A SHORT COMMENTARY ON

ON THE DOCTRINE OF RESURRECTION

From ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī's *al-Mawāqif fī ʿIlm al-Kalām*

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Abbreviations

Below are the abbreviations of key works often cited in this article.

EI[1]	*The Encyclopedia of Islam*, first edition
EI[2]	*The Encyclopedia of Islam*, second edition
EI[3]	*The Encyclopedia of Islam*, third edition
EQ	*The Encyclopedia of the Qurʾān*, ed. by J. D. MacAuliffe
JNES	*Journal of Near Eastern Studies*
JQS	*Journal of Qurʾānic Studies*
JSS	*Journal of Semitic Studies*
QE	*The Qurʾān*: *An Encyclopedia*, ed. by O. Leaman

Part 1: Introduction

Section 1: The Author of *al-Mawāqif*

Below is a translation of the author's biographical entry from the printed edition of *al-Mawāqif*:

> His Name and Lineage: He is ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Aḥmad b. ʿAbd al-Ghaffār b. Aḥmad al-Ījī, al-Shīrāzī. It is mentioned that his lineage traces back to Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq (God be pleased with Him).

> His title: "The aid of the religion (*ʿaḍud al-dīn*)," "the supreme judge," "the teacher of the scholars," and the "master of the Shāfiʿīs in his town."

> His birth: He was born in Īj, a locality of the city of Shīrāz, in the *year 680 [Hijrī], although some have stated it to be the year 700 [Hijrī].

> His knowledge: He was a leader in the rational sciences, a subject specialist verifier (*muḥaqqiq*) with exacting knowledge, an expert in the two foundational disciplines–rational theology (*kalām*) and jurisprudence (*uṣūl al-fiqh*)–as well as the discipline of word-order (*maʿānī*), literary embellishment (*bayān*), and grammar. He also contributed to law and the arts.

> His teachers: He took knowledge from the learned teachers of his time, being particularly devoted to the *shaykh* Zayn al-Dīn–or Tāj al-Dīn al-Hanakī–who was the student of al-Qāḍī Nāṣir al-Dīn al-Bayḍāwī.[1]

> His students: His most notable students that met with immense fame included Shams [al-Dīn] al-Kirmānī,[2] Ḍiyā' [al-Dīn] al-ʿAfīfī, and Saʿd al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī.[3]

> His works: In the subject of *kalām*, he wrote *Kitāb al-Mawāqif*, *al-Jawāhir*, an abridgment of *al-Mawāqif* and *al-ʿAqā'id al-ʿAḍudiyya*. He also wrote *Sharḥ Mukhtaṣar Ibn al-Ḥājib* in jurisprudence, and *Kitāb al-Fawā'id al-Ghiyāthiyya* about word-

order and embellishment. He also wrote *Risāla fī ʿIlm al-Waḍ*
and *Ādāb al-Baḥth wa-l-Munāẓara*.[4]

His qualities: He was a liberal soul, influential, wealthy, most
kind, and financially generous towards students of knowledge
and greatly honoured his guests.[5]

His residency: He would initially stay in the city of Ṣulṭāniyya
during the time of the Mamlūk governor Abū Saʿīd, but then
moved to Īj where he took up permanent residence.

His trial and death: Serious quarrels and disagreements occurred
between [al-Ījī] and [Sayf al-Dīn Aḥmad] al-Abharī[6] which
eventually led to the ruler of Kirmān arresting [al-Ījī] and putting
him in the Diraymiyān prison. He remained in prison until he
died in the year 756 [Hijrī]. [end][7]

Section 2: An Overview of *al-Mawāqif*

The *al-Mawāqif* of al-Ījī is one of the most influential theological texts in
post-classical Sunnī rational theology (*kalām*).[8] Based on the hybrid
genre of *kalām* and Arabic philosophy (*falsafa*)–a synthesis found in al-
Ghazālī and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī–it has remained a mainstay of Ottoman
madrasa curricula as well as regional Islamicate metropolises of learning
since it was written.[9] It spawned many commentaries, super
commentaries and marginalia (*ḥawāshī*), the most famous commentary
of which is the *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif* of Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d.
816/1413).[10] D As a post-classical text, al-Ījī's *al-Mawāqif* embodies the
distinctive hybridity of *kalām* and *falsafa*, through the content and
structure of the text. There is a clear attempt to explicate the theories and
doctrines of both *kalām* and *falsafa* as rival explanatory models of truth
(epistemology), reality (metaphysics), ethics (morality), anthropology
(human nature), and revealed theology.

The broad approach al-Ījī adopts to present the materials in *al-Mawāqif*
involves mentioning:

> specific arguments made for their specific positions and shows
> weaknesses of these arguments and positions through objections
> to premises or conclusions, all in a concise and often abstruse
> manner, thus making commentaries indispensable for
> deciphering and comprehending the text.[11]

Not only does al-Ījī present a critique of the philosophers, but he also:

> extends his critique to the positions of the different schools of *kalām* as well as individual *mutakallimūn* on the questions he discusses, mentioning their particular arguments and positions as well as his objections to them.[12]

One of his major aims in this kind of deconstruction is to demonstrate that the Ashʿarī theses on the various discussions and questions is broadly correct. Al-Ījī is determined to prove how sound theological and philosophical reflection correspond to the intuitions, interpretations, and theses of the Ashʿarī school, sometimes in an arguably strained way. This polemical nature of *al-Mawāqif* also constructs itself like a diagnostics catalogue of theological and philosophical views and positions up to al-Ījī's time, and thus is an important repository of philosophical theology from the seventh/thirteenth and eighth/fourteenth centuries.

One of al-Ījī's aims in writing the *al-Mawāqif* was to demonstrate how *kalām* was also a systematic and thorough discipline like philosophy, with clear intellectual foundations and an edifice of knowledge that can be built on that foundation.

The text of *al-Mawāqif* divides into six areas or "stations" (*mawqif*, pl. *mawāqif*), with each *mawqif* having its own section preliminaries, number of "aims" (*maqṣid*, pl. *maqāṣid*), and topics of discussion. There is also an appendix (*tadhyīl*) at the end describing seven heterodox groups alluded to by the Prophet Muḥammad followed by the orthodox group. The six *mawāqif* comprise of:

> (1) epistemology and logic,
> (2) ontology,
> (3) metaphysics I: accidents,
> (4) metaphysics II: atoms and substances,
> (5) natural theology and
> (6) revealed theology.

Section 3: A Note on the Philosophical Notes

The text of *al-Mawāqif* is accompanied by my philosophical notes on the subsection on the Doctrine of Resurrection and therefore are rough, terse and in some places highly sketchy. They are NOT really detailed or

systematic comments, nor are my finalized reflections. These notes are based on a "walk through" approach that presents the text in its own division, sequencing, and thought progression, followed by my brief explanations and interpretations along the way. These explanations and interpretations have been taken broadly from the theological and philosophical in-text commentary of al-Jurjānī called *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*. I also use other well-known Islamic theological manuals and treatises written before and after this work that help shed light on the doctrine of resurrection.

The answer to why I'm annotating this subsection of *al-Mawāqif* is that the doctrine of bodily resurrection is fundamental to Islam, and yet it is overlooked in Muslim systematic theology relative to the other doctrines like the divine attributes (*al-ṣifāt*), and divine decree and predestination (*al-qaḍā' wa-l-qadar*). Yet, in order to formulate an orderly, rational, and coherent account of core Islamic doctrines, resurrection cannot be ignored or overlooked. It is precisely due to this oversight on the Doctrine of Resurrection by scholars and commentators alike that calls for clearer analysis and explication of the arguments regarding it. In addition, many students who study the various manuals of Islamic theology lament the absence of access to primary texts discussing this doctrine. Hopefully, this short study will not only build a more accurate understanding of al-Ījī's own claims, but allow a greater appreciation of his text, and, more importantly, obtain clarity on the doctrine of resurrection itself.

Finally, the section headings I've used to structure the notes are my own and not from *al-Mawāqif*. These headings are for navigation purposes; they indicate the kinds of topics addressed in the analysis of the text.

Section 4: Logical Analysis

The notes on the Doctrine of Resurrection make use of formal presentation of arguments. This means that these arguments are reconstructed in natural language (as much as possible) followed by semi-formal as well as formal (symbolic) language. To this end, I make use of the following notations:

Table of Abbreviation

□	= necessary
◊	= possible
∨	= or

- • = and
- ≡ = if and only if
- (x) = all
- ∃ = some
- ~ = negation
- ⊃ = if . . . then . . .
- ∴ = therefore

I formally present arguments in *al-Mawāqif* in logical language in order to help me understand the overall arguments first, and then identify the key inferences that will better help me assess for validity. Of course, some of these arguments are reconstructions based on what I take to be assumptions and unstated commitments and so in any reconstruction, a degree of interpretation takes place by the one doing the reconstruction. Hence, I acknowledge that these argument representations are open to revision and indeed objection.

Section 5. Some Challenges in Reading *al-Mawāqif*

Al-Ījī's *al-Mawāqif* offers some challenges for the non-specialist reader on the Doctrine of Resurrection that include the following:

1. The author's use of terse language. This often makes it difficult to decipher the precise points being made.

2. The author presents theological and philosophical arguments in shorthand form. This requires unpacking and elaboration on his meaning, which is not always easily determined.

3. The author often gives little or no reasoning behind some arguments that he offers. This requires scaffolding the arguments, whether supplied from the commentary literature or through reconstruction.

4. The author omits all discussions on ḥadīth. This may because the nature of the discussions he engages in are conceptual and not hermeneutical and acriptural.

Section 6: The Printed Edition of *al-Mawāqif*

The text of *al-Mawāqif* I have used is the Beirut edition printed by ʿAlām al-Kutub in 1969. The entire Sixth Station (*al-mawqif al-sādis*), titled

"Revealed Theology" (*al-samʿiyyāt*), is found from pp.337-403 of the printed edition, and divides into four topical sub-sections with thirty-three aims. The entire contents page of the *samʿiyyāt* section has been translated below:[13]

The Sixth Station – Revealed Theology

The First Marṣad: On the Doctrine of Prophecy

Aim One:	On the meaning of a prophet
Aim Two:	On the true nature of a miracle
Aim Three:	On the possibility of sending a prophet
Aim Four:	On establishing the prophethood of Muḥammad
Aim Five:	On the infallibility of prophets and a refutation of the objections raised to their narratives in Scripture
Aim Six:	On the true nature of infallibility
Aim Seven:	On the infallibility of angels
Aim Eight:	On the superiority of prophets over angels
Aim Nine:	On saintly feats

The Second Marṣad: On the Doctrine of Resurrection

Aim One:	On restoring the non-existent
Aim Two:	On the congregation of bodies
Aim Three:	An account of the philosophers' doctrine denying the assembling of bodies during the resurrection
Aim Four:	Paradise and Hell: are they both created [now]?
Aim Five:	Discussion on reward and punishment based on the principle of the Muʿtazilīs
Aim Six:	An account of the doctrine of our companions on [the issue of] reward and punishment
Aim Seven:	On the annulment of reward
Aim Eight:	On God pardoning enormities
Aim Nine:	On the intercession of Muḥammad

The Third Marṣad: On Names and Classifying People

The Fourth Marṣad: On the Imāmate

I have reproduced the original Arabic text of the subsection on the Doctrine of Resurrection for convenient access to enable the reader to analyze the text closely and/or make comparisons with other theological and philosophical works. I have also made use of a non-technical commentary of the entire revealed theology section by the Azharī *shaykh* ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Baraka entitled *Sharḥ Mabḥath al-Samʿiyyāt min Kitāb al-Mawāqif fī ʿIlm al-Kalām,* printed in Amman by Dār al-Nūr al-Mubīn in 2016. The format of the entire commentary involves the *Shaykh's* own interlinear comments on the text of *al-Mawāqif* followed by full reproductions of the text and its commentary by al-Jurjānī. The *Shaykh's* own direct commentary on the Doctrine of Resurrection is located on pp.271-281, 291-297 and 307-311.

Part 2: The Text and Commentary of *al-Mawāqif*

<div dir="rtl">

الْمَرْصَدُ الثَّانِيُّ :

فِي الْمَعادِ
</div>

Al-Marṣad al-Thānī – fī al-Maʿād

The Subsection:
On the Doctrine of Resurrection

The First Aim (*al-Maqṣid al-Awwal*)

<div dir="rtl">

في إعادة المعدوم
</div>

On Re-existence

Text 1 (pp.371-372)

<div dir="rtl">

المرصد الثاني: في المعاد. وفيه مقاصد. المقصد الأول : في إعادة المعدوم، وهي جائزة عندنا، خلافا للفلاسفة، والتناسخية، وبعض الكرامية، وأبي الحسين البصري؛ لنا: أنه لا يمتنع وجوده الثاني لذاته ولا لوازمه. وإلا لم يوجد ابتداء؛ فإن قيل: العود أخصّ من الوجود ولا يلزم من إمكان الأعمّ إمكان الأخصّ ولا من إمتناع الأخصّ إمتناع الأعمّ قلنا: الوجود أمر واحد لا يختلف ابتداء وإعادة؛ وكذلك الإيجاد إذا يتلازمان إمكانا، ووجوبا، وإمتاعا. ولو جوزنا كون الشيء ممكنا في زمان ممتنعا في زمان آخر معللا بأن الوجود في الزمان الثاني أخص من الوجود مطلقا ومغاير للوجود في الزمان الأول بحسب الاضافة لجاز الإنقلاب من الإمتناع إلى الوجوب. وفيه مخالفة لبديهة العقل، وإغناء للحوادث عن المحدث، وسدّ لباب اثبات الصانع؛ ويمكن أن يقال : الإعادة أهون من الإبتداء. وله المثل الأعلى. لأنه استفاد بالوجود الأول ملكة الاتصاف بالوجود.
</div>

والخصم يدعى الضرورة تارة ويلتجيء إلى الإستدلال أخرى. أما الضرورة فقالوا: تخلل العدم بين الشيء نفسه محال بالضرورة، فيكون الوجود بعد العدم غير الوجود قبله. فلا يكون المعاد هو المبتدأ بعينه؛

وأما الإستدلال فهو من وجوه: الأول: إنما يكون المعاد معادا بعينه إذا أُعيد بجميع عوارضه ومنها الوقت فيلزم أن يعاد في وقته الأول، وكل ما وقع في وقته الأول فهو مبتدأ . فيكون حينئذ مبتدأ من حيث أنه معاد. هذا خلف. الجواب : إنما اللازم إعادة عوارضة المشخّصة والوقت ليس منها ضرورة. إن زيدا الموجود في هذه الساعة هو الموجود قبلها بحسب الأمر الخارجي ومايقال: إنا نعلم بالضرورةِ أن الموجود مع قيد كَوْنه في هذا الزمان غير الموجود مع قيد كَوْنه قبل هذا الزمان، فأمرٌ وهميٌّ، والتغاير إنما هو بحسب الذهن دون الخارج؛ ويُحكى أنه وقع هذا البحث لإبن سينا مع أحد تلامذته وكان مصرا على التغاير. فقال له: إن كان الأمر على ماتزعم فلايلزمني الجواب لأني غير من كان مباحثك؛ فبهت وعاد إلى الحق، وإعترف بعدم التغاير في الواقع، ولئن سلمنا أن الوقت داخل في العوارض وأنه معاد بوقته الأول فلم قُلْتُم: إن الواقع في وقته الأول يكون مبتدأ وإنما يكون كذلك أن لو لم يكن وقته معادا معه .

الثاني: لو فرضنا إعادته بعينه والله قادر على إيجاد مثله مستأنقا فلنفرضه موجودا، وحينئذ لايتميز المعاد عن المستأنف ويلزم الاثنينية بدون الإمتياز وهو ضروريُّ البطلان. الجواب : منع عدم التمايز . بل يتمايزان بالهوية كما يتمايز مبتدأ عن مبتدأ مع التماثل . وكل إثنين متميزان بالهوية سواء كانا مبتدأين أو معادين أو أحدهما مبتدأ والآخر معادا وأي اختصاص لهذا بالمبتدأ والمعاد .

الثالث: الحكم بأن هذا عين الأول يستدعي تميزه حال العدم وإنه محال. الجواب: على أصل المعتزلة وهو كون المعدوم شيئا ظاهر وعلى أصلنا لِأّنا نمنع استدعاءه التميز؛ بل التَّميُّز إنما يحصل حال الإعادة وهو أمر وهمى لا حقيقة له.

Section 1: Re-existence

The term "re-existence" is generally defined as returning a non-existent object back to existence after a "gap" in existence (see section 2.2). Al-Ījī upholds its possibility. As a shorthand, I call it the re-existence thesis (RT):

> (RT): it is possible for a body to have re-existence.

(using R)

$$\lozenge R$$

The stronger claim (RT′) would be:

> (RT′): it is possible for <u>the same body</u> to re-exist again.

(using R′)

$$\lozenge R'$$

Al-Ījī appears to uphold the possibility of both RT and RT′. The groups that have objected to RT and RT′ include the philosophers, reincarnationists (*ahl al-tanāsukh*), some of the Karrāmiyya and Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d.436/1044) from the Muʿtazila. Al-Ījī's general reasoning for the possibility of RT and RT′ is: an object *x* existing a second time is something intrinsically possible because its existing a first time is intrinsically possible. Denying the possibility of a second existence is tantamount to denying the possibility of the first existence. Al-Ījī, like all Ashʿarīs, denies the re-existence restriction imposed by the philosophers. One reasoning he presents of those who reject RT and RT′ is:

(1) The possibility of something general does not necessitate something more particular.
(2) The impossibility of something particular does not entail the impossibility of something general.
(3) Re-existence is more particular than existence.
(4) Therefore, re-existence is not possible

(using G, P, R)

$$\Diamond G \nvdash \Diamond P$$

and

$$\sim\Diamond S \nvdash \sim\Diamond G$$

Formally:

> 1 $\Diamond G \supset \sim\Box P$
> 2 $\sim\Diamond P \supset \Diamond G$
> 3 $((\Diamond G \supset \sim\Diamond P) \bullet (\Diamond R \equiv \Diamond P)) \supset \sim\Diamond R$
> 4 $\therefore \sim\Diamond R$

Al-Ījī's reply is: existence (*wujūd*, 'E') is univocal or uniform in its applicability to things described with modal notions like possibility ($\Diamond$), necessity ($\Box$) and impossibility ($\sim\Diamond$). It applies to an object irrespective of whether it is the object's first existence E_1 or second existence E_2 (re-existence). If it is possible for something to exist at one time t_1 but impossible at another time t_2 because existence at t_2 is more special or specific (*akhaṣṣ*) and hence totally different than at t_1, then it would entail a possibility in one instance becoming an impossibility in another, which is impossible as that would entail collapsing modal categories, e.g., possibility into impossibility or impossibility into necessity. Such a view would contradict clear-cut rational postulates (*badīhat al-ʿaql*), like allowing temporally originated entities not to have a cause and thereby close the door on establishing the existence of a Creator (*ṣāniʿ*).

The act of bringing something into existence (shortened to "creating," *al-ījād*, 'I') is also univocal and uniform in its applicability to things. It applies equally to objects irrespective of whether it is the object's first creation I_1 or second creation I_2 (recreation). Similarly, if it is possible for something to be created at one time t_1 but impossible at another time t_2 because being created at t_2 is more special or specific (*akhaṣṣ*) and hence totally different than at t_1, then again it would entail a possibility in one instance becoming an impossibility in another, which is impossible as that would entail collapsing modal categories.

Al-Ījī proposes that perhaps re-existence (*al-iʿāda*) as being lesser or easier than existence (*ahwan min al-ibtidāʾ*) can be argued based on the Qurʾānic verse:

> "And it is He who begins creation; <u>then He repeats it, and that is [even] easier for Him.</u> To Him belongs the highest description [i.e., attribute] in the heavens and earth. And He is the Exalted in Might, the Wise." (Q.30:11)

This, of course, is an *a fortiori* argument. If the stronger can be done, then it is even more so that the weaker be done.[14] However, in respect to God's eternal attribute of power (*qudra*), there is undoubtedly no gradation in it–things are not easy or difficult for God; the terms of comparison or degree like "hard," "easy," "less," and "strong" are for the benefit of human conceptualisation and comprehension. In the empirical world, we observe one thing x being easier than or less than another thing y, but this has no relation to God's perception, power, or how He creates.[15]

Section 2: Gappy Existence[16]

The objector to resurrection sometimes makes a strong claim using modal notions and other times relies on specific arguments. Both of these are explained below.

Section 2.1: The Modal Claim:

The modal claim is that it is necessarily false (i.e., impossible) that an object first exists, passes out of existence, and then re-exists. This means that the first existence is not the same as the second existence as there is an "intervening state" (*takhallul*) between both. If the first existence is not the same as the second existence, then we cannot say the resurrected body in its re-existent state (its second existence) is identical to the pre-resurrection body (its first existence). Following contemporary metaphysical literature, I'll refer to an object's state between the first existence and second existence as "gappy existence" (GE). I'll state it as follows:

> (GE): It is possible that x exists at time t, x goes out of existence at t_1 and y begins to exist at t_2 such that $y = x$.

The Islamic philosophers deny GE. They argue that: x exists at t_2 after going out of existence at t_1, then the way x exists at t_2 is not identical to the way x existed at the prior time of t_1. This must mean existence at t_1 is not the same as it is at t_2.

Al-Ījī's possible reply: he enters a semantic point about the meaning of "takhallul." For him, non-existence is not an intervention of sorts, i.e., something that "enters" between an object existing at time t_1 and then later at time t^* that separates the essence of an object from itself. All that is going on is an object has existence, loses the property, and then is endowed with it again and this occurs at different times. See the diagram below:

x at t_1	**GAP** <**at** t_2>	x at t_3	x at t_4	x at t_5

An analogy sometimes given in the creedal commentary literature of this kind of gappy existence is how a person wears an item of clothing, takes it off, only to then wear it again.[17]

Section 2.2: The Specific Arguments

The arguments al-Ījī mentions that deny bodily resurrection are supposed to involve an absurdity or contradiction, and that is supposed to establish its impossibility. They, along with his responses, are as follows:

Argument 1: *the problem of past times*

This argument is presented tersely by al-Ījī. The broad form of it is:

(1) Resurrection of the same body is possible only if the related temporal accidents of resurrection are recreated.
(2) Time is an accident of resurrection.
(3) Therefore, time will also be recreated.
(4) If time is recreated, then temporal states that existed in that time will also be recreated.
(5) It is impossible to have both resurrection of the same body and time.
(6) Therefore, it is impossible time is recreated.
(7) Therefore, all related accidents of resurrection cannot be recreated.
(8) Therefore, resurrection of the same body is impossible.

(using B, A, T, R, E)

Formally:

1 ◊B ≡ ◊A
2 T
3 ∴ R
4 R ⊃ E
5 ~◊(B • R)
6 ~◊R
7 ∴ ~◊A
8 ∴ ~◊B

The core of the philosopher's argument runs from premises 2-5. The main objection–premise 5–is the metaphysical absurdity they claim is entailed by recreating past existents and non-existents. In particular, if time is a special property of some past existent, resurrecting that past existent would entail resurrecting time and the temporal states that had occurred in that time. This would entail an identical thing existing at two different times–in the past (pre-mortem) and in the present (resurrection), which is impossible.[18]

Al-Ījī's reply: he challenges premise 2. The accidents or properties that are recreated with bodily resurrection are those related to the individual (*mushakhkhaṣa*), and time is not one of them because the individual remains and time lapses. If a person existent now (the present) is the same person prior to the present (past), then the change (*al-taghāyur*) is not on account of something external (*amr al-khārijī*). This must mean time is really a mental phenomenon; something experienced by the observer that does not have a specific mind-independent ontology. Al-Ījī's view is that the measuring that takes place when we measure the duration of an event or an interval of time is really a mental act, one located in the mind; hence, the experience of temporal duration is intrinsically bound up by a psychological process and not because of some metaphysical feature of reality.[19]

Al-Ījī rehearses an argument from Ibn Sīnā about how we as persons persist from one moment to another without there being some fundamental metaphysical change in us because if there was, we would be entirely different persons from moment to moment and anyone conversing with us would be conversing with two different persons at two different times. But that would directly fly in the face of our own psychological intuitions and awareness of self-continuity.

Argument 2: *discernability of identicals*

Objection: If we necessitate resurrection of the same body, it is still possible for Allah to create a replica. If we have both resurrected body *b* and its replica *b**, then we would have two things (*ithnayniyya*) without indiscernibility (distinction), which is impossible.

Al-Ījī's reply: he seems to uphold the notion of *essential differentiation*, i.e., any two entities are differentiated by virtue of their ipseity (*kullu ithnyan mutamāyizān bi-l-huwiyya*). He thus rejects the claim of the philosophers that a body *b* and its replica *b** are indiscernible objects. Their discernibility is because of their different ipseity. This would also apply to a pre-resurrected body and a post-mortem body, where there will still be an aspect of differentiation and discernibility (*ikhtiṣāṣ*) between both.

Argument 3: *discernability from non-existence*

Objection: If the object to be resurrected is taken out of existence (i.e., ceases to exist or is annihilated), then it is impossible for it to be differentiated or discerned (*tamayyuz*) from some other object (e.g., its replica) while in that state of non-existence.

Al-Ījī's reply: discernibility or differentiation of one object *x* with another *y* while *x* is in a state of non-existence is impossible. Any mode of discernment or differentiation is in fact a fictitious matter (*amr wahmī*) without any real extra-mental reality or existence. In other words, the differentiation happens in *abstracto*, or in the conceptual level by the mind and is not a differentiation that exists beyond the mind.

The Second Aim (*al-Maqṣid al-Thānī*)

في حشر الأجساد

On Bodily Resurrection

Text 2 (pp.373-374)

المقصد الثاني: في حشر الأجساد. أجمع أهل الملل عن آخرهم على جوازه ووقوعه، وأنكرهما الفلاسفة. أما الجواز: فلأن جمع الأجزاء على ما كانت عليه و إعادة التأليف المخصوص فيما أمر ممكن كما مر، والله عالمٌ بتلك الأجزاء، قادرٌ على جمعها وتأليفها لما بينا من عموم علمه وقدرته، وصحة القبول والفعل توجب الصحة قطعا.

وأما الوقوع: فلأن الصادق أخبر عنه في مواضع لا تحصي بعبارات لا تقبل التأويل حتى صار معلوما بالضرورة كونه من الدين؛ وكل ما أخبر به الصادق فهو حق.

أحتج المنكر بوجهين: الأول : لو أكل أنسان إنسانا بحيث صار المأكول جزءا منه فتلك الأجزاء إما أن تعاد فيها وهو محال أو في أحدهما. فلا يكون الآخر معادا بعينه . الجواب: أن المعاد إنما هو الأجزاء الأصلية وهي الباقية من أول العمر إلى آخره لاجميع الأجزاء، وهذه في الأكل فضل فإنا نعلم أن الإنسان باق مدة عمره، وأجزاء الغذاء تتوارد عليه وتزول عنه .

الثاني – لو حشر فأما لا لغرض وهو عبث، و إما لغرض إما عائد إلى الله وهو منزه عنه، أو إلى العبد، وهو إما الإيلام و إنه منتف إجماعا وبديهة العقل لقبحه وعدم ملاءمته للحكمة والعناية به وإما الإلتذاذ وهو أيضا باطل لأن اللذة إنما هو دفع الألم بالاستقراء وأنه لو ترك لم يكن له ألم، والإيلام ليدفع فيلتذ. لايصلح غرضا إذ لا معنى له. الجواب: نختار أنه لالغرض. وحكاية العبث والقبح العقلي قد مر في جوابه. ولا نسلم أن الغرض، هو إما الإيلام، أوالإلذاذ ولعل فيه غرضا آخر لانعلمه. لكن لا نسلم أن اللذة دفع الألم. غايته أن في دفع الألم لذة، وأما أنها ليست إلا هو فلا، ولم لا يجوز أن تكون أمرا آخر يحصل معه تارة ودونه أخرى ؟... سلمنا ذلك في الذات الدنيوية . فلم قلتم إن اللذات الأخروية كذلك؟ ولم لا يجوز أن تكون اللذات الأخروية مشابهة الدنيوية صورة ومخالفة لها حقيقة فتكون حقيقة هذه دفع الألم وحقيقة تلك أمرا آخر ولا مجال الوجدان والإستقراء فيها

تذنيب :- هل يعدم الله الأجزاء البدنية ثم يعيدها أو يفرقها ويعيد فيها التأليف؟ الحق أنه لم يثبت ذلك ولا جزم فيه نفيا ولا اثباتا لعدم الدليل. وما يحتج به: من قوله تعالى (كل شيء هالك إلا وجهه) ضعيف؛ فإن التفريق هلاك؛ فإن هلاك كل شيء خروجه من صفات المطلوبة منه وزوال التأليف الذي به تصلح الأجزاء لأفعالها وتتم منافعها. والتفريق كذلك.

Section 1: Bodily Resurrection

There is a consensus in all religions that bodily resurrection is both possible (a rational claim) and that it will occur (a scriptural or revelatory claim). The philosophers rejected both the *possibility* of bodily resurrection and its *occurrence*.

Section 1.2: The Possibility

By "possible" they mean either *metaphysical* possibility or *logical* possibility because clearly it is not physically possible to resurrect the dead. This would make resurrection an act beyond any physical explanation and hence a miraculous act of Allah. Al-Ījī mentions two propositions that are possible:

> (Pr1) Reassembling bodily parts of some temporal object *x* according to its original structure is possible.

This is because Allah knows where these original body parts of *x* are and so He can reassemble them through His power. His knowledge tracks their location and His power brings about the reassembly. The second proposition is:

> (Pr2) Recomposing something non-existent is possible.

See the section on re-existence above for the discussion on this proposition.

(using R, C)

$\Diamond(R \bullet C)$

Section 1.3: The Occurrence (Actuality)

The fact that bodily resurrection will occur (*wuqūʿ*) is established based on the report of one who is a truthful informant (*al-ṣādiq*).

Argument:

(1) Whatever is reported by someone who is affirmed as truthful will categorically occur.
(2) Bodily resurrection has been reported by someone who is truthful.
(3) Therefore, bodily resurrection will occur.

The truthful informant has informed innumerable times about the occurrence of bodily resurrection in a language that is not figurative, to the extent that it has become a necessary matter of the religion, denial of which is tantamount to disbelief.

Section 2: Rejection of Resurrection

Al-Ījī presents two objections to the possibility of bodily resurrection. They are, along with his responses, given below:

Section 2.1: The Problem of Anthropophagi (cannibalism):

Objection: If one person (cannibal) eats another person, then the one eaten (cannibalised) becomes a part (*juzʾ*) of the cannibal. Either the consumed parts are restored (via reassembly, re-composition, reconstitution, etc.) *in* or *to* both the cannibal and the cannibalised, which is impossible, or in one of them, which is also impossible, as it would entail that one of them is not resurrected as the very same person.

Al-Ījī's response: it is the core parts (*al-ajzāʾ al-aṣliyya*)[20] that are resurrected, not every single part (*juzʾ*). The core parts are those that remain or persist throughout one's entire life (birth to death), as this is what maintains a person's diachronic identity. This must mean that the core parts, if consumed by a cannibal, pass out of the digestive tract as excess or surplus (*faḍl*) and do not assimilate into the cannibal.[21]

Section 2.2: The Problem of the Dilemma of Aims:

Objection: If bodily resurrection occurs then it is either for an aim (*gharaḍ*) or no aim at all. If it is for no aim at all, then resurrection is gratuitous or pointless (*ʿabath*). If it is for an aim, then the aim either reverts to Allah, which cannot be the case as He is above any need for a resurrection, or it reverts to human persons (*al-ʿabd*). If it reverts back to persons, then the resurrection is either to inflict pleasure or pain. If it is to inflict pain, then that is morally repugnant according to all forms of moral consensus and what is rationally self-evident (*badīhat al-ʿaql*), as it contravenes any wisdom/wise purpose and providence (*al-ʿināya*). If it is for pleasure, then that too would be invalid, as pleasure is prevention of and/or absence of pain according to inductive reasoning (*bi-l-istiqrāʾ*) such that if it was abandoned, there would be no pain to prevent or negate and hence no pleasure to enjoy.

The Philosopher's Argument may be constructed as follows:

(1) Bodily resurrection will not occur.
(2) Bodily resurrection will occur (assumption).
(3) If bodily resurrection occurs, then it is either for an aim or no aim.[22]
(4) If it is aimless, then it is pointless.
(5) If it is for an aim, then it is either for Allah or human beings.
(6) It cannot be for Allah because He is in no need of it.
(7) Therefore, it must be for human beings.
(8) If it is for human beings, then it is either for pleasure or pain.
(9) It cannot be for pain as that is morally repugnant and contravenes wise purposes.
(10) Therefore, it must be for pleasure.
(11) It cannot be for pleasure because you cannot get pleasure without pain.
(12) Therefore, bodily resurrection will not occur.

(using B, A, P, G, H, J and T)

Formally:

1 ~B
2 B (asm)
3 B ⊃ (A ∨ ~A)
4 ~A ⊃ P
5 A ⊃ (G ∨ H)
6 ~G

7 ∴ H
8 H ⊃ (J ∨ T)
9 ~T
10 ∴ J
11 J ≡ T
12 ~B

The philosophers' argument attempts to impale the purpose of bodily resurrection on the horns of a dilemma. If resurrection is aimless, then it means Allah has ordained something for sport, namely a gratuitous summation of human history indicating folly and pointlessness on the part of the divine. If resurrection is to benefit Allah in some way, then that entails He stands to gain something, but His perfection would mean that is impossible. If resurrection is for human benefit, then assuming a welfare model of divine action, the benefit would either manifest in pleasure or pain. The latter is ruled out on the basis that Allah cannot be author of injustices or morally reprehensible acts in inflicting pain on His created creatures. The former is ruled out by elimination, viz. if pleasure is defined by the absence of pain. One would not be possible without the other.

Al-Ījī's response: he prefers that resurrection is not brought about for some aim (*gharaḍ*) governing divine actions (see his discussion on the Ashʿarī divine action model). Hence, he would accept premise 6. However, he rejects the philosopher's objection as a false dilemma. Perhaps there is a third aim behind bodily resurrection that is neither for pain nor pleasure; we just don't happen to know it. Hence, he rejects the exclusive disjunction in premise 5 as covering only both these possibilities. He further rejects the contrary definition of "pleasure" (*ladhdha*), viz. it being the absence of or repelling of pain (*dafʿ al-alam*) based on the possibility of something else arising from the absence of one without the other. Why must it be only these two paired without a third or fourth? Al-Ījī's retort is that even if we accept the worldly reality of pleasure and pain being inextricably bound and defined in that way, why assume that is the identical case in the hereafter. There may be experiences of pleasure (and its absence) in the afterlife that are unfathomable and inexplicable to us. Thus, al-Ījī retreats or defers to an argument that posits a possibility but does not delineate what that possibility is or might be. This might be taken to weaken his overall counter-argument. Here is how the bare argument dialogue might be stated:

Philosophers: either *X* or *Y*.

Al-Ījī: it is at least possible that neither *X* nor *Y* but *Z*.

Philosophers: what is this other *Z*?

Al-Ījī: I may not know exactly what *Z* is but it is at least conceivable that there is one.

Section 3: al-Ījī's Follow up Point

Al-Ījī states the following propositions regarding the models of resurrection:

> (Pr3) It is possible for Allah to annihilate bodily parts of an object and then returns[23] them again.

> (Pr4) It is possible for Allah to disperse bodily parts and then reassemble[24] them.

Al-Ījī insists that the Qur'ān neither upholds nor rejects either of these resurrection models in a clear and decisive way due to the lack of sufficient clear indications.[25] However, he rejects as weak those who use Q.28:88 as evidence for suggesting an annihilation of all thing, i.e., becoming non-existent: "*everything will perish except His face*." Dispersal of bodily parts means to perish. Everything perishing means to lose one's requisite properties, which includes loss of composition; meaning, something that enables bodily parts to function properly.

Section 4: Different Views on Resurrection

According to al-Jurjānī's survey, there are five historical views on the resurrection within the theological and philosophical literature:[26]

1. Body only: the view of the *mutakallimūn* who generally rejected the idea of a rational soul (the intellect) as conceived by the philosophers.[27]

2. Spiritual only: The view of the philosophers who denied the possibility of a bodily resurrection.

3. Body & soul: The view of figures like al-Ḥalīmī, al-Ghazālī, al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī, al-Dabbūsī, Maʿmar from the Muʿtazila, the later Imāmiyya and Sufis who broadly defined personhood as: x is a person $=_{def} x$ is a rational soul. It is this soul that bears moral responsibility, will be rewarded or sanctioned for its worldly behavior, and it alone will persist after the destruction of the body, which is merely a tool for the soul. On resurrection day, God will create a body for the soul to animate and control and it is not necessarily the material body inhabited during one's temporal life.

4. No resurrection: the naturalist philosophers, i.e., materialists who denied the existence of an immaterial aspect to human beings. Their view is that once death occurs, all perception, sentience, powers, and properties cease. All that remains is the elementary divided matter (*al-mawādd al-ʿunṣuriyya al-mutafarraqa*).[28]

5. Suspension of judgment: a view attributed to Galen who is said to equivocate between a soul being either (i) a disposition (*mizāj*) in which case it would be impossible for it to become non-existent and then recreated or (ii) a substance (*jawhar*) that persists after the destruction of the physical body structure (*binya*), which would allow for the possibility of a resurrection.[29]

Al-Jurjānī seems to imply that that the view of al-Ījī falls into the first category.

The Third Aim (*al-Maqṣid al-Thālith*)

في حكاية مذهب الحكماء المنكرين لحشر الأجساد
في أمر المعاد

<u>The Views of the Philosophers on the Denial
of Bodily Resurrection</u>

Text 3 (p.374)

المقصد الثالث: في حكاية مذهب الحكماء المنكرين لحشر الأجساد في أمر المعاد .

قالوا : النفس الناطقة لا تقبل الفناء لأنها بسيطة وهي موجودة بالفعل، فلو قبلت الفناء لكان البسيط فعل وقوة وأنه محال؛ لأن حصول أمرين متنافيين لا يكون إلا في محلين متغايرين وهو ينافي البساطة، ثم أنها إما جاهلة و إما عالمة. أما الجاهلة : فتتألم بعد المفارقة أبدا، وذلك لشعورها بنقصانها نقصانا لا مطمع لها في زواله؛ وأما العالمة : فإما لها هيئات رديئة إكتسبتها بملابسة البدن و مباشرة الرذائل المقتضاة للطبيعة و ميلها إلى الشهوات أولا؛ فإن كانت تألمت بها ما دامت باقية فيها لكنها تزول عاقبة الأمر بحسب شدة رسوخها فيها وضعفه لأنها إنما حصلت لها للركون الى البدن وجرتها محبتها له وذلك مما ينسي بطول العهد به ويزول بالتدريج، و إن لم تكن بل كانت كاملة بريئة عن الهيئات الرديئة التذت بها أبدا مبتهجة بأدراك ما لها. هذا ما عليه جمهورهم.

وقال قوم منهم: -وهم أهل التناسخ إنما تبقى مجردة النفوس الكاملة التي أخرجت قوتها إلى الفعل، وأما الناقصة فأنها تتردد في الأبدان الإنسانية ويسمى نسخا؛ وقيل ربما تنازلت الى الحيوانية ويسمى مسخا؛ وقيل: إلى النباتية ويسمى رسخا؛ وقيل إلى المادية ويسمى فسخا؛ هذا في المتنازلة، وأما المتصاعدة فقد تتخلص من الأبدان لصيرورتها كاملة كما مر، وقد تتعلق ببعض الأجرام السماوية لبقاء حاجتها الى الإستكمال. ولا يخفى أن ذلك كله رجم بالظن بناء على قدم النفوس وتجردها.

Section 1: Indestructability of the Soul

Al-Ījī mentions philosophical views that deny bodily resurrection based on the dispensability of the body and the indestructability of the soul. The point here is that he highlights how the philosophers uphold a spiritual afterlife and not a corporeal one. On these philosophical views, it is the soul that subsists and experiences states of either felicity or infelicity depending on the level of moral perfection it acquired while embodied.

One of the arguments of the Islamic philosophers for the indestructibility of the soul after its separation from the body is based on its simple nature. The basic argument form is:

(1) Whatever is simple (indivisible) is indestructible.
(2) The soul is simple (indivisible)
(3) Therefore, the soul is indestructible.

(using S, I)

Formally:

1 S ⊃ I
2 S
3 ∴ I

If souls are destructible then their simple nature (*basāṭa*) will exemplify both potency and actuality, which is impossible because for each contrary property to be exemplified requires two different substrates and that means composition and composition undermines simplicity.

Section 2: Different Types of Souls

Al-Ījī briefly mentions different categories of souls and their post-mortem states according to the majority of the philosophers. Their view is that the afterlife journey is characterised not as a bodily resurrection but the soul's separation from the body and its union with the abstract realm of the World Soul.

The ignorant soul (*jāhila*), being preoccupied with its bodily pleasures while dwelling in its bodily entity, suffers unending pain upon separation from it because its state of moral imperfection. It is also fully aware of

its moral imperfection and how there is no second opportunity to rectify itself from that lowly state.

On the other hand, the knowing soul (ʿālima) is either (a) in an imperfect state because of some of the vices it carried out and the bodily pleasures it indulged in while attached to the body and will suffer pain upon separating from it according to the degree to which it was engrossed in those pleasures to finally then be purged and freed from the pain or (b) it is in a perfect state that is free from moral imperfection and upon separation from its bodily entity persists in eternal bliss.[30]

Section 3: Reincarnation

According to the reincarnationists,[31] the direction of an iniquitous or imperfect soul after its separation from the entity it inhabits is a downward descent to another entity. The direction of a perfected soul after dispensing from the bodily entity it occupies is an upward ascent that finally results in uniting with one of the celestial spheres or souls and awaits its perfection. The diagram below represents the ascent and descent of the soul:[32]

Soul's Descent

↓
in a body (*naskh*)

Celestial spheres
(*al-ajrām al-samāwiyya*)

↓
in an animal (*maskh*)

↓
in a plant (*faskh*)

↑

↓
in an inert object (*raskh*)

Soul's Ascent

According to the doctrine of reincarnation, there is no bodily resurrection (*māʿād jismānī*), only a cycle of incarnations of the soul. The doctrine was refuted extensively by Islamic philosophers and theologians.[33]

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¹ The author of the intricate theological work *Ṭawāliʿ al-Anwār min Maṭāliʿ al-Anẓār*, see Edgar Calverley and James

Pollock, eds. and trs. *Nature, Man and God in Medieval Islam*. ʿAbd Allāh Bayḍāwī's Text, *Ṭawāliʿ Al-Anwār Min Maṭāliʿ Al-Anẓār*, along with Maḥmūd Iṣfahānī's Commentary, *Maṭāliʿ Al-Anẓār, Sharḥ Ṭawāliʿ Al-Anwār*. 2 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 2002): 1:xxii-xlv.

On al-Bayḍāwī in the context of al-Ījī see Reza Pourjavady,"The Legacy of ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī: His Works and His Students," in A. Shihadeh and J. Thiele (eds.), *Philosophical Theology in Islam: Ashʿarism East and West*. (Leiden: Brill, 2020): 337-342.

² Pourjavady, 351-355.

³ It is highly doubtful that al-Taftāzānī was al-Ījī's student, see "al-Taftazānī", *EI²*, 10:88-89.

⁴ See Pourjavady, 342-349 for a fuller and detailed list of his works.

⁵ See Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī, *Ṭabaqāt al-Shāfiʿiyya al-kubrā*. 10 vols. (Cairo: Fayṣal al-ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī, 1984): 10:46.

⁶ Al-Abharī was the student of al-Ījī. See Pourjavady, 356-358.

⁷ See Al-Ījī (1969: 21).

⁸ On the development of post-classical Islamic philosophy, refer to Frank Griffel, *The Formation of Post-Classical Philosophy in Islam*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021).

⁹ On the reception of *al-Mawāqif* in India, refer to Ahmed (2020).

¹⁰ For a list of these commentaries, refer to the editor's introduction to a recent edition *al-Mawāqif,* Muḥammad al-ʿAzāzī (ed.). (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2020): 9-1).

¹¹ See Alnoor Dhanani, "*Al-Mawāqif Fī ʿIlm al-Kalām* by ʿAḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī (d. 1355) and Its Commentaries" in K. El-Rouayheb and S. Schmidtke (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2017): 376.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ I thank Dr. Omar Qureshi of Zaytuna Institute for allowing me to use his translation. I have made minor changes to it.

¹⁴ See Gwynne (2004: 126-129).

¹⁵ See ʿAbd al-Fattāḥ Baraka, *Sharḥ Mabḥath al-Samʿiyyāt min Kitāb al-Mawāqif fī ʿIlm al-Kalām*. (Amman: Dār al-Nūr al-Mubīn, 2016: 275).

¹⁶ I use this interchangeably with 'intermittent existence' (IE).

¹⁷ Baraka, 276-277.

¹⁸ See Tariq Jaffer, "Avicenna and the Resurrection of the Body." MA diss. (McGill University, 1998): 17-18 and Würtz (2016: 114-115). Ibn Sīnā's

argument against the impossibility of bodily resurrection based on the problem of time is translated in Michael Marmura, "Avicenna on Primary Concepts in the Metaphysics of his al-Shifā," in R. M. Savory and D. A. Agius (eds.), *Logos Islamikos. Studia Islamica in Honorem Georgii Michaelis Wickens,* (Toronto, 1984): 236-237. It reads as follows:

> Moreover, if the non-existent were to be brought back into existence, then this would require that all of its special properties in terms or which it was, should also be brought back into existence. But these properties include the time in which it existed. But if this time is brought back, then the thing would not have been brought back into existence, because that which is brought back into existence is that which would he existing in another time.
>
> Now, if it is allowed that the non-existent could return to existence with all the non-existing properties existing with it, time being considered either as having real existence that has ceased to be or according to what is known of their doctrine, as one of the accidents having correspondence with an existent, then we would be allowing that time and temporal states could return to existence. But then there would not be [one period] of time and another and hence no return of the non-existent to existence.
>
> The mind, however, rejects the notion that there are no different periods of time in a manner that renders exposition unnecessary; all that is said concerning this is deviation from peripatetic teaching.

[19] Würtz, 113-114.

[20] Alternatively, "essential parts," "atomic parts," and "core bodily matter.".

[21] Baraka, 292-293. Al-Taftāzānī (1950: 101-102) in his commentary on al-Nasafī's creed states:

> [114] **And the Quickening of the Dead (*al-baʿth*)**/that is to say that Allah quickens the dead from the grave by gathering their original parts and restoring their spirits to them.
>
> **is a Reality**/because of the statements of Allah, "Then on the Day of Resurrection (*yawm al-qiyāma*) you will be quickened" (Qur'an 23:16), and, "Say, 'He who formed them at first will revive them'" (Qur'ān 36:79). And there are many other decisive statutes which speak of the Day when the bodies will be assembled.
>
> The Philosophers denied the Quickening of the Dead on the basis that the restoration of the non-existent thing (*al-maʿdūm*) with its substance is impossible. Although there is no proof worthy of consideration for their statement it does not harm the purpose [of the Quickening], for our meaning is that Allah gathers the original parts of man and restores the spirit to him, whether or not that is called the restoring of the

nonexistent thing with its substance. In this way their supposition falls down, which is that if a man ate a man so that he became part of the one who ate him, then those parts must be restored in both of them, and that is impossible; or in one of them only, and thus the other is not restored with all his parts. This [supposition falls down] because the restored parts are the original parts continuing from the earliest of one's life until its end; and the parts eaten are superfluous in the eater and not original.

Someone may object that this statement admits that there is transmigration (*al-tanāsukh*), for the second body is not the first [115] because tradition relates of the people of the Garden that they are without hair on their bodies and beardless, and ornamented with *kuḥl*; and that the molar tooth of one of the people of *jahannam* (Hell) is like the mountain of Uḥud. So from this it is seen that in every school of thought [the idea of] transmigration has a firm footing. But we reply that transmigration would only be necessary were the second body not a creation out of the original parts of the first body. If anything like that is called transmigration the dispute is only in the name; and there is no proof that it is impossible to restore the spirit to such a body; but the proofs rest on the fact of its reality, whether or not this is called transmigration.

Al-Taftāzānī's view is akin to resurrection as reassembly model. Allah reassembles all bodies from the original sub-organic matter regardless of the forms it takes subsequent to its decay or disintegration. The philosophers' objection at core is that reassembly is tantamount to both reincarnation and replication. Al-Taftāzānī's response to the objection raised by the philosophers is that the matter that constitutes the essential or primary parts of the body is a sufficient condition for sameness of identity. There would be spatio-temporal continuity between the original pre-mortem and created post-resurrected body so long as a primary unit of matter from the original body was present. Thus, it is not a necessary condition that the resurrected body have (numerically) the exact same atoms, particles, simples or parts arranged in the same way. On the cannibalism objection specifically, al-Taftāzānī side-steps it by arguing that Allah will reassemble the body from the matter that formed it up until the last moment of death–irrespective of how it is digested or consumed subsequent to the death. Put like, this, al-Taftāzānī's account of resurrection would be: (RB = resurrected body):

RB[1] : a person's body that is resurrected in the afterlife consists of all and only those primary parts that composed the body at the point of death.

Or

> RB^2 : a person's body that is resurrected in the afterlife consists of parts that composed the body during that person's life.

[22] I'm using "aim" and "purpose" synonymously.
[23] Or recreates and/or restores them.
[24] Or recompose and/or reconstitute them.
[25] For Al-Ghazālī's resurrection model, see Al-Ghazālī, *al-Iqtiṣād fī-l-Iʿtiqād*. (Beirut-Damascus: Dār al-Qutayba, 2003): 155-156. It reads as follows:

> If it is asked, "what do you say: are substances and accidents annihilated and then both re-created or are the accidents alone annihilated but not substances with the accidents re-created?" we will reply that all of this is possible. There is no decisive proof in the Law that specifies one of these possibilities over the other. One of these possibilities is that the accidents are annihilated and the human body remains, having the form of earth, for instance. Thus life, colour, moistness, composition, shape, and other accidents pertaining to it cease. The meaning of re-creating these [accidents] would be that they themselves are restored to the body or replaced by new accidents similar to them. For us, an accident does not subsist. Life is an accident, and what is existent is at every hour another accident and a man is that very man by virtue of his body. He is one not by virtue of his accidents, for every accident is renewed and is not the previous accident. Hence it is not a necessary condition for re-creation that the same accidents are re-created. We mentioned this because some of our colleagues hold the view that it is impossible to re-create the same accidents but this is false. However, the arguments for its falsity are elaborate and there is no need for discussing it given our aim here. The second possibility is that bodies are annihilated as well [as the accidents], and then re-created by being originated for a second time. If it is asked "in what way is the re-created body different from the first and what is the meaning of your statement that the re-created body is exactly the same as the first when what is non-existent has no continuing essence or identity (ʿayn) which would allow [an identical one] to be restored?" we will reply that: non-existents (al-maʿdūm) in Allah's knowledge are divided into that which had a previous existence and that which had no previous existence, in the same way non-existence (ʿadam) from eternity divides into that which will have existence and that which Allah (Most High) knows will have no existence. This division according to Allah's knowledge cannot be denied because God's knowledge is complete and perfect and His power is great and encompassing. The meaning of re-creating [the same entity] is substituting the non-existence that was preceded by existence with existence. The meaning of replica (mithl) is to originate existence for a non-existence that had no previous existence. This is the meaning of re-creating. So long as a body is able to persist and the issue reverts

back to renewing accidents that are replicas of the first ones, what the Law [mentions] would be upheld and the problem of re-creating and distinguishing the re-created thing from the first is resolved.

[26] Sayyid Sharīf al-Jurjānī, *Sharḥ al-Mawāqif*. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1998): 324-325

 See the same list of opinions in al-Ījī's *al-Maṭāliʿ fī Sharḥ al-Ṭawāliʿ* cited in A. Al Ghouz, "Recasting al-Bayḍāwī's Eschatological Concept of Bodily Resurrection: Shams al-Dīn al-Iṣfahānī and Aḥmad al-Ījī in Comparative Perspective," *Mamlūk Studies Review* 20: 53.

[27] On the metaphysics of bodily resurrection in Baṣran Muʿtazilism, see the analysis in Vasalou (2008: 157-180).

[28] Würtz, 116.

[29] On Galen's anthropology, see Robert Hankinson, "Body and Soul in Galen" in R. A. King (ed.), *Common to Body and Soul: Philosophical Approaches to Explaining Living Behaviour in Greco-Roman Antiquity*. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2006): 232-258.

[30] For helpful details on these different categories of souls (*nufūs*) and their theoretical context in the thought of Ibn Sīnā, see Shams C. Inati, *Ibn Sīnā and Mysticism. Remarks and Admonitions Part Four*. (London and Kegan Paul International, 1996): 8-30. See also Baraka, 307-311.

[31] On reincarnation, see M. Bulgen, M., "Reincarnation (*Tanāsukh*) According to Islam: Comparative, Historical and Contemporary Analyses." *ULUM* l/l (July, 2018): 127-162.

[32] A number of arguments establish reincarnation as being incompatible with Islam. One argument is that Islamic doctrine affirms belief in resurrection and an afterlife in Heaven or Hell, based on the judgment of one's earthly deeds. Reincarnation would contradict the uniqueness of the individual's judgment and the finality of their ultimate destiny. Similarly, Islamic source texts contain clear eschatological beliefs (i.e., beliefs concerning the end times and the final destiny of souls). Reincarnation would conflict with these beliefs, especially the notions of final judgment and resurrection. Another argument is that Medieval Muslim thinkers (perhaps influenced by Aristotle), believed in the uniqueness of the individual soul. They held that each soul is created by God for a specific body. Reincarnation would undermine this uniqueness by suggesting that a soul could inhabit multiple bodies over time. A third argument is that if reincarnation were true, then it would be reasonable to expect individuals to have memories of their past lives. The general absence of such memories therefore serves as evidence against reincarnation. Finally, some Islamic philosophers, especially those influenced by Neoplatonism, believed in the idea of emanation and return. Everything emanates from the One (God) and eventually returns to the One. This cyclical understanding is not necessarily congruent with a linear journey implied by reincarnation.

Summarising from the 18th century Indian encyclopaedist al-Tahānawī, Kamada (1995: 120) describes reincarnation (metempsychosis) as follows:

The rational soul reaches the sacred world (ʿālam al-quds) when it frees itself from bodily restrictions and attains perfection. On the contrary, the soul which has not attained perfection is made to return to a human body and transmigrates from one body to another until the soul reaches its goal. The transmigration of souls limited to human bodies is called *naskh*. Transmigration of souls downwards into animal bodies is called *maskh*, *raskh* when souls go down to vegetative bodies, and *faskh* when souls descend further into mineral bodies. Thus, souls are divided into two groups: (1) those which ascend to reach the divine world, and (2) those which descend to migrate into different bodies. Tahānawī categorises souls with regard to the type of metempsychosis. The first category is that of the perfect souls (*nufūs kāmila*), which have reached human bodies after their transmigration among various bodies and attain enough perfection in both knowledge and morality to enter the world of intelligence (ʿālam al-ʿuqūl), free from bodies. The second is that of the intermediate souls (*nufūs mutawassiṭa*), which reach the level of the celestial bodies and the imaginative forms (*ashbāh mithāliyya*) without attaining perfection. The third is that of the deficient souls (*nufūs nāqiṣa*), which remain in animal bodies.

See Shigeru Kamada, "Metempsychosis (*al-tanāsukh*) in Mullā Ṣadrā's Thought," *Orient* 61: 119-132.

[33] Ibid., Kamada