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Mustafa Sabri on Kant's Understanding of Causality: Ash'arite Occasionalism in Conversation with Kantian Theoretical Philosophy

Emir Faruk Kayahan

The study of Muslim intellectuals' reaction to modernity has developed in the wake of the substantial growth of "Islamic Studies" research after the turn of the last millennium. Yet the work of Shaykh al-Islām Mustafa Sabri Efendi (1869-1954), the most senior religious scholar in the Ottoman juridical system and author of a four-volume magnum opus *Mawqif al-'aql wa-l-'ilm wa-l-'ālam min rabb al-'ālamīn wa-'ibādih al-mursalīn*, an assessment and critique of the most influential schools of thought of his time as well as major figures in the history of modern philosophy, remains largely unstudied.

In *Mawqif al-'aql*, Sabri recognises that Kant's transcendental philosophy is considered an inevitable reference point in Western philosophy and understands it as the strongest challenge to classical metaphysics and its arguments for the existence of God. Consequently, he deals with Kant's philosophy in detail, even if he is forced to depend on secondary sources. Sabri's philosophical-historical classification of Kant and his discussion of Kant's criticisms regarding proofs of God would be better examined in a separate study. In this study, I will try to present Sabri's epistemological evaluation of Kant's understanding of causality.

This paper will attempt to present Sabri's own understanding of the causality principle, on the one hand, and to trace his critical engagement with Kant around this law of thought, on the other. Setting this objective, in the first main part, I will present Sabri's fundamental understanding of the causality principle through a close reading of *Mawqif al-'aql* (sections 2–3). Then, I will compare this with a summary of Kant's theoretical insights (4) in order to provide some philosophical background to Sabri's intellectual debate with Kant's understanding of causality. To this end, I will provide an interim summary (5) comparing the two epistemological paradigms and their understanding of metaphysics, revealing the starting point as well as the reason for Sabri's intellectual confrontation with Kant.

The second main part will focus on Sabri's substantive-systematic confrontation with Kant's epistemology. In order to situate this correctly, however, it is necessary – following the lead of Sabri himself – to summarise not only Kant's basic epistemological ideas but also those of Hume, given that Kant's conception of causality in the *CpR* must be understood as a reaction to Hume's sensualism. Consequently, it is appropriate to begin by presenting Sabri's understanding (6) of the epistemologies of both thinkers.

In the next chapter (7), this thesis addresses the question of the epistemological criticisms Sabri formulates against Kant's edifice of thought and how he rejects his approach. This rejection paves the way for Sabri to present his own epistemological system. Hence, in the final chapters (8 and 9), the thesis shows Sabri's positions in contradistinction to Kant (and Hume) on topics directly related to his understanding of causality. This includes inner-worldly causality/secondary causation, the possibility of empirical science, the problem of induction, the possibility of miracles as well as the possibility of scientific metaphysics. Subsequently, the central points of the research will be summarised in the conclusion.

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Islamic Kalam in the Contemporary Philosophical Landscape: A Mustafa Sabri Inspired Approach

Muhammed Rashid AK

This study examines the evolving intersection of Islamic Kalam's theology with the contemporary philosophical landscape, guided by the inspiration of Mustafa Sabri's pivotal contribution. Employing an approach that combines a comprehensive analysis of Mustafa Sabri's works, a critical analysis of contemporary philosophical practice, and an analysis of the developing discourse in Islamic theology, the study aims to be illuminating on the close relationship between Kalam and modern philosophy.

In this context, we emphasize that the theological ideas and methods of Mustafa Sabri deeply shape and inform the contemporary discourse on Kalam's theology. Furthermore, we hypothesize that this influence not only enhances the theological tradition but also provides valuable insights and solutions for contemporary philosophical challenges.

The main objective of this study is to test this hypothesis by critically examining the theological contribution of Mustafa Sabri in the context of its continued relevance to contemporary philosophy and theology. We also aim to identify key areas of intersection between Islamic kalam and contemporary philosophical developments, with a focus on how these intersections can enrich both disciplines. Furthermore, we seek to contribute to the ongoing discourse of religious studies by providing insights into the compatibility of traditional Islamic theology with contemporary philosophical paradigms.

Through this Mustafa Sabri-inspired approach, our research aims to provide empirical evidence and a broader perspective on how Islamic art can develop and thrive in contemporary philosophy, and ultimately, it will underscore the enduring importance of this theological tradition in contemporary global philosophical discourse

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Buti's Critique of Dialectical Materialism: A Reevaluation of Islamic Thought and Marxist Philosophy

Ijaz Peramadathil

This paper presents an in-depth analysis of Saeed Ramadan Buti's critique of dialectical materialism, offering fresh insights into the intellectual dialogue between Islamic theology and Marxist philosophy. Buti's meticulous examination of dialectical materialism reveals not only his profound commitment to Islamic values but also his dedication to fostering meaningful intercultural discussions.

Buti's critique centers on several key aspects of dialectical materialism, including its atheistic foundation, historical determinism, ethical implications, and its philosophical framework rooted in materialism. He passionately argued that these aspects are incongruent with the core tenets of Islamic theology and ethics. In doing so, Buti challenges the compatibility between Marxism, which advocates for a materialistic and revolutionary worldview, and Islamic thought, which places God at the center of the universe and emphasizes moral agency and individual free will.

This paper delves into Buti's writings and speeches, extracting the key arguments and nuances of his critique. By doing so, it seeks to elucidate Buti's position within the broader context of Islamic scholarship and philosophical discourse. Furthermore, it examines the historical and cultural backdrop against which Buti formulated his critique, shedding light on the complex dynamics of ideological confrontation and cooperation.

Through a meticulous exploration of Buti's critique, this paper aims to contribute to the ongoing dialogue between Islamic thought and Marxist philosophy. It offers an opportunity to reevaluate the historical tensions and affinities between these two intellectual traditions, highlighting the potential for mutual understanding and cooperation in addressing contemporary global challenges.

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Epistemic Certainty in Islamic and Western Philosophy: The Relevantization of Kalam Epistemology in Kubr Al-Yaqīniyyāt Al-Kawnīyyah

Abdulla Sinan PT

This article delves into the central theme of elucidating principles that govern the emergence of realities and certainties, as an inquiry into the fundamental nature of knowledge that has been a focal point of contemplation among western and Muslim philosophers for over a century. Recently, Imam Muḥammad Sa'īd Ramaḍān Al-Būṭī's significant work *Kubrā Al-Yaqīniyyāt Al-Kawnīyyah* is gaining scholarly recognition in this domain. In this seminal work, Imam Būṭī introduces a theological criterion to authenticate knowledge and legitimate arguments through the pivotal concept of Universal Certainty (*Yaqīniyyāt Al-Kawnīyyah*). Al-Būṭī posits that the true nature of knowledge cannot be fully apprehended by mere cognitive expeditions. So, the sources of all knowledge may originate from another realm of certainty (*Yaqīniyyā*). And with that, all certainties only derive from truth (*Haqeeqat*). Not from conjectures (*Zanniyyat*). This perspective stands in contrast to the historical characteristics of liberal western metaphysics, which have been deeply rooted in rationalism and empirical inquiry. From this point of view, Al-Būṭī criticises all western ideologies that oppose metaphysical realities.

Through a meticulous analysis of Būṭī's work, this study argues for the "*relevantization*" (a term coined to describe the process of modernization) of kalam epistemology as it has evolved in *Kubrā Al-Yaqīniyyāt* to unravel how Al-Būṭī bridging the gap between traditional islamic theology and contemporary philosophical discourses. Within Al-Būṭī's novel framework, empirical experimentation can substantiate materialistic truths. Aligning with western methodologies. But, when it comes to matters governing metaphysical realities, reductionist scientism lacks a suitable

methodology to incorporate the perspectives of religious and scientific theologians. And this limitation results in a materialistic and nihilistic worldview.

Through this assertion, this paper endeavours to show how theological epistemology deals with the certainty of knowledge while also offering critical insights into western metaphysical thought.

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Genealogy of Hujjatullahil Baligah by Shah Waliyullah of Delhi

Yunus Karuthedath

In this paper, I look into the genealogy of the text *Hujjathullah il baligah* by shah waliyullah of Delhi in Islamic philosophical tradition. "*Hujjatullahil Baligah*," by Shah Waliullah of Delhi (1703-1762), occupies a unique position within the intellectual tradition of *Maqasid al-Shari'a*. This erudite opus artfully treads the analytical path laid out by eminent Islamic philosophers such as *Kindi*, *Farabi*, and *Ibn Sina*, simultaneously maintaining doctrinal fidelity to the *Ash'ari* and *Maturidi* theological networks and the jurisprudential *Hanafi*, *Shafi'i*, *Maliki*, and *Hanbali* schools. Emanating within the Sunni public sphere during the 18th century, subsequent to the critical treatise of al gazali's "*Tahafutul Falasifa*," this work exhibits discernible traces of Neoplatonic influence intertwined with elements of *Advaita* from Indian mystical philosophy. Shah Waliullah's "*Hujjatullahil Baliga*," meticulously categorized within the realm of *Uswuluddin* and *Maqasid al-Shari'a*, transcends disciplinary boundaries by deftly intertwining tenets of *Aqeedah*, Philosophy, and *Tasawwuf*. Its profound insights, harmoniously balancing reason (*aql*) and revelation (*naql*), elicit heightened acceptance within the Sunni public domain, rendering it a magnum opus that bridges the chasm between Islamic thought and practice. Thus, Shah Waliullah's opus emerges as a testament to the seamless continuity of intellectual traditions.

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Blind Reason

Abbas Nemati

Blind Reason is a theory that demonstrates how Islamic philosophy is incapable of transforming the challenge of modernity into a problem or addressing it correctly so that it can reflect upon it and provide solutions accordingly. For a challenge to become a problem, its conceptual representation must be possible, which requires suitable Intelligibles. According to this theory, Islamic philosophy lacks such a possibility. This theory explains that at the beginning of Iranians' challenging confrontation with modernity, Muslim philosophers, due to this insufficiency, either ignored the challenge, meaning it did not become a problem or formulated it as a sectarian problem. In other words, modernity was diminished into a sect, and dealing with it took a theologic form. This lack of Intelligibles was caused by a blockage. This blockage, as this theory argues, was rooted in three related teachings: (1) the doctrine of the platonic realism, (2) the doctrine of the active intellect as a

spontaneous/substantial reason beyond humanity, and (3) the doctrine of the fundamental distinction between immaterial and material beings. On one hand, these three teachings formed the basis for considering the relationship between human reason and intelligibles as exploratory rather than productive, and hence, the human reason could not manipulate and utilize Intelligibles to problematize the challenges of the era. On the other hand, Intelligibles originated from the active intellect as an immaterial and transtemporal finite being, leading to a static scope of Intelligibles (the area of rationalities). The consequence of a fixed range of Intelligibles in the face of a variable range of challenges due to the changing era is the phenomenon of blind reason. Iranian Muslim philosophers took two paths in confronting macro challenges in this situation. First, they ignored the challenge, evident in the intellectual works of this group, which lacked any discussion addressing the challenge or seeking to problematize it. The second path involved the use of outdated Intelligibles to describe and problematize the challenge. This article refrains from addressing the first path and, after explaining the general principles of the theory of blind reason, focuses on three prominent philosophers who followed the second path. In this regard, Aqa Ali Modarres' "Badae' al-Hekam" 1 is discussed first, followed by Muhammad Hussein Tabataba'i's "Principles of Philosophy and the Method of Realism", and finally, Mehdi Haeri Yazdi's "Hierarchy of Being". These examples illustrate how the flawed problem definitions by these philosophers can be explained by the theory of blind reason.

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Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's Method of Tahqīq as a Framework for Contemporary Kalām

Kübra Sümeyye Bahçi

The purpose of this paper is to examine the relevance of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's method of tahqīq for contemporary Kalām. Throughout Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's works, he engages with various philosophers, scholars, and schools of thought. This paper argues that al-Rāzī's method of dealing with theories, both those he rejects and those he accepts but criticises for their inherent weaknesses, has the potential to illuminate a robust framework for modern Kalām. Al-Rāzī's method of tahqīq (critical inquiry) asserts the pursuit of truth alone, irrespective of the originator of a position or the formulation of the argument. In this quest, for the case that the position may be true but not strongly defended, he strengthens the positions of his intellectual opponents with novel arguments not formulated by the proponents themselves. He establishes new connections between issues, laying the groundwork for a systematic and coherent approach to a particular school of thought. Meanwhile, he weakens the arguments formulated by his companions, even though he supports the thesis itself. Thus, he is not only aiming at acceptance of a belief regardless of its reasoning, but also at defending a belief based on strong arguments, which can be seen as a landmark of post-classical Islamic thought. It is noteworthy that al-Rāzī is not pragmatic in defending his positions, because he avoids weak arguments and doesn't hesitate to state openly that an issue has not been fully resolved. In the first part of this paper, al-Rāzī's method of tahqīq is presented according to his own description. Secondly, the method of tahqīq will be illustrated by means of specific examples based on al-Rāzī's works. Finally, the tahqīq method will be applied to the design argument, which has been judged weak in traditional Kalām. However, it may be strengthened in contemporary Kalām due to the weight of modern scientific evidence.

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Harmonizing Reason and Revelation: Contemporary Dialogues in Kalam and Western Philosophy

Muhammed Nazal Nawas

In the landscape of philosophical inquiry, the harmonious synthesis of reason and revelation stands as an intellectual aspiration, inviting discourse and exploration across diverse philosophical traditions. This paper, titled “Harmonizing Reason and Revelation: Contemporary Dialogues in Kalam and Western Philosophy,” endeavors to investigate the potential convergence and productive engagement between Kalam, a branch of Islamic philosophical thought, and Western philosophy. The aim is to elucidate the inherent compatibilities and enriching dialogues that can emerge from a synthesis of these distinct yet interconnected intellectual streams.

Kalam, deeply rooted in Islamic theological discourse, seeks to elucidate and rationalize religious doctrines through reason and logical argumentation. Its foundational principles uphold the importance of both reason (‘aql) and revelation (naql) in shaping a comprehensive worldview. This paper begins by exploring the historical foundations of Kalam, examining its key tenets, and delineating the evolution of Islamic philosophical thought in various historical periods. It then proceeds to analyze contemporary Western philosophical paradigms, emphasizing the significance of reason and empirical inquiry in the Western philosophical tradition.

Furthermore, the paper explores potential points of convergence between Kalam and Western philosophy, focusing on contemporary philosophical dialogues that showcase their shared intellectual objectives. The discussion encompasses ethical considerations, metaphysical inquiries, epistemological stances, and philosophical methodologies. Through this exploration, the paper seeks to elucidate how a harmonious engagement between Kalam and Western philosophy can enrich the discourse and generate new insights in both philosophical realms.

Moreover, the exploration delves into the potential benefits and challenges of bridging these philosophical traditions. It acknowledges the diverse cultural, historical, and methodological differences that necessitate a nuanced approach to facilitate meaningful dialogue. However, it argues that these differences can be a source of mutual enrichment, fostering a greater understanding of the complexities inherent in philosophical inquiries.

In conclusion, this paper advocates for an intellectual synthesis that harmonizes reason and revelation, drawing from the wellspring of Kalam and Western philosophy. By promoting a mutually respectful and fruitful dialogue, we can cultivate a philosophical landscape that transcends boundaries, embracing the plurality of thought and knowledge. The aim is to forge a more comprehensive understanding of the human experience and contribute to a global philosophical discourse that engages with the fundamental questions of existence, ethics, and truth.

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Theologians' Opposition to Existentialism: A Critical Appraisal of 'Al Madhabibu Thawheediyya wal Falsafaathul Muaasara' of Said Ramadan al-bouti

Muhammed Noufal M.K

Existentialism, a significant philosophical doctrine, came to prominence in the 20th century, asserting the primacy of existence over essence. Theologians raised questions about this perspective and its perceived association with atheism, sparking a brief but intense debate between these two ideologies.

In response to this discourse, Dr. Saeed Ramadan Bouti conducted an extensive examination of the subject matter, uncovering the nuances of existentialism's ideological disparities with religion, particularly within the context of Islam. His work, '*Al Madhabibu Thawheediyya wal Falsafaathul Muaasara*' serves as a critical critique of the veiled atheistic elements embedded within existentialism.

This study undertakes a meticulous analysis of Dr. Saeed Ramadan Bouti's ideological framework and briefly draws comparisons with the viewpoints of other contemporary theologians within the realm of philosophical discourse. It aims to shed light on the intricate interplay between existentialism and religious thought, offering valuable insights into the ongoing dialogue between these intellectual currents.

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Imam Al-Ashari's Synthesis Of Rationalism And Traditionalism In Arabic Philosophy

Ahmed Cimak

The paper "Imam al-Ashari's Synthesis of Rationalism and Traditionalism in Arabic Philosophy" examines Imam al-Ashari's contributions to Islamic philosophy and theology. Al Ashari is a well-known philosopher and theologian who lived in the ninth and tenth centuries CE. His theories had a big influence on how Islamic thinking evolved. He provided profound insights into the fundamentals of Islamic theology through his well-known writings, which include *Maqalatul Islamiyyeen*, *Kitab Al luma*, *Al Imana*, and *Risala ila Ahli Sigr*. These works continue to have an impact on modern Islamic thought. He had a lasting influence on Islamic philosophy and theology with his criticism of Greek philosophical ideas and stress on conventional Islamic metaphysical views. Al Ashari's formulation of the Ash'ari creed, which served as a foundation for later theologians and thinkers, highlighted the significance of divine unity and condemned anthropomorphism. Through the synthesis of traditional Islamic theology and rationalism, Imam al-Ashari tried to bridge the Aristotelian philosophy with religious ideology. The viewpoint of Imam al-Ashari on a number of philosophical topics, such as the existence of God, his attributes, free will, predestination, divine words (the Qur'an), epistemology, and theology, is also discussed in the paper. Scholars can learn

more about Al Ashari's significant works and discoveries and his views' continued applicability to modern Islamic thought as well as their contribution to the growth of Islamic philosophy and theology.

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Philosophy of science in the Quran- analysing the diverse approaches on how science can be read in Quran

Luckman Muthuvallur

Describing the scientific findings in Quran is one of the popularised task among all over the Muslims of the world. This come out of the comparison between Quran and science. Quran is not a book of science, but it contains some of the verses which indicates to the scientific facts. The scientific knowledge works as a mean to strengthen the belief of the followers and its divinity. The question 'does Quran contains scientific miracle or scientific truths?' comes from the comparison between Quran and science. The quest for comparison come out of the conclusion that Quran inspires people to think about the creations of god, the universe, the nature and science is the study about the nature. But the comparison between Quran which is absolute truth and science which is constantly changing is impossible. Here the question arises that how Muslim philosophers approached the science and Quran.

The scientific facts in the Holy Quran has been discussed among classical, pre-modern and modern Muslim scholars and philosophers. But they all concluded on divergences of technics. The approach introduced by pre-modern scholars like imam al-Gazzali got acceptance as it gives philosophical background for the scientific reading. But when modern ideologies influenced the Muslim theological and intellectual discourses, the problem became more sophisticated. Scientific interpretation of the religious texts and ideologies got worldwide popularity. Dr. Mourris Bucaille, a French scientist in his book 'The Bible, The Quran and science' explained that Quran is a book of science. It got wide acceptance among Muslims, but, it got academic and scientific criticism from mainstream academicians and scientists. Even the criticism of the interpretations doesn't affect the divinity of the Holy Quran the basic philosophy i.e. scientific interpretation of the verses or scientific miracles should be examined. As a result of this, modern and contemporary Muslim Academicians introduced new approach which is called 'multi-layer and multi-level approach' which is complete negation of the scientific facts in holy Quran.

This paper analyses the philosophy of the scientific reading of the Holy Quran and describe diverse scholarly approaches to the science in the Quran and analyses them critically. This paper also suggests a new approach as it can resolve the holes and answer the criticism philosophically.

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An Inclusive Exclusivist: Mīrzā Mahdī Iṣfahānī on the Diversity of Religious and Mystical Experiences

Amir Mohammad Emami

Religious experiences come in a variety of forms among different traditions with considerable differences. The most notable distinction is between the theistic experience of God as an infinitely perfect personal creator and the non-theistic experiences of the impersonal ultimate reality which is, in a sense, inseparable from the world and other beings. This diversity is considered the main challenge to the epistemic reliability of religious experiences. As a solution, some scholars seek a common core to all religious experiences to regard them as manifestations of the same reality. By rejecting the variety of veridical religious experiences, others insist that only a specific kind is reliable. Nevertheless, neither strategy is straightforward. On the one hand, the assumption of the unity of religious experiences results in neglecting the individual characteristics of each. On the other hand, it is epistemically problematic to prefer some perceptions to others without the epistemic superiority of the preferred experiences. A more promising solution would be to accept the diversity of religious experiences without considering them as perceptions of the same reality. In this way, one can adopt theism without rejecting non-theistic religious experiences by interpreting them as perceptions of entities other than God in a way that is consistent with theism.

This approach was adopted by Mīrzā Mahdī Iṣfahānī, the founder of the Maktab-i Taḥkīk, in dealing with mystical experiences. Iṣfahānī and his followers frequently mention the possibility of perceiving God as the ultimate reality and the creator of the world as a firm basis for theistic belief. Similar to major Islamic theologians, they conceive God as transcendent and distinct from all creatures, which leads them to oppose the pantheistic concept of God, adopted by prominent Islamic mystics who reject the distinction of God from the world. Nevertheless, Iṣfahānī does not deny the validity of mystical experiences entirely to support the classical conception of God. Instead, he assumes such experiences to be perceptions of the “light of existence,” as he calls it. According to Iṣfahānī, the light of existence is the action of God but is mistakenly regarded as divine. The light of existence within his theology is the vast impersonal reality that all the existing creatures possess and receive from God in order to come into being. My aim in this research is to recast Mīrzā Mahdī Iṣfahānī’s view on religious and mystical experiences as an instance of the mentioned approach to solving the problem of religious diversity. Hopefully, this reading will also open up the opportunity for providing similar solutions based on other theologies that include variant religious experiences without refraining from their concept of God by interpreting them consistently.

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Kalam in Late 19th Century and Early 20th Century: A Study of the Prelude to the Dramatic Collapse of Ash'arism

Youssef Madrari

This paper demonstrates that early printing activities in the mid-19th century reaffirmed the dominance of the Ash'arite school; this was the last scene of its dominance. This paper attempts to show that the movement of reviving Islamic classics at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century strengthened the dominance of the Ash'arism in the Islamic world, that printing represented the last shout of its supremacy and sovereignty, and that this sovereignty will begin to crumble due to the spread and development of printing, which will radically change the religious landscape. The paper tries to trace examples of the titles of printed books in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century in the Islamic world or in the west. Even orientalist heritage publications were dominated by Ash'arite texts because they were the ones that prevailed in the Islamic world. We also try to show that the dissemination of the Ash'arite heritage in the beginning was not supported by any revivalist idea other than making the texts available to school students.

In order to try to give a preliminary historical narrative of that a dramatic change, I made a set of hypotheses that I will establish arguments on. The first hypothesis: Since the end of the 19th century, the Salafi movement has made unremitting efforts to intensifying work on specific scholarly texts. The second hypothesis, by which we explain the disappearance of the Ash'ari texts and the limited influence of them, is the judgments issued by the Arab Reformists against the Sunni Ash'ari school, which lost its vigor and activity due to the great reputation of the Arab Reformists in the Islamic world

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Eternal Recurrence as Delusion: An analytical study of Alethia corresponding Transcendence and Immanence

Lukman

This paper undertakes a rigorous examination of the intricate concept of eternal recurrence, seeking to elucidate its profound existential implications through a meticulous analytical lens. It navigates the intricate interplay between Alethia, denoting truth and disclosure in Greek philosophy, and the philosophical constructs of transcendence and immanence, thereby introducing layers of intricacy to this philosophical inquiry and scrutinizing the transparency of eternal return. Eternal recurrence, as articulated by the renowned philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, posits the perpetual cyclic nature of existence, wherein every moment is destined for infinite repetition. Nevertheless, this paper

provocatively challenges this postulation, casting eternal recurrence as a potentially deceptive illusion rather than an immutable verity, simultaneously critically probing the theologies supporting eternal return like Vaishnavite Eschatology. The integration of Alethia into the discourse invites an exploration of whether the repetitive nature of existence unveils a deeper truth or remains ensconced within the realm of illusory constructs, scanning the revivals by Martin Hiedegger . This investigation ventures into the profound philosophical, existential, and metaphysical facets of truth and repetition, traversing the boundaries of conventional wisdom, therewith attempting its correspondence to transcendence and immanence, to fix the legitimacy of one of the two inherently contrasting concepts. For sake of that, the paper adroitly employs the ontological juxtaposition of transcendence and immanence. In this intellectual endeavour, the paper meticulously dissects how these ontological paradigms interact with the enigmatic concept of eternal recurrence, thereby invoking profound inquiries into the very nature of existence and the elusive boundaries of reality. In doing so, the analytical approach adopted herein involves a scrupulous deconstruction of the underpinning arguments supporting the notion of eternal recurrence delving into the profound psychological, ethical, and existential ramifications that ensue from the acceptance of such a cyclic worldview and posing the question of whether eternal recurrence can withstand the rigors of logical examination or succumbs to the weight of its inherent paradoxical implications. Elaborating the Islamic philosophical views of transcendence and immanence specially focusing on the views of Abd Al-Karim Al-Jili, the study depicts the eternal recurrence as a delusion rather than a doubtful philosophical illusion critically dealing with Stoicism and Pythagoreanism. Moreover, this scholarly inquiry delves into the rich tapestry of cultural and historical contexts that exerted the superiorization of either transcendence or immanence that essentially support the infinite regress which has been substantially proved invalid, thereby justifying the eternal return. In summation, this erudite exposition boldly challenges the prevailing consensus regarding eternal recurrence, positioning it not as an incontrovertible truth but as a potentially beguiling delusion. By invoking the philosophical elements of Alethia in light of transcendence, and immanence, it embarks on a profound and intellectually stimulating odyssey to dissect the very essence of existence and the authenticity of Nietzsche's hypothesis of eternal recurrence that is discerned whether it signifies a mere illusion or a profound revelation concerning the human condition.

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Muslim World: Kalam Theology and Political Theology

Muzaffar Ali

This paper investigates the dynamic interplay between Kalam theology and political theology within contemporary Muslim-majority countries. Kalam theology, a distinctive theological and philosophical tradition within Islam, profoundly impacts the intersection of religion and politics in societies where Islam holds a central role in public life. Thus, Considering evolving political landscapes and ongoing discourse surrounding the relationship between religion and governance, this research delves into the influence of Kalam theology on contemporary discussions of political theology and governance. It explores how Kalam theology shapes the conceptualization of political authority, the interpretation of religious principles in the public sphere, and the understanding of religion's role in politics.

The study conducts an in-depth analysis of key Kalam theological concepts and their relevance to contemporary political thought. It also assesses the impact of Kalam-derived principles on political decision-making, state structures, and the formulation of public policies in diverse Muslim-majority contexts. Particular emphasis is placed on examining the tensions and synergies between theocratic ideals and secular governance, with a specific focus on addressing challenges related to human rights, pluralism, and religious freedom.

By critically evaluating the contemporary significance of Kalam theology in the domain of political theology and governance, this study contributes to a nuanced comprehension of the intricate relationship between religion and politics in the Muslim world. It illuminates the intricate ways in which theological traditions continue to shape and influence political ideologies, statecraft, and the broader socio-political landscape in Muslim-majority countries.

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Being and Time: A Novel Version of the Kalam Cosmological Argument

Ramon Harvey & David Solomon Jalajel

Arguments of natural theology are one of the popular areas of debate within contemporary philosophy of religion. Notably, perhaps the most widely discussed argument of the last half-century, the Kalam Cosmological Argument (KCA), draws inspiration from the Islamic theological tradition. This argument, which was given its modern form by William Lane Craig (1979), has received both criticism and defence within the literature, with pressure placed on its premise that things that “begin to exist” have a cause, and that the universe as whole must be a thing that “began to exist”. Even when authors, such as Andrew Loke (2017, 2022), have sought to overcome typical lines of objection, they have usually retained Craig’s core syllogism, with the notion of the world’s origination considered essential to identifying the Kalam variety of cosmological arguments.

In this paper, we develop a novel version of the KCA, which is also inspired by debates within Islamic theology. Retaining the centrality of the world’s origination but arriving at a distinctly nondurational concept of divine timelessness, we avoid the kinds of objections that can be put forward to the two main premises of Craig’s KCA. The result, we propose, is a powerful argument for a truly timeless conception of a unique Necessary Being creating an originated world.

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Ashraf 'Ali Thanwī's (d. 1943) Text al-Intibāhāt al-Mufīda

Safaruk Chowdhury

The Western-European colonial project under modernity to the Muslims lands brought intellectual challenges to cornerstone doctrines of the Islamic worldview ('aqīda). These challenges ranged from hermeneutical to the philosophical and scientific. Muslim scholars in particular engaged with modernity primarily as a threat to Muslim confidence in the Islamic 'aqīda as a coherent and cogent account of human beings, life and the universe. One way of ensuring a defence of this 'aqīda was using the rationalist dialectical method of theology known as 'kalām'. The application of kalām as an apologetic tool addressing newly emerging threats from colonial modernity that began in the latter half of the 19th century and carried into the first half of 20th century is often referred to as "novo kalām" (kalām jadīd). One eminent figure from north India and major spiritual and scholarly representative of renown religious seminary Dār al-Ulūm Deoband Mawlānā Ashraf 'Alī Thanwī (d. 1943) undertook a project of kalām jadīd to neutralise newly emergent doubts about Islamic doctrines and beliefs. This paper will examine Mawlāna Thanwī's small text al-Intibāhāt al-Mufīda 'an al-Ishtibāhāt al-Jadīda as an exemplar of this apologetic enterprise underpinning kalām jadīd. The outline of the paper is as follows: a contextualisation of the text al-Intibāhāt, a summary of its aim and structure, the cluster of modernist contentions it addresses and the theological, metaphysical and epistemological principles it presupposes to respond to these contentions. Finally, the paper will conclude with reflections on Mawlāna Thanwī's method and approach in al-Intibāhāt and evaluate its overall cogency as a project of kalām jadīd.

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Islam And Artificial Intelligence: Islamization Proposal

Nuruddin Al Akbar

This study was inspired by discussions about Islam and Artificial Intelligence, which Hamza Yusuf, Muzaffar Iqbal, and Osman Bakar discussed. This study assumes that Hamza Yusuf and Muzaffar Iqbal tend to take a more skeptical position towards the development of AI. On the other hand, Osman Bakar tends to respond more positively to AI developments, although he also continues to develop a critical attitude towards this phenomenon. This study is more consistent with Osman Bakar's position than Hamza Yusuf and Muzaffar Iqbal. The reason is that the arguments raised by Yusuf and Iqbal do not seem to touch the core of the problem. Yusuf, for example, criticizes the idea of progress, which is considered inevitable. He tries to counter this argument by presenting several historical facts about several countries in various world civilizations that attempted to stem the emergence of new technology. However, Yusuf's argument is weak because the government that refused finally affirmed this new technology. In other words, Yusuf's idea will be easy to criticize

because progress remains unstoppable. The same weakness can also be seen in Iqbal's argument, where Iqbal takes issue with the term AI, which, according to him, is metaphysically problematic because only humans have intelligence, not machines. Using the word AI will encourage human dehumanization and exaltation of machines above humans. Although this criticism is interesting, Iqbal does not offer an alternative term for calling AI.

In contrast to Yusuf and Iqbal, Osman Bakar attempts to build a more detailed critique of AI in terms of metaphysical and non-metaphysical dimensions. Regarding the metaphysical dimension, Osman Bakar stated that Natural/Human Intelligence (NI), which is the AI model, has experienced such a reduction due to the secularization process. According to Osman Bakar, in Islamic intellectual discourse, NI is not only related to cerebral intelligence but also cardiac and intuitive intelligence. However, Osman Bakar still gives a positive appreciation for the development of AI in imitating the brain's work in a theoretical framework because this work aligns with human natural curiosity to know his nature. According to Osman Bakar, what is more problematic is related to the non-metaphysical dimensions, namely, the socio-political dimensions behind technological development. For Osman Bakar, it appears that the development of AI is still dominated by the economic desires of capitalism and the politics of Western countries such as the US, which wants to advance its military with the help of AI. On the other hand, the social dimension of AI does not get discussed at all. At this point, Osman Bakar criticizes that AI will endanger human civilization if the social dimension is lost.

This study wants to continue Osman Bakar's thesis based on the perennial philosophy slogan "as above, so below." This slogan means that the reality outside oneself reflects the fact within humans. Because AI reflects secularized NI, the problem with AI lies in what it reflects. It can be said that with the loss of the sacred dimension of the concept of human intelligence, the dimension of rationality remains. This rationality is increasingly reduced to mere instrumental rationality, which makes entities outside themselves objects. When reflected in AI, this kind of NI will also produce destructive AI, just as secular NI is dangerous. So, the solution to the AI problem is the need to carry out an Islamization process of the NI concept, so the implication is that when NI becomes a model for AI development, it will create AI that can encourage users to carry out deep thinking processes rather than accelerating their instrumental thinking.

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AI and Free Will: Ash'arite and Māturīdite Kalām Perspectives

Nazif Muhtaroglu

This presentation explores the implications of Artificial Intelligence (AI), focusing on the potential of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and Strong Artificial Intelligence (SAI) to simulate or replicate the human mind focusing on its aspect of will. It addresses the pressing need for diverse perspectives in managing AI's impact on humanity's future. I introduce a philosophical-theological viewpoint on AI, specifically through Islamic kalām, particularly Ash'arism and Māturīdism.

I analyze the compatibility of AI's algorithmic nature with concepts of free will in these schools. I argue that Māturīdism views SAI as a metaphysical impossibility due to the incompatibility between SAI and the human will, Ash'arism finds no conflict between SAI and human will. I will analyze these differing stances and their implications for understanding AI's potential and limits.

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The Traditional Islamic Sciences as Philosophical Inquiry: Ḥadīth Sciences as a Case Study

Mohammed Tayssir Safi

I argue in this paper that the traditional Islamic sciences are best understood as a type of philosophical inquiry. This can be characterized as a metaphilosophical investigation and claim. By investigating the scope and methods of contemporary philosophy and comparing them with the traditional Islamic sciences, I find that despite differences, there is considerable overlap. Furthermore, I argue that the differences in the actual topics investigated, questions considered, methods employed, and views espoused do not render the Islamic tradition non-philosophical since these particulars are not essential to philosophy.

After this initial metaphilosophical analysis and comparison, I focus on the specific case of Ḥadīth Studies. In this section, I show how Ḥadīth Studies falls within the metaphilosophical parameters outlined previously. Not only does Ḥadīth Studies fall within the broad scope and methods of philosophical inquiry but I also show how it is relevant to contemporary anglophone philosophy. By tying what is often considered the least rational of the Islamic Sciences to contemporary anglophone epistemology, I am able to show the fruitfulness of this approach.

Finally, I use these findings to address several points of contention in the greater Islamic Studies discourse. The first point concerns the most fruitful path forward for a robust engagement with contemporary philosophy. The second point concerns the ongoing debate over whether kalām is a type of philosophy. The third and final point concerns various pedagogical approaches to teaching Islamic studies.

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Ethics as Islamic Philosophy: An Overview of Ṭaṣkōprüzāde's Commentary on the Virtue Ethics of 'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī

Feryal Elif Salem

Studies in Islamic philosophy often overlook the dimension of moral philosophy as it developed within the Islamic context. The ethics of 'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī is a work that has had a foundational impact on transforming and developing the field of virtue ethics. The origins of this text can be

traced back to Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics. Through its incorporation into Islamic moral philosophy, we find it transforms into a significantly altered version that is exclusively Islamic in its framework and contents. The long tradition of moral philosophy was originally translated by Yaḥyā b. ‘Adī and was later adopted into the Islamic tradition by Miskawayh and then Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī.

Later when Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī wrote an abridged version of this tradition of moral philosophy he himself inherited from Tūsī, it was assumed by some modern writers that Ījī’s ethics did not add anything novel to previous discussions of virtue ethics. But what resulted with the writings of al-Ījī was quite the opposite. The abridged version of Tūsī’s ethics allowed for it to be used in the vast madrasa networks of the Ilkhānids and Ottomans. It also made it necessary that the text be studied with a teacher who could contextualize, expand on, and humanize its contents. Finally, it led to a flowering of commentaries written on these ethics that became prevalent in the Sunni world at the time. One key commentary on Ījī’s ethics is that of the Ottoman polymath, Ṭaṣköprüzāde. This presentation will give a brief overview of the contents and structure of Islamic moral philosophy as presented in the commentary of Ṭaṣköprüzāde on the ethics of Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī

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Typologizing Taḥqīq: Illustrating the Multifaceted ‘Acts’ of Verification in the al-‘Aqā’id al-‘Aḍudiyyah Literature

Yusuf Sulaiman

Taḥqīq, or ‘verification,’ in the field of kalām is the process of rigorously scrutinizing theologians’ conclusions, ensuring that their conclusions are reflective of and in accordance with a larger philosophical, creedal framework and with reality (ḥaqīqah or nafs al-amr). The exact entailments of what compromises taḥqīq, its different modes of application in diverse geographical and historical contexts, and its multifaceted connotations have left taḥqīq as a somewhat obscure and, undoubtedly, complex term. Current scholarship has made significant strides in deciphering the elusive taḥqīq in the works of Asad Ahmed, Robert Wisnovsky, and Khaled El-Rouayheb. Building on their insights, this paper further advances the understanding of taḥqīq through a specific examination of its practice in the post-classical kalām tradition, focusing on the al-‘Aqā’id al-‘Aḍudiyyah and its surrounding literature. The main text of study is Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī’s (d. 908/1502) commentary, along with two glosses by late Mughal and Ottoman ‘verifiers’ (muḥaqqiqūn), respectively, al-Fāḍil ‘Abd al-Ḥakīm al-Siyālkūṭī (d. 1067/1657) and al-Fāḍil Ismā‘īl al-Gelenbevī (d. 1206/1791). Additionally, for further context and comprehensiveness, three other authors who have glossed on Dawānī will be consulted: Ḥusayn al-Husaynī al-Khalkhālī (d. 1014/1604), ‘Abdullah b. Ḥasan al-Kānqirī (d. 1239/1824), and Shihāb al-Dīn al-Marjānī (d. 1306/1889)—may Allah’s mercy envelop them all. From these works, this paper analyzes two contentious issues as case studies to further expand current scholarship on taḥqīq: 1) the ontological relationship between God and his Attributes and 2) God’s volition. Through the process of this investigation, the paper introduces a comprehensive typology of taḥqīq, comprising fourteen distinct practices and functions of verification, or what this paper terms as ‘acts.’ This paper demonstrates these categories from the source text and its commentaries, offering a nuanced exploration of taḥqīq

in late kalām scholarship, thereby shedding light on the practices of the ‘verifiers.’ Accordingly, this paper argues that taḥqīq entails these fourteen acts, constituting the criteria by which one earns the title of ‘muḥaqqiq’.

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Can we Mend the Divide between Shaykh Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī and the Akbarī School? - Al-Tirmidhī’s
Analogy of the Mirror and its Implications for the Debate around waḥdat al-wujūd

Aiyub Palmer

Shaykh Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī (d. 1954 CE) is probably the best representative in the 20th century of a Kalām response to the various ideological movements both within and without Islam that were challenging normative Islamic theological traditions in light of modernity. In this way, we can see Shaykh Muṣṭafā as following in the footsteps of Imām Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) CE who wrote numerous works in which he exposed the heterodox beliefs of both the Falāsifa and the Ismā‘īlīs during his time. In Shaykh Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī’s work *Mawqif al-‘aql wa al-‘ilm wa al-‘ālam min rabb al-‘ālamīn wa ‘ibādihī al-mursalīn*, he addresses the Akbarī school and the notion of *waḥdat al-wujūd* (the unity of existence) in particular as a doctrine that runs contrary to the ‘aql and to normative Islamic belief. He is careful not to impugn *taṣawwuf* in general, but rather addresses what he sees as Hellenistic philosophical notions parading in Islamic garb. For Shaykh Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī, when Ṣūfīs make statements that address categories within Kalām and philosophy, he rightly feels justified in addressing what he sees as excesses. The discussion around *waḥdat al-wujūd* in Muṣṭafā Ṣabrī’s work revolves in part around the analogy of the mirror as it is used in the Akbarī school to describe the nature of the world in relation to God. Ibn al-‘Arabī (d. 1240 CE) is not the only Muslim theologian to use the mirror as an analogy. Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. circa 905-912 CE) also describes the nature of the world in relation to God using two mirrors, although differently than Ibn al-‘Arabī. However, al-Tirmidhī’s use of the mirror analogy helps us situate the way analogy may be understood in the context of the heart as the vehicle through which the human being both witnesses God and understands the variegated nature of the cosmos. Through this view of the heart, we propose a vantage point through which the Kalām tradition might better appreciate the place of *waḥdat al-wujūd* in Ṣūfī metaphysics.

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Kalam before and after Sabri: The Inseparability of Kalam and Philosophy

Kamal Shlbei

This paper shows how Sabri can be taken as the last historical stage of Kalam in terms of its vital relationship to philosophy. My argument is based on the analysis that I make on the scientific characteristics of Mutakallimūn in general. The horizon of this paper is historical. I stop at the most important historical moments in the history of Kalam that constitute its essential element in relation

to philosophy. I investigate the primary characteristic that each mutukallim must have in order to be a mutukallim. I find that the main characteristic of the Mutakallimūn is that they are very religious yet very intellectual. They extensively dealt with philosophy. Faith and reason go side by side. The deep understating of philosophy is a primary condition for Mutakallimūn. It was originally because of its intellectual characteristics that Kalam got its specific name in Islamic sciences. Kalam as intelligent science was used as a tool to defend the main rules of faith (God Nature Man).

When we apply this main historical characteristic role of the Mutakallimūn on Sabari, we find that it fits him very well. In his books, he proved to be a real mutukallim by providing a high understanding of the main philosophers of ancient, modern, and contemporary philosophy. He read them with high respect for reason and logic, and he agreed and disagreed with them. This historical scientific link between theology and philosophy in Kalam as finally represented in Sabri no longer exists. In the academic departments of Islamic universities, theology and philosophy are no longer one field of investigation - as is the case in Kalam before Sabri. The main question of my paper is how can Kalam be rethought in terms of its vital relationship to philosophy?

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Reason and Mysticism in al-Munqidh min al-Dalal and Hayy ibn Yaqzan

Hikmat Jamal

Al-Ghazali's Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal re-evaluates the role of reason in relation to mystical knowledge. His intellectual crisis is resolved by the "light of God" and confirms the limits of reason in certain domains. For al-Ghazali, beatific dhawq, or mystical experience acts as a judge of the rational sciences like metaphysics, cosmology, and the natural sciences. Ibn Tufayl's novel Hayy ibn Yaqzan also evaluates the role of reason through the story of a lone boy that is born and grows up on an island. Similarly, reason is under the tutelage of mystical truths. However, the intellectual journey of the protagonist in the novel, from brute sciences to metaphysics to direct knowledge of God suggests a slightly different picture. I argue that the progression in the novel highlights the necessity of the rational sciences, such as theology and philosophy, for mystical experience. This raises a problem: how can reason be required for mystical truths if mystical truths are what judges reason? I suggest two possible responses for Ibn Tufayl and assess their viability.

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Argument of Siddiqin Mulla Sadra: The pinnacle of Islamic philosophy in proving the existence of God without prerequisites

Mohammad Meftah

This article embarks on a descriptive and text-based journey to dissect the foundations of this argument, highlighting its unique features and positioning it as a compelling and distinct approach to proving God's existence in the context of Islamic philosophy. The Seddiqin Argument, elaborated by Mulla Sadra, a luminary in the realm of Islamic philosophy, celebrated as one of the most eminent proofs of God's existence among Muslim philosophers, challenges the conventional norms

of philosophical discourse by transcending complex metaphysical constructs. While many classical proofs of God's existence rely on intricate philosophical premises and logical deductions, Mulla Sadra's approach offers a refreshing departure by emphasizing intuitive knowledge. At the heart of the Seddiqin Argument are several foundational principles: 1. "Existence as the Primordial Reality:" Mulla Sadra posits the primacy of existence over essence, contending that existence is the primary and most fundamental aspect of reality. All entities derive their identity from their existence rather than their essence. This ontological shift serves as the cornerstone for Sadra's philosophy. 2. "Necessary Existent (Wajib al-Wujud):" Relying on the originality and reality of existence, Sadra proves the existence of "necessary existence" - a being whose existence is self-sufficient and does not depend on anything else. He argues that this Necessary being is none other than God, the ultimate source of all existence. The most important point in Seddiqin's argument is that Contingent being is not used to prove the existence of wajib al-wuhud rather he uses the principle of existence to prove Wajib al-Wuhud. 3. "The Seddiqin's argument:" Sadra introduces the concept of the Seddiqin, individuals who attain direct, unmediated knowledge of God's existence through mystical experiences and inner illumination. In contrast to conventional proofs of God's existence, which require a rigorous philosophical foundation, the Seddiqin Argument offers a more accessible and immediate path to the Divine. It bridges the gap between philosophy and mysticism, aligning with the broader Islamic mystical traditions that venerate direct mystical experiences as a means of encountering divine truths. In this article it will be described that, Mulla Sadra's Seddiqin Argument is a remarkable achievement in the realm of Islamic philosophy, offering a compelling and distinct approach to proving God's existence without the need for extensive philosophical prerequisites. Its emphasis on rational and intuitive knowledge, as well as its inclusivity, renders it a potent tool for those who aspire to bridge the gap between rationality and mysticism in their quest to explore profound metaphysical questions. This article underscores the foundational principles of the Seddiqin Argument and highlights its pivotal role in the rich tapestry of Islamic philosophical thought.

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The method of abstraction and realization of the concept of existence (From the perspective of Sadra's philosophy)

Meysam Azizian Mosleh

The way of abstracting the concept of existence is one of the topics that have been the focus of Muslim thinkers in recent epistemology and by the way, there are considerable opinions about this among the early Islamic philosophers.

Among Muslim philosophers, there are generally two views on this matter: firstly, the concept of existence is a rational consideration; This means that the concept of existence is the result of the activity of the intellect; Even with the assumption of accepting the principality of existence. Abdul Razzaq Lahiji in the book »Gohar Murad« and Misbah Yazdi in the book »Teaching Philosophy« and also Allameh Tabatabai in the book »principles of philosophy and the method of realism « believe in this opinion According to the second view, it is a factual concept; That is, the concept of existence has been abstracted from immediate knowledge to real existence (unity of knowing subject with objective reality). This view belongs to Mulla Sadra as well as Allameh Tabatabai in the book »Nahayeh al-Hikma«.

The purpose of this article is to investigate these two views and prove the second view. According to the second point of view: First of all, it is possible to have an immediate knowledge to real existence, and the concept of existence is abstracted from this knowledge. Secondly, the origin of this abstraction, as well as the basis of the adaptation of the concept of existence to real existence, is not the consideration of real existence in a special way (Abdol Razzaq Lahiji and Misbah Yazdi's point of view) and not a mental act called »judgment« (Allameh Tabatabai in the Principles of Philosophy), Rather, its origin is the priori immediate knowledge of the »self-aware soul« to real existence. Finally, we have also mentioned the fruits of the chosen view.

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Marjānī's (1818-1889) Synthesis of Kalam and Falsafa: The Concept of Hudūth

Ayse Betul Donmez Tekin

In post-classical Islamic theology, the concepts of Kadīm (Eternal) and Wājib (Necessary) became synonymous. However, the discussion on the concept of *hudūth* (origination) continued until the modern times. Philosophers divided the origination into two: essential and temporal. According to theologians the origination is only temporal. Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī (1426-1502) mentions this problem in his commentary on al-Ijī's (d. 756/1355) '*Aqā'id al-Adudiyya*. According to Dawānī, the world is originated, therefore he criticizes the philosophers who claim that the universe is eternal. This issue was elaborated in the glosses of Dawānī's commentary which is known as *Jalāl*. In the nineteenth century the Māturīdī theologian Shihāb al-Dīn al-Marjānī (1818–89) asserted a different definition for the concept of origination and eternal in his gloss (*hashiya*). Trying to solve conflicting meanings Marjānī defined the eternal as that which does not emanate from another. On the other hand, the origination is the emanation of the world with all of its parts from God through His will. He thinks that he does not oppose to the philosophers in this sense. The paper will focus on the critique of Marjānī on Dawānī's discussion of origination and eternity.

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The Status of Scientific Theories as Instruments: A Sunnī Epistemological Investigation

Amana Raquib, Marium Ezam Qazi, and Talha Moosani

This paper seeks to argue that out of two central positions within the contemporary philosophy of science tradition, Scientific Realism (SR) and Instrumentalism, Instrumentalism is the one that can be appropriated from within the Sunnī theological-epistemic framework to arrive at a theological position about the status of scientific knowledge. Within the Sunnī theological understanding of knowledge and its hierarchy, '*ilm qat'i*' (certain knowledge) is defined in contradistinction to *ẓann* (probabilistic knowledge). Whereas *ẓann* (probabilistic knowledge) has room for doubt, there is no such room in '*ilm qat'i*' which has *yaqīn* (absolute certainty). Using this understanding, scientific knowledge cannot count as certain source of knowledge¹ since it is always *ẓannī* and never *yaqīnī* (certain)- this claim has been substantiated by the history and philosophy of science. Scientific knowledge is '*ilm*' only in a metaphorical sense; in reality, a "*fann*" (art) or *alab* (instrument) for

explaining, predicting and problem solving. The only types of knowledge that are capable of becoming theological evidence are: knowledge gained directly from *wahī* (revelation); from the five senses/*ḥawās*; from *mutawātir* reports; or from self-evident deductions of reason. Prominent scholars from the Sunnī tradition are generally in agreement over this definition of knowledge. It will also survey some pre-modern Muslim Scientists and this understanding of “theories as instruments” seems to be implicit in their approach to science.

The Sunnī theological framework does not need to affirm the ontological status of scientific theories, models and entities. Epistemologically, instrumentalism doesn’t claim absolute accuracy in reaching Truth nor aim to represent Reality. It allows for the metaphysical realism found in Sunnī theology without entailing scientific realism. Since only *‘ilm qat’i* (certain or conclusive knowledge) counts as proof (*burhān*) in Sunnī theological (*kalām*) claims, scientific knowledge cannot be beneficial for a purely theological pursuit such as knowing and appreciating divine attributes.

* * *

Postclassical Islamic Philosophical Debates on Essential Accidents

Kenan Tekin

In this paper, I will look at postclassical debates on essential (*per se*) accidents. Although the topic of essential accidents was treated in the books of demonstration which were concerned with the theory of science, during the postclassical period preliminary introductions of handbooks in logic spawned debates on aspects of the theory of science including them. Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī’s (d. 675/1276–77) *al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya* provides a case in point. The prolegomenon of this treatise was divided into two sections. In the first section, Kātibī introduces logic by mentioning its purposes and definition. In the second section, concerning the subject matter of logic, Kātibī first describes what a subject matter is and then identifies the subject matter of logic. For our purposes in this paper, his description of subject matter is significant as it led to debates on essential accidents. Kātibī defined the subject matter of a science as the thing whose accidents that inhere to it for what it is that is to say for its essence, or the thing equal to it, or its part, are investigated in the science. This somewhat vague presentation led to an important debate on the essential accidents owing to Quṭb al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s (d. 766/1365) interpretation of the topic. Quṭb al-Dīn took care in determining what kind of accidents are essential and which are not. After presenting Quṭb al-Dīn’s interpretation of Kātibī’s remarks on the issue, I will look at other commentaries of the text or glosses on Quṭb al-Dīn’s commentary including those by Nāsir al-Dīn al-Qāshānī (d. 755/1354), Mirak al-Bukhārī (fl. 733/1332), Sa’d al-Dīn al-Taftāzānī (d. 792/1390), al-Sayyid al-Sharīf al-Jurjānī (d. 816/1413) and Dāwūd al-Khawāfī (fl. 839/1465), among others. The paper will show a divergence between the classical and postclassical Islamic philosophers’ understanding of essential accidents. By bringing to the fore the debate on essential accidents, we can better understand Islamic philosophy of science.

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Ismail al-Gelenbevi's (d. 1791) Modal Metaphysics and the Problem of Nomological Claims about Nature (Laws of Nature)

Ahmed Abdel Meguid

The development of modal logic, metaphysics and epistemology from the pre-Avicenna period of early Islamic philosophical theology (*kalām*) through the post-Avicenna late classical and post-classical periods is one of the key contributions of the Muslim Intellectual tradition. The importance of this contribution has been stressed by scholars of Islamic philosophy like Nicholas Rescher, Robert Wisnovsky, Khaled al-Rouayheb, Tony Street and even classicists like Charles Kahn. However, Islamic modal thought remains largely understudied. This study responds to this scholarly lacuna focusing on the modal logic and metaphysics of the prominent Ottoman mathematician, logician and philosopher Ismail al-Gelenbevi (d. 1791), focusing on the implications of his system to epistemic and ontological conditions of laws of nature. The first part of the paper focuses on the foundation of al-Gelenbevi's modal system in his major work on modality, *Risālat al-Imkān* (A Treatise on Modality). In this vein, the paper will highlight al-Gelenbevi's critical development of the modal operators (*al-muwajjihāt almanṭiqiyya*) in the logic of Najm al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 1277), Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1365 C.E.) and Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī (d. 1283) as the key post-classical thinkers who expanded Avicenna's and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's (d. 1210) conception of modal operators. Further the discussion examines the implications of al-Gelenbevi's modal system for his understanding of the metaphysical foundations of nature synthetically correlating *Risālat al-Imkān* with selected positions from his gloss (*ḥashiya*) on Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī's (d.1512) commentary (*sharḥ*) on the 'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī's (d. 1355) magnum opus, *al-Mawāqif*. The discussion will focus on al-Gelenbevi's reconceptualization of *possibilia* (*al-mumkināt*), the relation between them and the necessary existent and the implication of this relation to two main concepts: actuality and causation. The second part of the paper further examines the results of the first part, responding to two fundamental questions: 1. is al-Gelenbevi's system of metaphysics a modally realist or a modally idealist system?; 2. what conception does al-Gelenbevi have of natural laws? Is it an empiricist, localized conception that is more in line with Humean supervenience or a more conceptualist position that has Kantian and/or Platonic constructivist inclinations?

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Avicenna's Philosophy of Beauty: Criteria, Classification, and Aesthetic Perception

Maryam Kheradmand

This research paper delves into Avicenna's views on beauty and the related topics discussed in aesthetics. The primary objective is to explore the criteria of beauty as expounded in Avicenna's philosophy. Avicenna's direct engagement with the concept of beauty occurs within his description of the beauty of God, notably highlighted in *Kitāb al-shifā'*. Here, Avicenna identifies four criteria that render an intellectual being beautiful, subsequently substantiating the beauty of God. Furthermore, Avicenna's treatises of love reveal his assertion that humans and animals are naturally drawn to entities possessing the properties of *Hosn-enazm* (good order), *Hosn-e-ta'lif* (beautiful

composition), and e'tedāl (harmony). In his work, *Jawamī 'Ilm al-Musīqī*, Avicenna further argues that Etefāq (pleasure of the soul) serves as the criterion for judging beautiful music.

This research paper seeks to address the following queries pertaining to Avicenna's philosophy of beauty: What are the specific criteria of beauty in Avicenna's philosophy? How can they be classified? How do these criteria interact with individuals' perception and judgment of beauty in various objects? The paper is structured into three key sections: an exploration of the definition of beauty, an introduction to Avicenna's criteria of beauty as elucidated in his treatises, and a discussion on how these criteria manifest themselves within objects and are perceived by individuals. Ultimately, the paper concludes by highlighting how Avicenna's philosophical ideas pave the way for a distinct approach to Islamic art.

The findings of this study reveal that in Avicenna's numerous discussions on the beauty of things, he does not attempt to present a straightforward definition of beauty. However, when describing the beauty of objects, he identifies specific criteria that, when possessed by entities, classify them as beautiful. To truly comprehend the concept of beauty, it is crucial to differentiate between the criteria of beauty in the intellectual realm and those that bestow beauty upon natural phenomena. In the realm of nature, the criteria of beauty can be viewed as aesthetic properties that engage and inspire viewers to contemplate the beauty inherent in objects. Additionally, Avicenna describes certain properties as avenues through which objects appear, with an emphasis on how these properties evoke passion and joy in the audience. Consequently, the criteria of beauty can be categorized into two types: manifest-appearing properties (pertaining to the visual and auditory aspects of objects) and response-dependent (perceiver-dispositional) properties. This division raises the notion that Avicenna believes in the interplay between an object's possession of criteria of beauty and its ability to elicit distinct responses from individuals with diverse cultural backgrounds.

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Avicenna and the Meaning of Logic: Revisiting Five Major Works

Shahab Khademi

Avicenna's logic has gathered much interest in recent decades. This has covered different aspects of Avicenna's logical system, from the five predicables, over the categorical propositions and their opposites, to (modal) syllogisms and their formalizations and axiomatizations. These have all been investigated to explain and understand Avicenna's logic to the fullest extent possible. However, one significant point that has hitherto been frequently neglected (and hence has cast a shadow on all the above-mentioned efforts) is what logic meant to Avicenna in the first place. If one fails to clarify this important notion, it would be hard to fully grasp the overall structure of Avicenna's logical system. Considering this issue, the aim in this paper will be to give a clear account of what logic means to Avicenna. This will be done by focusing on the logical sections of five of his comprehensive works, namely, the *Kitāb al-Madḥal* (of *the Kitāb al-Šifā'*, the Cure), *an-Najāt (the Salvation)*, *Dānešnāme-ye 'Alā'ī* (*Philosophy for 'Alā'-ad-Dawla*), *al-Mašriqiyyūn* (the Easterners), and *al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbihāt* (Pointers and Reminders). The reason for choosing these four works is fourfold, namely, logico-philosophical, linguistic, chronological, and diversity of intended audience (which will be explained in detail in the paper).

The paper will first focus on the passages in which Avicenna explicitly discusses the nature of logic and what this means to him. It will then analyze each account (from each of the aforementioned works) by discussing three fundamental elements which Avicenna links to the notion of logic, i.e., its status, its definition, and its goal. This will provide a sufficient context to grasp what exactly Avicenna means by logic in each work. Finally, it will compare the accounts of logic introduced in the five works (which are classified according to the three significant elements mentioned above), in an attempt to find the meaning(s) of logic for Avicenna. This will cast new light on previous scholarship on Avicenna's logic, by clarifying the true nature of logic as meant by Avicenna.

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Avicenna on Divine Simplicity

Hashem Morvarid

As with most medieval philosophers, Avicenna advocated for Divine Simplicity Thesis (henceforth DST), according to which God is absolutely simple, lacking any composition within Him. However, DST raises a puzzling question about the ontological status of divine attributes. According to DST, these attributes cannot be distinct positive intrinsic properties of God, as such properties would bring about a composition within Him. Consequently, proponents of DST must propose alternative accounts of their ontological status. In this paper, I identify and delineate three distinct accounts in Avicenna. According to the first account, divine attributes are positive, intrinsic properties of God that exist in a non-composite, unified manner. On the second account, these attributes are either extrinsic or negative properties, which are not real features within God. In the third account, divine attributes are concomitants (*al-lawāzīm*) of God, namely, distinct entities proceeding from His essence (*dhāt*). As these concomitants are ontologically posterior to God, their plurality would not constitute a composition within God. I argue that although all three views are suggested by Avicenna's corpus, his official stance was the negative-extrinsic account. Subsequently, I explore the major philosophical challenges this account encounters and examine how Avicenna would meet them.

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Knowledge and Method of Inquiry: An Epistemological Analysis of Ibn Fūrak's Conceptions Based on His Commentary (Sharḥ) on Abū Ḥanīfa's Al-ʿĀlim wa al-Mutaʿallim (The Scholar and the Learner)

Jafar Paramboor

Signifying the historical context in which any particular branch of knowledge was widely spread, discussed, and debated, the *sharḥ* (pl. *shuruḥ*, commentary) and *ḥāshiyah* (pl. *ḥawāshī*, scholium) of many original scholarly contributions, be it in the exegesis, kalām, logic, philosophy, or Prophetic traditions, have played some cardinal roles in the Islamic knowledge transmission over the centuries. Parallel to this tradition, the misconceptions that such explanatory scribbles do not provide any novelty to the knowledge field also prevailed to a great extent while the fact is, many of such

scholarly commentaries on others' works were original on their own, a completely new *ijtihad*, rather than being just simplifiers or facilitators with mere *tabṣiṭ* (axiomatization). One among such *sharḥ* is the less explored -if not unexplored- *Sharḥ Risālah al-ʿĀlim wa al-Mutaʿallim Li Abi Ḥanīfah* of Ibn Fūrak (Abū Bakr Maḥammad ibn Ḥasan) on the jurist and theologian Abū Ḥanīfa's *Al-ʿĀlim wa al-Mutaʿallim* (The Scholar and the Learner), which was drafted by Abū Muqātil in the form of a dialogue between the scholar and his disciple. Despite being an acclaimed polymath and authority of knowledge¹, Ibn Fūrak has generously annotated the work from a theological perspective in which he excelled, other than *Hadīth*, by many aspects. The *Sharḥ* functions as a validating instrument for Abū Ḥanīfa's theology, conceptualizing the Islamic philosophy of knowledge and method of inquiry to find the ultimate truth. Here, the paper looks into two dimensions; first, Ibn Fūrak's conception of knowledge and method of inquiry to arrive at the truth as he argued that a mere imitation of scholars is inadequate to have knowledge, but there should be valid proofs and reliable evidence leading to the fundamentals; and second the historical significance of such a commentary despite his being an authority in the discipline and having authored close to hundred works. The paper argues that his *Sharḥ* was a mark of significance for the time and context in which he lived, refuting the non-Ashārites including the *Karrāmiyyah* and *Muʿtazilah*. The analysis would also lead to one of the possible conclusions that Ibn Fūrak chose to comment on, rather than originate this discourse at that particular context, out of his utmost unpretentiousness and respect towards the discipline as well as the author of the *matn*.

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Ibn Rushd [Averroes] on the Immortality of the Soul

Abdulaziz Alotaibi

The concept of the afterlife holds profound significance in numerous religions and cultural traditions, serving as the locus for final judgment, redemption, and the fulfillment of prophecies. This paper delves into Aristotle's treatise, *De Anima*, exploring its implications on the immortality of the soul and its intersection with prophetic beliefs, particularly in the context of Islam. The central figure in this exploration is Averroes, whose interpretations of Aristotle's works, steeped in his Islamic jurisprudential background, provide a unique perspective on these complex themes.

This essay aims to uncover Averroes' understanding and interpretation of Aristotle's texts, primarily focusing on *De Anima* and *De divinatione per somnum* (concerning prophecy). Some scholars have argued that Averroes incorporated elements of his Islamic theology into his interpretations of Aristotle's works. However, through an examination of Averroes' exposition of the intellect, this essay contends that his interpretation was rooted in his philosophical paradigm rather than religious dogma. This divergence becomes particularly apparent when juxtaposed with Avicenna, who ardently championed the personal immortality of souls and post-mortem rewards in contrast to Averroes.

The essay is structured in three main sections to explore these themes comprehensively. First, it provides a summary of Aristotle's depiction of the soul in *De Anima*, serving as the foundation for

¹ The list of titles epithets given by his successors in knowledge includes *Al-Ustad al-Imam*, *Shaykh al-Mutakallimīn*, *Al-Allamah al-Ṣāliḥ*, *Al-Adīb al-Mutakallim al-Uṣūlī*, and *Al-Wāʾiz al-Naḥwī*, to mention a few.

subsequent discussions. Second, it investigates how Averroes received and engaged with these debates concerning the intellect, culminating in his original synthesis. Finally, the essay delves into Averroes' attempts to justify or reconcile his philosophical synthesis with his religious upbringing and legal expertise as shown in his *Decisive Treatise*, but also in the commonly understudied *Paraphrase of the Parva Naturalia*, as well as his famous *Incoherence of the Incoherence*.

This study ultimately offers insights into the intricate relationship between philosophy, theology, and jurisprudence in the medieval Islamic world. By dissecting the philosophical underpinnings of the immortality of the soul and prophecy, it sheds light on Averroes' unique role as a bridge between Aristotelian philosophy and Islamic tradition. Averroes' distinct perspective provides valuable glimpses into the intellectual ferment of his era, enriching our understanding of the interplay between reason and revelation in the medieval Islamic world.

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