitive, but existential: the very substance of the being is refined through stages of self-awareness, intellectual development, and moral discernment. Sadra's emergentist framework thus introduces a graded conception of moral value, wherein beings occupy different ethical levels according to the depth and quality of their ontological and existential development.

From this perspective, moral agency and moral worth cannot be adequately captured by behavioral complexity, computational capacity, or algorithmic sophistication alone. Rather, moral status presupposes an intrinsic capacity for self-transcendence, intellectual ascent, and participation in the metaphysical journey of being. AI systems, which are designed and governed by humancreated algorithms, lack the ontological continuity and inner existential motion characteristic of true moral subjects. Although AI may simulate ethical reasoning or affective responses, these processes are derivative and externally imposed, rather than arising from the inner transformation of the soul. Consequently, AI remains confined to the plane of matter and cannot achieve the immaterial subsistence that defines moral personhood in Sadrian terms.

The distinction between forms of consciousness further clarifies this limitation. Sadra's framework differentiates physically based consciousness, which may be partially replicated in artificial systems, from immaterial or spiritual consciousness, which arises through substantial ontological evolution. Only the latter form of awareness entails the depth of moral insight and ethical responsibility associated with higher moral status. As a result, AI is excluded from these higher levels of consciousness and the corresponding degrees of moral consideration, illustrating the graded and hierarchical nature of moral standing across different entities. Nevertheless, human engagement with AI carries profound ethical and metaphysical significance. The act of creation itself embodies moral responsibility, and technological innovation can be viewed as a manifestation of divine creativity (tajallī). From a Sadrian perspective, the ethical focus thus shifts from the artificial agents to human creators and users,

whose decisions in design, deployment, and governance of AI systems bear lasting moral consequences.

By reconstructing moral status through the lens of Mulla Sadra's philosophy of the soul, the present study bridges classical Islamic metaphysics with contemporary philosophy of mind and AI ethics.

This approach provides a richer ontological understanding of moral value, illuminates the limitations of artificial systems in achieving moral personhood, and underscores the enduring ethical responsibility of humans in the age of intelligent machines. Such a framework contributes to cross-cultural philosophical discourse, offering fresh insights into the ethical boundaries of artificial intelligence while demonstrating how classical metaphysical principles can inform and enrich contemporary debates.

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Metaphysics of Science: An Islamo-Kantian Approach

Nuruddin Al Akbar

This paper examines the metaphysical foundations of science through a comparative analysis of Immanuel Kant's critical philosophy and Alparslan Açıkgenç's contemporary Islamic philosophy of science. It argues that Açıkgenç's project may be read as an "Islamo-Kantian" synthesis—affirming Kant's insight that science presupposes a priori structures of the mind, yet extending it by situating those structures within a culturally and religiously grounded conception of reason. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason sought to defend both metaphysics and rationalism from empiricism by showing that metaphysics is the necessary condition for science. For Kant, science becomes possible only because the mind possesses regulative ideas—such as space, time, and causality—that organize experience. These transcendental conditions render scientific knowledge universal and objective. Thus, metaphysics is not subordinate to physics but its prerequisite.

Açıkgenç accepts this transcendental framework but contests its universalism. While the human mind provides the structural possibility for scientific activity, he argues, it is neither purely abstract nor uniform. Rather, it operates like a digestive system—structurally similar yet functionally shaped by its specific "nutrients." In epistemological terms, Açıkgenç defines worldview as a mental framework through which a person perceives everything. This framework comprises two interrelated structures. The life structure concerns human survival and tends to be relatively homogeneous across societies, encompassing everyday habits such as manners, customs, and cultural practices that evolve with social learning. From this emerges the world structure, which operates at a deeper level. As humans begin to ask existential questions—about life's meaning, origin, and destiny—they gradually form conceptual representations of the world. These representations solidify into a world structure that shapes both one's understanding of reality and the cognitive conditions under which scientific inquiry becomes possible. In this view, worldview functions as a particularized metaphysical structure. While Kant's transcendental conditions are universal, Açıkgenç situates them within the intellectual and civilizational context of the knower. Consequently, science is not entirely universal but reflects the worldview that enables and constrains it.

This opens the possibility of multiple scientific traditions—Islamic, Christian, or secular—each grounded in distinct metaphysical and axiological assumptions. By synthesizing Kant's transcendentalism with the sociology of knowledge and drawing insights from Muslim thinkers such as Naquib al-Attas and Fazlur Rahman, Açıkgenç presents a model where metaphysics and science are reciprocally constitutive: metaphysics provides the conceptual architecture for science, while scientific practice refines the worldview from which it arises. This paper thus proposes an Islamo-Kantian approach to the metaphysics of science—one that preserves philosophy's critical function while recognizing the plural, situated, and civilizational dimensions of human rationality. It contributes to ongoing debates on the universality of science and the possibility of constructing an Islamic philosophy of science that is both epistemologically rigorous and metaphysically self-aware.