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## Kalām Atomism's Elementary Qualities: How can Indian Ungodly Cosmologies Define Contemporary Kalām Cosmological Trends?

Muhammad Shafeeq Vayalpeediyekkal

Since the emergence of debates about the Divine Justice, Human Free will, Pre-Destination and the Human actions, the total phases of Islamic Philosophical Theology and Dialectics had been changed is course intuitively from Particulars to Universals in the last phase of Second Century. On one hand, The Physical theories of Natural sciences and Metaphysics of all Pre-Socratic, Peripatetic and Neo-Platonist Hellenistic Philosophy were the dialectical topics of Kalām and the Ungodly cosmological speculations and its rebuttals of all *Dabriyya*, *Zanādiqa* and *Mulḥdūn* were simultaneously associated with it, on another hand.

However, depending on the aphorisms of some Orientalists and Neo-Mutakallimūn, the ancient Indian cosmologies and natural philosophy's orientation with Ilmu'l-Kalām's cosmological presumptions are the real locomotives behind this paper. Nyaya- Vaisesika natural philosophy's circulations in Arabian oikumene during the last Umayyads and early Abbasids, often seems to have been more explicit and speculative proof for this thought. The attempts to check the facts of this apocryphal, although seemed to be more mysterious, the classical Kalām texts neither reckon a source of their cosmological debates whether they have been borrowed from Greek, Syriac, Aramaic, and Sanskrit, nor they developed a systematic methodology as it seen precisely in Hellenistic philosophy and Aristotelian Logic.

Hence, some Near Eastern intellectuals could claim that Kalam or Islamic Philosophical theology might have borrowed the cosmologies both Greek and Indian philosophy. The elementary qualities of an atom in Kalām cosmology, are ultimately differing from them in Indian philosophical atomism. In Kalām, while the arguments of Creatio-Ex-Nihilio and creation from nothingness are widely accepted, the Indian Philosophy unambiguously cemented that universe and beings are created from eternity, and the universe neither required a creator and nor a beginning point for its existence. Finally, my attempt in this paper is to reveal such a rational and philosophical controversy occurred in the arguments of some philosophers and to exhibit precisely that Kalām cosmology never associated with ancient Indian philosophy except some intellectual debates in accounts of Wāṣil b. Atā (d.131) and Buddha Philosophers.

Indian ungodly philosophies or ancient Vedic philosophies have been considered as the source of Greek and later civilizations' natural and cosmological debates. In Kalām Atomism, the primary and secondary qualities of every atom (apart from the modern science's Sob-atomic arguments) are tantamount to the Vedic atoms in terms of their size and behavior. In this paper, I hope that it is possible to drag the Vedic atoms to the monotheistic ontology rather than Vedic philosophy's rejection of God against the dogmas of Semitic religions.

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## Possibilities and Limitations of Scientific Theories in the Subject of the Letter of Deeds

Motahare Sadat Hoseinian

Many verses of the Qur'an, refer to the witnesses of human actions in this world and the hereafter. The place of registration of deeds is called the deeds' letter. In the Day of Judgment (Resurrection), all human actions, even the smallest ones, will be exposed to human display. In this research, in the context of religious sciences, philosophy and modern sciences (physics and biology), various possible methods (possibilities) of storing human actions information, on the body and soul, and their limitations have been investigated.

Due to the two-way effect of soul and body, each event in the brain could have psychological effects in addition to material effects. The most important result of this article is the necessity and existence of an intermediary third space through which the body and the mind (soul) communicate with each other. In the approach of quantum physics, this space can be called the space of possibilities, and in philosophy, from Avicenna's perspective, can be considered as a formal substance, and from Sheikh Eshraq's viewpoint, as a soul, and mullah Sadra (in the form of gradation) and the mystics consider that medium as the subtle body titled Vaporous soul, (which is created by mixing four subtle elements together). And this intermediate space itself, due to the effect of both psychological and material dimensions, as well as its otherness with matter and soul, can be considered as a new possibility for addressing the letter of deeds.

Although in this research, various material possibilities of information storage have been investigated, but the issue of information survival at the material level is disputed due to the second principle of thermodynamics and due to the wave function reduction in QM. On the other hand, our understanding of modern sciences indicates the active effect of consciousness on the nature and integrity of the material world, which can be attended with regard to the non-physical dimension of the universe, as the deeds' letter of individual, collective, or social.

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## Quantum Mechanics, Incompleteness of Physical Reality and Islamic Occasionalist Idealism

Safaruk Zaman Chowdhury

A central doctrine of the Sunnī Islamic theological tradition of kalām as well as several philosophers of the modern and late modern period is occasionalism, the idea that God is the only true efficient cause of everything in reality. In the present time, some Muslim theologians and philosophers seem

reticent, even highly sceptical in maintaining a commitment to occasionalism, by not only resurrecting the theological criticisms of its opponents from the medieval intra-Muslim polemics but dismissing its compatibility with contemporary physics altogether. In this paper I seek to redress this reticence by suggesting the possible explanatory merit of Islamic occasionalism vis-à-vis quantum mechanics. To do this, I will be defending the following argument tentatively proposed:

1. Either naturalistic interpretations of quantum mechanics or a theistic-interpretation best explains the reality, persistence, and coherence of natural phenomena.
2. Naturalistic interpretations of quantum mechanics do not best explain the reality, persistence, and coherence of natural phenomena.
3. Therefore, a theistic-interpretation does.
4. The Islamic occasionalist idealism best meets the explanatory candidate for theistic interpretation.
5. Therefore, Islamic occasionalist idealism best explains the reality, persistence, and coherence of natural phenomena.

The aim is to show how quantum mechanics reveals a general ontological and causal indeterminacy of physical reality and this poses a major problem for naturalistic metaphysics. If attempts at naturalistic interpretations of quantum mechanics are shown to be either highly improbable or inadequate then perhaps a theistic interpretation will fare better. Here, the divine action model of Islamic occasionalism coupled with a form of phenomenalism may meet the interpretive demand and the paper will subsequently unpack this explanatory merit.

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The Source of Origination (maṣāʾ al-iḥtirāʾ) instead of the Source of Abstraction (maṣāʾ al-intizāʾ). Ṣadr al-Dīn Šīrāzī's other Account of Natural Universal

Mansooreh Khalilizand

The question of how existence is conceived of in the philosophy of Ṣadr al-Dīn Šīrāzī (Mullā Ṣadrā) has been the subject of a considerable amount of research on his thought, usually constituting a chapter in each monograph on his philosophy. The counter-concept of existence, i.e. essence, which is also strikingly present in the make-up of his thought, remains however to a large extent unstudied and hence obscure. In my paper I will shed some light on the locus and significance of essence in Ṣadrā's system of thought. I will try to answer the question as to whether, in his philosophy, based on the primacy of existence (aṣāla al-wuḡūd), any function can be allocated to essence. Despite the complexity of the answer to this question and Ṣadrā's at times somewhat incoherent-sounding formulations in

this regard, the main point of my argument can briefly be put this way: Ṣadrā's gradational account of existence enables him to account for the reality of the multiplicity of the essences, despite the unity of existence. According to Sadra, each degree of existence gives rise to a particular essence in the soul. It is the limits of a degree of existence that determine what it is, i.e. by demarcating it from the rest of the existence. In other words, each existent is what it is, primarily through the negation of all other existents from it. Viewed this way, negation at the ontological level is the basis, origin and the root of the position at the epistemological level. This is what I describe as the positive function of negation in Ṣadrā's philosophy.

The other major point in regard to Ṣadrā's novel account of essence is the active role he ascribes to the soul in constituting the essences. What is real is a privative element, i.e. the limits of the existent. The soul, confronted with these limits, generates (ʿiḡād) or originates (iḥtirāʿ) essence. This differs from the theory of abstraction (intizāʿ), according to which essence exists in the external world as "natural universal" and consciousness only needs to purge it from matter, in order to capture it. In my view, Ṣadrā breaks away from the correlationist account of knowledge that he inherited from his Avicennian predecessors and moves toward a sort of, shall we say, idealistic understanding of consciousness, in which what we experience as reality is for the most part the production of the soul, as Ṣadrā would put it.

In my paper I will bring out the major constitutive elements of Ṣadrā's notion of "natural universal". This will be followed by an underlining of Ṣadrā's assertion that for essence, there is an origin in the texture of existence which functions as a sort of preparatory cause. Encountered with this origin, it is ultimately the soul that engenders essence.

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### The Epistemological Interaction between Philosophy and Mysticism in Suhrawardi's Thought

Mahdi Abbaszadeh & Zeynab Shokri

This article is to investigate the quality of the epistemological interaction between philosophy and mysticism in the thought of "Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi" - the Islamic philosopher of the 12th century A.D. It seems that his inclination toward approximating philosophy to mysticism epistemologically, which is formed under the influence of the post-al-Ghazali mind-set, is the most pivotal part of his thought system. He develops the plan for such approximating with the help of the epistemological factor of "al-Ishraq" (illumination). Lexically, the word "al-Ishraq" Means "effusion of light", but in Suhrawardi's terminology it is a method and school which emphasizes on

the necessity of inner refinement and avoiding material and sensory concerns to be prepared for hearty perceptions and intuition in finding the truth, in addition to confirming intellect and argumentation; however, he designates heart and intuition superior than intellect and argumentation. Hence, in human being, the result of illumination is accessing to "al-Shuhud" (intuition). Lexically, the word "al-Shuhud" means "to see" and "to watch", but terminologically it is the perception and cognition of subjective and objective reality, directly and without the mediation of mental form (idea). In the view of Suhrawardi, intuition is in four kinds: inner intuition (self-consciousness); sensory intuition; imaginary intuition; and hearty intuition. He believes that the highest stage of intuition is epistemologically the hearty intuition, which is exactly equal to "al-Mukashifah" (unveiling) in the view of mystics. Hearty intuition is the presential perception of the supreme realities resulting from avoiding material and sensory concerns through asceticism and eventually "al-Tajrid" (detachment) or partition of the soul from the body which can provide the highest level of epistemological certainty for human being. Hence, achieving this level of certainty is not merely possible through theoretical intellect but the practical activity of human being is needed. He emphasizes on the pervasive, deep, and direct influence of human's action on his thought or knowledge. It means that the realm of action and the realm of knowledge - as two important aspects of human being- are not separated and have a direct relationship; qua, it seems that Suhrawardi considers the influence of human action on human knowledge more than the influence of intellectual and theoretical activities on it. In Suhrawardi's Thought, action and knowledge of human would be unified in an "existential" context. Consequently, according to Suhrawardi - exactly like the viewpoint of the mystics- the pure knowledge i.e. the logical and theoretical knowledge cannot singly lead to the final certainty. The actions influencing human knowledge belong to two things: "Values" which acting and practicing according to them would have direct and positive influence on the intuitive knowledge; and "anti-values" which acting and practicing according to them would have direct but negative influence on it. Suhrawardi believes that, acting and practicing according to mystical values - or as mystics say: "al-Suluk" (mystical conduct) - would lead to human existential expansion and eventually promotion of the level of his intuitive knowledge and achieving final certainty.

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Unity of Philosophy as a Science: A Debate on the Introduction of Matāli' al-Anwār of al-Urmawī

Kenan Tekin

Prolegomena of handbooks written in the post-classical period (after 12<sup>th</sup> century) included information on definition, subject matter, and purpose of the science treated in the book. I have already presented two papers in this conference series on how commentaries and glosses on *Mukhtasar al-Muntaha*, and *al-Tawdih* debated extensively the brief remarks in their prolegomena resulting in rich considerations on the notion of science. In this presentation I will focus on another work whose prolegomenon gave way to intensive debates on the preliminary

matters that is Siraj al-Din al-Urmawi's *Matali' al-Anwār*, a handbook of logic and philosophy. This work, like the above mentioned books, drew interest of scholars in the following centuries thus being subject to numerous commentaries and glosses. Among them, the most popular commentary and gloss were those of Qutb al-Din al-Razi, and Sayyid Sharif al-Jurjani, respectively. Besides discussing the notion of prolegomenon and its supposed content, these works dealt with another preliminary issue which was raised because of the particular content of the text, a book on logic and philosophy. The content of the latter part, i.e. the section on philosophy gave way to debates on definition and nature of philosophy as a science (*'ilm*). This issue, as we will see, sparked some heated debates in the fifteenth century Ottoman intellectual circles as reflected in the supergloss of Molla Lutfi and other scholars who also debated the issue in independent treatises. In this paper, I will look at some select discussions on the nature of philosophy and the topic of prolegomenon particularly following Qutb al-Din al-Razi, al-Jurjani and Molla Lutfi's positions on the issues.

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Avicenna against 'existential inertia'

Davlat Dadikhuda

'Existential inertia' (EI) is the thesis that once a thing comes into existence it remains in existence independent of a sustaining cause. EI is, rightly we think, taken as the default state of beings, such that its denial i.e., that a thing needs to be kept in being by a cause once it exists, should be demonstrated. Among EI's opponents, Thomists stand out in particular for their attempt to provide the requisite demonstration. In this paper, I will add to the effort made against EI, but drawing from the Islamic philosopher Avicenna (d. 1037). To do that, I'll proceed in three stages: first, criticize two Thomistic cases against EI as inadequate. Second, supply an Avicennian argument for an important thesis about all efficient causality i.e., that an effect not only needs its cause for bringing it into being but also for conserving it in being. This is known as the conservation thesis (CT). With CT established, the falsity of EI straightforwardly follows. Finally, in light of the preceding, address the considerations recent proponents of EI raise in its favor.

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The Ideal of Freedom/Liberty as an Emergent Quality Between Ethics and Knowledge in  
al-Tirmidhī's Nawādir

Aiyub Palmer

The ideal of freedom/liberty has been a central tenet of liberal paradigms since the Enlightenment. In Islamic legal theory, the ideal of liberty is not mentioned among the six aims of the Shariah as developed by Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and Abū Ishāq al-Shaṭībī (d. 790/1380). This has led some orientalist scholars to posit that Islam does not consider liberty as an ideal in Islam, setting it apart from “progressive” modern liberal systems. The ideal of liberty (ḥurriyya) did exist in the writings of early Muslim scholars, particularly within the realm of Islamic ethical and Sufi discourse. Al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī (d. 295-300/907-912) was one of the first to write about the notion of ḥurriyya as an ideal. His characterization of ḥurriyya, unlike Lockian notions, develops ḥurriyya, not within the context of property rights and ownership, but rather, within the context of knowledge (‘ilm) and ethics (akhlāq). In his *Nawādir al-uṣūl*, al-Tirmidhī juxtaposes knowledge to ethics and posts a tension between these two aspects of the Shariah. When knowledge that is practiced is balanced by ethical virtue at its best (ḥilm), the human soul (nafs) becomes freed from its attachments to the world (dunyā) and achieves ḥurriyya. While this notion of ḥurriyya does not create an ideal that belongs to every human being by birthright, it does posit a type of ḥurriyya that is accessible to every human being through spiritual effort and divine grace.

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Modal Epistemology and the Critique of Naturalism: A Key to the Harmony  
between Classical and Post-Classical Islamic Metaphysics and Epistemology

Ahmed Abdel Meguid

The problematic relationship between post-classical and classical Islamic philosophy has been a subject of debate in scholarship on Islamic philosophy for over a century. Recent contributions by scholars like Robert Wisnovsky, Frank Griffel, Ayman Shihadeh and Asad Ahmed among others decisively demonstrated the originality of post-classical Islamic vis-à-vis early twentieth century claims that most post-classical glosses on philosophy, logic and philosophical theology (kalām) are vacuous repetitions of classical contributions. This paper makes a new contribution to this increasingly expanding literature pointing out an aspect of philosophical harmony between the two traditions, specifically concerning philosophy of science and the metaphysical foundations of nature. Focusing on the work of Abū Ya‘qūb al-Kindī (d. 873 C.E.) as a key figure of classical Islamic philosophy and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 1111 C.E.), as the key figure marking the beginning of the post-classical period of Islamic philosophy, this study demonstrates that both thinkers employed a similar set of modal epistemic and metaphysical commitments to criticize Aristotelian essentialist naturalism and to reconstruct philosophy of science. The first part of the study examines al-Kindī’s *Treatise on First Philosophy* demonstrating the modal commitments of



al-Kindī's epistemology in his criticism of Aristotle's theory for the eternity of the world. The discussion focuses on the second proof al-Kindī puts forward for the finitude of physical time and investigates the implications of this proof for the connections al-Kindī establishes between physics and metaphysics as two theoretical sciences in the Treatise and other works. The second part of the study examines the third and fourth refutations of the eternity of the world in al-Ghazālī's Incoherence of the Philosophers. Both proofs are essentially modal proofs about the difference between the logical and metaphysical import of modality *de re* and modality *de dictum* and their implications for truth claims about spatio-temporal phenomena. Examining these proofs, the argument will show that the intersection between al-Ghazālī's and al-Kindī's modal commitments on the epistemic and metaphysical levels. The study will conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of this connection between classical and post-classical Islamic philosophy especially, concerning problems of metaphysics and epistemology.

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### Al-Mātūrīdī's Metaphysics of Causality: A Distinctive Concurrentist Model

Ramon Harvey & David Solomon Jalajel

Abū Manṣūr al-Mātūrīdī (d. 944) is the eponym of the Mātūrīdī tradition of kalām, one of the recognized theological schools of Sunnī Islam. Whereas the classical Mātūrīdī tradition adopted an occasionalist Divine Action Model (DAM), we argue that al-Mātūrīdī's own works indicate a distinctive DAM that can best be described as concurrentist. It is grounded in his concept of God's nature, particularly His attributes of existentiation (*takwīn*) and wisdom (*ḥikma*), and in an ontological bundle theory of dispositional accidents to account for objects. We suggest that the resultant DAM is robust, avoiding the objections of instability and overdetermination that typically plague other concurrentist models, and then explore its implications for the origin of the world, time, and human free will.

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### Ismail al-Gelenbevi's (d. 1791) Modal Metaphysics and the Problem of Nomological Claims about Nature (Laws of Nature)

Ahmed Abdel Meguid

The development of modal logic, metaphysics and epistemology from the pre-Avicenna period of early Islamic philosophical theology (kalām) through the post-Avicenna late classical and

post-classical periods is one of the key contributions of the Muslim Intellectual tradition. The importance of this contribution has been stressed by scholars of Islamic philosophy like Nicholas Rescher, Robert Wisnovsky, Khaled al-Rouayheb, Tony Street and even classicists like Charles Kahn. However, Islamic modal thought remains largely understudied. This study responds to this scholarly lacuna focusing on the modal logic and metaphysics of the prominent Ottoman mathematician, logician and philosopher Ismail al-Gelenbevi (d. 1791), focusing on the implications of his system to epistemic and ontological conditions of laws of nature. The first part of the paper focuses on the foundation of al-Gelebevi's modal system in his major work on modality, *Risālat al-Imkān* (A Treatise on Modality). In this vein, the paper will highlight al-Gelenbevi's critical development of the modal operators (al-muwajjihāt almantīqiyya) in the logic of Najm al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī (d. 1277), Qutb al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1365 C.E.) and Sirāj al-Dīn al-Urmawī (d. 1283) as the key post-classical thinkers who expanded Avicenna's and Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī's (d. 1210) conception of modal operators. Further the discussion examines the implications of al-Gelenbevi's modal system for his understanding of the metaphysical foundations of nature synthetically correlating *Risālat al-Imkān* with selected positions from his gloss (ḥashīya) on Jalāl al-Dīn al-Dawānī's (d.1512) commentary (sharḥ) on the 'Aḍud al-Dīn al-Ījī's (d. 1355) magnum opus, *al-Mawāqif*. The discussion will focus on alGelenbevi's reconceptualization of possibilita (al-mumkināt), the relation between them and the necessary existent and the implication of this relation to two main concepts: actuality and causation. The second part of the paper further examines the results of the first part, responding to two fundamental questions: 1. is al-Gelenbevi's system of metaphysics is a modally realist or a modally idealist system?; 2. what conception does al-Gelenbevi have of natural laws? Is it an empiricist, localized conception that is more in line with Humean supervenience or a more conceptualist position that has Kantian and/or Platonic constructivist inclinations?

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Akbarī and Kalam Ontologies within Sunni Islam

Muhammed Volkan Yildiran Stodolsky

The first revelation in the Noble Qurʾān included the statement, “Your Lord is the most generous, the one who gave knowledge through the pen, gave the human knowledge he did not know.” Some ulama have noted that it is impossible to give anyone knowledge they already know. This would be reminding rather than giving knowledge. As the negation of something impossible is pointless, there must be a deeper meaning, which is that there is a type of knowledge that only Allah gives that is not attainable by ordinary means of reasoning or sensing: Allah gave the human knowledge that he cannot obtain through ordinary means. This divine knowledge is the manifestation of the greatest generosity of Allah. Remarkably the Noble Qurʾān does not say “the Prophet” but rather

“the human,” which suggests that potentially this divine knowledge is attainable by any human being. Divine knowledge according to the ulama is of two types: one that establishes *taklīf* (ethico-legal and eschatological obligation), called revelation, and that which does not, called *kashf* (divine disclosure). By the consensus of the ulama, while the former ended with the last revelation given to the last messenger to the whole of human kind, the Prophet Muhammad, may peace and blessings be upon him, *kashf* remains accessible to those who sincerely seek it.

In Sunni Islam there have been two main ontologies, each with its own history, aims, and epistemology. One is the ontology of Kalam that is epistemologically based on, reason, empirical observation, and revelation in which real temporal substances subject to change are indicators of their eternal creator. The second is the Akbarī Sufi understanding of *wahdat al-wujūd* (the oneness of being) that is based primarily on *kashf* and most comprehensively articulated by Ibn ‘Arabī, in which everything one witnesses is the manifestation of the divine names and attributes according to Allah’s eternal knowledge of the quiddity of everything. The kalam ontology is rational, creationist and atomistic, while the Akbarī understanding is mystical, emanationist, and hylemorphic. The former’s aim is eschatological but at the same time communal and interreligious, to attain salvation as well as preserving the unity of Muslims and promoting Islam to non-Muslims, whereas the latter is personal, to increase one’s own divine knowledge. The method of the former is using logical reasoning to establish religious truths, while the method of the latter is *dhikr* (remembrance) and refining one’s self by *mujahadah* (struggle) to obtain *makārim al-akhlāq* (the noble traits) of the Prophet and get rid of any addiction to created things. This paper will outline and compare the history, aims, epistemology, and ontology of these two views, based on the writings of al-Ghazālī, al-Taftāzānī, Ibn ‘Arabī, al-Qayṣarī, and Ahmed Avni Konuk. Addressing the question of what type of ontology Muslims should subscribe to, the paper will argue that any belief held by Muslims, including those concerning ontology, must not oppose the apparent meaning of revelation, reason, and observable objective facts. The paper will try to demonstrate that neither ontology contravenes this standard.

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### Al-Rāzī on the Theologians’ Materialism

Amal A. Awad

In this paper I investigate al-Rāzī’s arguments for the theologians’ materialism. I argue that, late in his intellectual life, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī espoused a dualistic position on the nature of the soul, denying that the soul is in any sense a material body. This view, which in broad terms concurs with Avicenna’s, sets al-Rāzī in opposition to the theologians’ materialistic stance. To make his position clear, in his last work al-Maṭālib al-Rāzī sets out a comprehensive case for the theologians’ materialism, before critiquing that position. This paper offers a reconstruction of al-Rāzī’s

arguments for the theologians' materialism, providing an insight into arguments in the philosophy of mind during the Islamic Middle Ages. I reconstruct al-Rāzī's arguments for materialism by classifying them into four categories: Ontological Arguments (OA), Epistemological Arguments (EA), Arguments based on the Agency of the Body (AA), and Arguments based on body– soul Causal Relations (CRA).

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Material World's Ontology (in Physics) Based on Fundamentals of Transcendental Wisdom  
(Hikmah Al-Muta'liyah)

Sepideh Razi

Discoveries and experimentations in the early 20th century revealed that classic physics lacks the capacity to create a comprehensive image of material world and these incapacities lead humans into a novel route in physics. However, in modern physics, phenomena of existence are regarded as integrated parts in action and reaction with a harmonious whole. On the other hand, in transcendental wisdom, in terms of philosophical fundamentals of Mulla Sadra's Philosophy like Longitudinal and transverse analogical gradation, the existence of common time, the issue of space-time, etc., a different framework of the material world system is depicted. In this system of thought, there is integrated structure of unity which it cannot be considered only as an artificial collection and composition. Also, in the same direction, the unity of the material world can be understood in the same multiplicity and the multiplicity of this world has a reality and it is not just an illusion. According to the gradation in length and width in existence, the position of each of them is not only clear and necessary, but the essence of that part is in that order. With this view, the beings of the material world are not distinct from each other and they are inseparably connected to their surroundings and their characteristics can only be understood through their connection with the whole world. These relationships extend to the distant distances of the material world, that is, to the stars and galaxies far away. According to the principles of Sadra, this communication is not a mechanical communication, but according to the characteristics and proofs of existence, it is accompanied by a level of consciousness. As a result by placing these foundations in the framework of the system of the world of matter, an image of the model of this world is formed, which firstly, has true unity and coherence and is based on philosophical foundations, secondly, it overlaps a lot with the new achievements of physics, and thirdly, this connection and integration is accompanied by the proof of a level of consciousness and awareness for all particles of the universe.

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## Nothing Could Be Something: A Treatise on Mental Existence

Zehra Oruk Akman

There is remarkable literature about non-existence (*madum*) in Islamic philosophy and theology. Although Avicenna thinks in the way that there cannot be any information about non-existence, there are some thinkers who consider non-existence a kind of existence and call it “mental existent”. In terms of definition and quiddity, the approaches to mental existence vary from discipline to discipline, as well as from thinker to thinker. The concept of mental existence refers to the concept which identifies with the mind and does not have any existence to any extent besides the mind. The fact that it has not yet come into existence in an extension other than the mind has led to the question of whether this kind of existence is possible. Is this being, which is said to exist in the mind, a being that can occur in reality or outside of the mind? Does its mentality prevent it from being a subject capable of taking the predicate “existence”? Is it possible to predicate such an entity with another entity, even in the mind? In this study, we will try to define a mental entity that can be the subject of a proposition without going into the details of these discussions, in line with the explanations in our classical logic literature.

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## Defining Reality through Science: the Philosophy of Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas

Khalina Mohammed Khalili

This paper elaborates on the formulation of philosophy of science by Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas which is couched within the architectonic framework he calls the worldview of Islam. Syed Muhammad Naquib Al-Attas is a Malaysian scholar (1930- present) who represents a contemporary approach to Islamic metaphysics or theoretical sufism. Al-Attas attracts a large and intimate following in South East Asia. This paper presents al-Attas’s argument as part of the discourse that has long been established in Islamic traditions as *kalam*, to a certain extent. Al-Attas proposes two dimensions of epistemology involving normal science and transcendental paradigm embedding them within the metaphysical dimension of Islam known as theoretical sufism. He believes that there is no serious confrontation in the history of Islamic philosophy other than between essentialists and existentialists, as witnessed today in the science war between realists and anti-realists. This paper attempts to show that the search for reality should take precedence over the saving of phenomena in science, and that contemporary science has the potential to cast light on absolute reality when verified with divinely-inspired epistemology. How can absolute reality be recognizable amongst a current of relative ontological construction of scientific explanation.

Al-Attas's construction of definitions distinguishes logical ontology from existential ontology through demonstration. Al-Attas's calls on Islamic scholars (non-science experts) to focus on verifying the explanation and theory of science which we believe will confirm the confluence of Islam and science.

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Islamic mysticism, theology and philosophy in contemporary times: the case of Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas

Fadila Ezzat

In this paper we wish to examine the role of sufism as understood by the contemporary Malay philosopher Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas (b. 1931). We specifically wish to understand how al-Attas integrates sufism, *kalām* and *falsafa* together in the larger mosaic of Islamic thought as well as some of the arguments he mobilizes in this endeavor. Though al-Attas considers that these three strands of Islamic thought complement each other in some ways, each one occupying a legitimate place in the “Islamic *Weltanschauung*” (synonymous here with Islamic ontology), he nonetheless posits a hierarchy between them whereby he attributes a greater value to “sufi metaphysics” which represent a more sophisticated ontological model according to him. In this context, *kalām* and *falsafa* present certain limitations which preclude them from offering a full vision of reality. This in turn raises questions as to how one is to distinguish between these three elements. Are their differences mainly methodological in nature? What about the shifts and turns that each of these categories have undergone throughout history as well as their mutual influences? We argue that we can gain a deeper understanding of how al-Attas defines these three categories by analyzing his discourse concerning some key figures of Islamic thought such as Ibn Sīnā (d. 1037), al-Ghazālī (d. 1111) or Ibn ‘Arabī (d. 1240). The central place occupied by al-Ghazālī in al-Attas’ *oeuvre* is particularly important in providing answers to the questions raised above.

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Like Logic to Khadija: The Sources, Students, and Epistemology  
of the Daughter of al-‘Āqil

David Owen

Ghadīja (Khadija) Mint (Bint) al-'Āqil al-Daymāniya (d. ca. 1835) flourished at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th century in the southwestern Sahara, in the Gebla region of today's Mauritania. A brief review of women's contributions to the history of logic underscores Ghadija's historical importance, as one of only two women authors on logic prior to Frege for whom a complete work on logic is still extant. In fact, Ghadija's Ṭurra 'alā l-Sullam is the best known, and most reliably preserved, textual record of her teaching across the Core Curriculum of Islamic West Africa (Hall and Stewart, 2010), including the transmission of the Jawāhir of Ibn Ṭayyib al-Hilālī on more advanced topics in logic, of Sanūsī's Umm al-Barāhīn in theology, and of al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ by Fīrūzābādī on lexicography. In this talk, I begin by introducing the audience to what is known about Ghadija's Arabic logic sources as well as her life, teaching, students, and broader West African legacy, from the 18th century down to the present day. I compare Ghadija's treatment in local prosopography to that of her brother and student Aḥmad, and other lacunae and contradictions therein. The third section describes the sources and methods of the edition of her work, especially her extant writing on logic. I describe the organization of topics in Akhḍarī's Sullam, the geographical reach of its reception, and the particular insights and emphases that Ghadija brings to her commentary thereon. Finally, we present a digital edition and digital archive of her Arabic Ṭurra and her miscellanea in Zenāga and Ḥassāniyya, alongside a complete annotated translation of the Ṭurra and its base-text, a 10/16th c. arjūza, sc. al-Sullam almurawnaq of al-Akhḍarī (on whom see El-Rouayheb in EI3). The research results herein show the relevance of gender to the field of Arabic logic, as well as the utility of text-editing, digital archiving, and comparative scholasticism.

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Philosophical Discourses on Epistemology in Sharhul Aqaaid; Reading Ilmu Kalam as Islamic  
Philosophy

Sahinsha P

The translation of Greek philosophical texts to Arabic was one of the major causes for the growth of philosophic tradition in the Islamic world. Muslim philosophers like Ibn Sina, al-Farabi and al-Kindi contemplated the Greek traditions and formulated their philosophical system. Scholars like Imam al-Ghazali, al-Iji and al-Taftazani tried to respond to the problems posed by the Muslim Aristotelian philosophy. The works of these scholars led Ilmu Kalam to a philosophical-theological system. They discussed epistemology, ontology, language, ethics, politics and all other topics which were discussed by philosophers. The discourse regarding epistemology is one of the first topics discussed by kalam scholars. Imam al-Taftazani gives a clear idea about Islamic epistemology in his

Sharhul Aqaaid. After explaining the ontological existence of realities and knowledge, he defines it and then explains the valid sources. This paper explores epistemological discourses in Sharhul Aqaaid of Imam al-Taftazani and argues that the later Ilmul Kalam itself is a form of Islamic philosophy with all its branches and discourses.

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Jurjani's Risalah on 'illah and gharad

Talal Ahdab

*Abstract Forthcoming*

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Taftazani on takwin in his Sharh al Aqaaid: Between Glossator and Verifier

Jawad Qureshi

*Abstract Forthcoming*

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International Justice: What Justice?

Mehmet Fatih Arslan

This study analyses the ethical theories of Muslim philosophers such as al-Fārābī, and Ibn Sīnā and argues that by utilizing their complex and profound ethical system, one can have a better understanding of the current situation of international order concerning justice. Muslim Peripatetics maintain that justice is the most difficult virtue to achieve, and it only emerges after the essential virtues, courage, temperance, and prudence have been attained.

Agreeing with Aristotle, Muslim philosophers claimed that since intellect cannot identify the measure of virtues in the practical domain. Thus, the only way to know whether any particular act is within the limits of the virtues is the revelation. Since the only uncorrupt, righteous revelation exists in the Virtuous City/State, and since it is the only place where the true revelation is in practice, justice cannot be served in any other city or state. Therefore, according to Muslim philosophers, the ideal of international justice is an illusion, and justice cannot be maintained outside the Virtuous State/City even if the citizens strive to attain it. Because, they cannot



accomplish the cardinal virtues without the guidance of true revelation and will be lost in the realms of particulars.

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Something Can Come From Nothing: A Kalam Critique of One Aspect of William Lane Craig's  
Kalam Cosmological Argument

Hamza Karamali

The major premise of William Lane Craig's formulation of the kalam cosmological argument is, "Everything that begins to exist has a cause." He justifies this premise with Parmenides' philosophical dictum, "From nothing nothing comes," famously expressed in Latin as "ex nihilo nihil fit". This paper will demonstrate that in the classical kalam tradition, this premise is justified with a noninferential appeal to contingency. It will then demonstrate that it is because of this difference that William Lane Craig is (a) able to build on the kalam cosmological argument for the fact that God can become a part of the created universe, and is (b) unable to effectively respond to the "Brute Fact" objection to the kalam cosmological argument.

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Occasionalism, Evolution, and Intelligent Design: Reconstruction of Mulyadhi Kartanegara's  
Thought

Nuruddin Al Akbar

This study attempts to reconstruct the thought of Mulyadhi Kartanegara, a contemporary Indonesian Muslim philosopher, who proposes a synthesis of the view that sees Nature as dependent on God and the view that sees Nature as having autonomy from God. The Asharite represents those who understand Nature as absolutely dependent on God. Meanwhile, those who understand that Nature has its degree of independence from God are represented by the Mu'tazilites. Mulyadhi said that as a consequence of such theology, the Asharites developed their physical framework based on atomic theory taken from Indian civilization. Meanwhile, the Mutazilites built their physical framework with their general approach, which for Mulyadhi, parallels the mechanical theory of Nature, especially that developed by Newton. The vital point of the atomic view is that because the atom's life is concise, Nature depends on God to sustain its

existence. In contrast to the *kumun* (latency) theory, where in the process of creating Nature, God has given Nature potential powers so that Nature can move independently based on the actualization of that potential in a grand scheme called *sunnatullah*.

Mulyadhi sees that these two theological traditions can be synthesized so they do not become two contradictory traditions. For Mulyadhi, this synthesis can be found in the theory of evolution developed by Muslim philosophers, especially the Ikhwan Al Shafa. The vital point of Ikhwan's conception of the universe is that they regard it as a great human being. In other words, like humans, Nature has its own freedom/will. In the case of the Ikhwan, this movement of Nature is autonomously possible thanks to the universal soul, which in its emanation process gives Nature its particular souls into existing objects. But for Mulyadhi, the Ikhwan only argued that Nature could autonomously move thanks to the universal soul. But why Nature chooses to move dynamically from its simple form to a more complex structure (even the Ikhwan believes in perfection) can be inexplicable. Mulyadhi stated that Rumi provided the answer to why Nature was moving evolutionarily toward its perfection. Evolution is not random and aimless, as understood by Darwin and modern evolutionists. For Rumi, this soul is essentially a loving soul, so the intrinsic mechanism of evolution is love. Mulyadhi said that although with the scheme developed by the Ikhwan and Rumi, Nature has its autonomy to move and love, at the same time, Rumi's idea shows that Nature is also dependent on God. Because the object that Nature loves is God. So that without God, Nature will not move toward its perfection. In this context, the dependence of Nature on God becomes fundamental as well.

This study feels a missing picture from the synthesis offered by Mulyadhi. It was specifically related to love as the driver of evolution. When referring to Rumi's other ideas about love, Rumi gives two essential dimensions of love: effort and grace. In Rumi's metaphor, one can try to dive and look for shells, but it takes "luck" for him to get Pearl shells. In this context, Rumi is talking about God's intervention that enables a person to achieve the desired result. Rumi's position can pave the way for integrating intelligent design explanations in evolutionary schemes. Intelligent Design, as an intellectual movement, focuses its work on uncovering the possibility of divine action (in a supernatural sense) in the history of life. For example, this group explores several historical phenomena, such as the Cambrian explosion, the creation of a motor for the flagellum, and even the non-mechanistic origin of life on the earth, which requires supernatural intervention to ensure that life can exist and undergo a radical transformation. In this context, we can say that intelligent Design has a close relationship with the Asharite tradition, which believes in the possibility for God to perform direct supernatural intervention at certain times in natural history, as was the case with the Miracles of the Prophets. In other words, intelligent Design can be positioned as a reinforcement of the position of the Asharite by providing empirical support that occasionalism has indeed occurred in natural history.

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## Gadamer, Ibn Sina, and the Aesthetics of Self-Transformation

Syeda Maryam Fatima Taqvi

This paper criticizes the contemporary subjectivization of aesthetics and the notion of aesthetic consciousness, taking references from Hans George Gadamer's Truth and Method. It proceeds by explaining the profundity of Gadamer's criticism in criticizing the momentary experience of art that does not transform human beings. Furthermore, this paper draws the resonance between Gadamer's understanding of aesthetics and the Arab-Islamic notion of arts and aesthetics, focusing on Ibn Sina's works related to arts and aesthetics.

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## Wonder, Self-Awareness and the Symbolic of Light in the Poetry of Naim Frashëri and Hafiz Shirazi

Melsen Kafilaj

Wonder is the first step towards the seeking of Truth. As in Philosophy, it plays also an important role in Mysticism; in this case into Islamic Mysticism (*Sufism*). Wonder in Sufism is deeply connected with the beauty of Creation which is in itself the beauty of the Creator. One of the ways to express this sense of wonder aesthetically and metaphysically is undoubtedly poetry. Many Sufi Masters, *tariqas*, mystics and poets have used poetry to express their sense of wonder and to describe their mystical experiences or their Self-Awareness on the Divine Love. The scope of this paper is to emphasize and treat the element of wonder as a ladder which climbs you up to this Self-Awareness and to explain the symbolic of Light and its role in the poetry of the Albanian National Poet and the Persian one, Naim Frashëri and Hafiz Shirazi. First part gives a general account of the sense of wonder in the poetry of both respective poets. The second one deals on the manner how this sense of wonder have brought both poets into Divine Self-Awareness, illustrating it with some examples from their poetry and the last part is focused on the symbolic of Light and different ways that it is used in the poetry of N. Frashëri and H. Shirazi.

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Fanā' fī Allah as Baqā' bi'Imām: Theomorphic Imāmology and 'Name Theophany' in the Brahm  
Prakāsh, Saloko Moṭo, and Moṭi Venti Granths

Stephen Cúrto

The Granths 'Brahm Prakāsh' of pīr Shams, and the 'Moṭi Venti' attributed to pīr Hassan Kabirdīn, both entreat a highly complex theosophical narrative discourse; a significant facet of this discourse surrounds the centrality of the pīr Shāh (in this case, the Imām), as a theomorphic emanation of the sabad (Divine word). The Brahm Prakāsh further situates this narrative within the context of 'taking the one exalted name' (ek nām). The centrality of the concept of this great name, the nām 'Alī in both theophanic and theomorphic contexts is heavily emphasized. Much more than simply a call to remembrance, Brahm Prakāsh places great theological emphasis on the context of mystical union, the concept of divine reunification (joḍ joḍāvo) with the pīr Shāh. The role of the pīr Shāh in such union can be situated in the religious studies discourse of a modified form of 'name theophany.' Thus, the connection between word and name cohering in the Imām as a personification of Divine command is a significant feature of the theological typology presented within both Brahm Prakāsh, and Moṭi Venti. This study highlights how the theologemes of 'word', 'name', and 'union', form an interrelated typology within these Granths, surrounding God's self-disclosure (tajallī), and mystical union with the Divine. This can be situated in the broader pan-Islamicate mystical discourse of the annihilation of individuation, and the individuated 'self' within Divinity (fanā' fī Allah). Specifically, these Granths position the modality of this within the concomitant necessity of baqā' fī Allah via spiritual fealty to the Imām, and His hierocosmic role as maḥzar for the Divine command (the process of Fanā' fī Imām).

Engaging the discourse-typology of these central ginānic themes, it is argued that a theological trajectory of theomorphic immanence vis a vis the Imām, as the maḥzar of Divine light; the path to intimacy with the otherwise ineffable, formless divine being, is of direct centrality to both Granths Brahm Prakāsh and Moṭi Venti. This paper further traces the implications for Ismā'īlī universalist soteriology, and 'high' Imāmology as flowing from this ginānic discourse.

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The Place of Al-Fārābī's Book of Short Syllogism According to The Method of Theologians (*Qiyās al-saghīr 'alā ṭarīqat al-mutakallimīn*) in his Project of Logic

Riza Kalyoncu

The main question of the paper is how to understand what al-Fārābī has done in his Book of *Short Syllogistics According to The Method of Theologians (Qiyās al-saghīr 'alā ṭarīqat al-mutakallimīn)*. As the title of the work suggests, it is problematic to classify this text in relation to other texts of al-Fārābī's logical corpus. However, the paper does not offer a full-scale argumentative stance on how to classify al-Fārābī logical corpus, it aims to show that it is possible to classify al-Fārābī's logical corpus in a different manner which focuses on the inner mechanisms of his project of logic. With this background the aim of the paper is to offer a new way of reading of al-Fārābī's *Book of Short Syllogism*.

The secondary literature on the book shows the indeterminacy of the scholars both on how to understand al-Fārābī's logical corpus and how to classify aforementioned book inside this logical corpus. In this paper, I selected major secondary literature on the subject regarding to that problem. The earliest attempt to understand and explain what this book of al-Fārābī is made by M. Turker who also edited the book first time (Turker, 1958). Later, N. Rescher published the translation of the work with the analyses and notes by the title "al-Fārābī's Short Commentary on Aristotle's Prior Analytics" (Rescher, 1963). Then A. I. Sabra and K. Gyekye criticized Rescher's translation in considering its misrepresentation of the work's title (Sabra, 1965; Gyekye, 1989). Even though Gyekye's work shows some aspect of al-Fārābī's text in relation to his overall project of logic, it does not cover the main aspects in a detailed manner. Moreover despite the fact that the criticism made by Sabra and Gyekye is a highly justifiable, the secondary literature on the book has been preserving the Rescher's approach (Lameer, 1994; Rudolph, 2017; Chatti-Hodges, 2020).

Against this backdrop to the interpretation of the text, the paper claims that what al-Fārābī has done in this text is not an "abridgement" (Chatti-Hodges, 2020) of Aristotle's prior analytics. The paper suggests that the general framework of al-Fārābī's project of logic is the decisive element of al-Fārābī's theory of syllogistics and this project is reflected in *Short Syllogism*. In order to justify this idea, the paper relates the analyses in this text to other texts of al-Fārābī's logical corpus. Furthermore, the main thesis of the paper is the idea that al-Fārābī's logic creates an "interactive" relationship between the realm of logic and the realm of language and the analyses in *Short Syllogism* are meaningful against the backdrop of this interactive relationship. In addition to this idea, the paper argues that the second defining aspect of al-Fārābī's idea of logic is its unification of syllogistic arts. As a result, based on these two defining features, the reconsideration of Aristotelian logic by al-Fārābī makes the evaluation of the method of theologians inside the Aristotelian logic possible. As a general result, the paper offers a new exegetical stance towards al-Fārābī's logical

corpus and implies the possibility of a different evaluation towards the contemporary interpretations of al-Fārābī's works.

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## Faith and Flux: Revisiting the Metaphysicality of Islam

Kidhar P.T

Following the lead of Nietzsche and Heidegger, one of the defining characteristics of the contemporary Western philosophy has turned out to be the contempt for metaphysics and virtual exclusion of it from its thought project. Heidegger recognized that metaphysics was trapped in presence hindering it from effectively engaging with the concrete existence characterized by the flux of time and change. From Plato to Hegel, metaphysics has been a rigorous search for a changeless, stable reality beyond the flux. When the pre-Socratic philosopher Heraclitus celebrated the flux, Eleatics and Plato tried to stop it. This was done through the concept of 'recollection' proposed by Plato setting in motion thereby the history of metaphysics.

It was under the influence of Heidegger that Derrida propounded his critique of metaphysics of presence and logocentrism that was, as it were, to hold its sway over the later philosophical ventures, with incredulity towards the grounds and transcendental signifiers as its defining feature. With no doubt, this total negation of metaphysics and for that matter, all transcendental grounds proved to be a major blow to the philosophy and the worldview advanced by religions especially Islam, which is absolutely theocentric.

Here, taking into account the view that metaphysics is unable to comprehend the concrete existence because of its intolerance towards the flux and change, this paper examines the intricate relation between metaphysics and the nature of faith in the view of Islam. The paper claims that the faith according to Islam maintains a balanced approach that accepts metaphysical grounding even as coming to terms with concrete existence. This is the case because a person isn't a believer in the view of Islam unless he preserves that identity through continuous religious practices surviving the flux of time while still having Allah, the unchanging and eternal being, as his ultimate ground. Accordingly, in contrast to many Islamic theologians, modern and pre-modern, who regard God as a wholly metaphysical entity, this paper argues that Islamic, or more precisely, Ash'arite conception of God doesn't render Him a wholly metaphysical being with no relation to the concrete existence since Allah, according to this view, is a ground the reference to which gives meaning to the believer's movement through time. This way, though an eternal and unchanging being in essence, Allah is also a being who constantly interacts with the finite world of change making possible

movements therein. This implies that faith as prescribed by Islam maintains an equilibrium between the extremes of poststructuralism that denied metaphysics altogether, and the philosophical tradition from Plato to Hegel, marked by its intolerance towards the concrete existence. Positing an eternal entity doesn't commit Islamic faith to being entirely metaphysical as it finds it easier to come to terms with the fluctuations of concrete existence and thus, maintain equilibrium between flux and stability, between change and changelessness.

Through these claims, this paper attempts to show how Islamic faith becomes the most plausible approach that best reflects reality of existence.

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The Divine Command from the Unseen towards the Seen: Decoding the Creator-Creation relationship in the thoughts of Nasiruddin al-Tusi

Kainat Jalaluddin

One of the significant discussions in Medieval Intellectual traditions had been around decoding the cosmological relationship of the Creator and the creation. At one hand, the task was to understand engagement of the creator in the creation, on the other hand, the question was how can the creation and the eternally existing God interact without having the simple unity of God destroyed by contact with the multiplicity? One of the attempts to preserving the Divine Unity was made by theologians influenced by Ismaili thought through recourse to a cosmological interpretation of God's creative command, i.e. His divine Order (amr) or Word (Kun). This study makes an attempt to revisit or possibly resolve the creative tension by understanding the role of Divine Command (Amr) in cosmology. The ultimate aim is to investigate the mediating role and the manifestation of the command with reference to Divine Unity and Divine Providence. Can God intervene in the world without putting His Unity at stake? To what extent can command play a role in it? While the interpretation of Divine Command is a broad topic and may need an extensive comparative study amongst many theological schools within Islam, this study limits itself to Nasir al-Din al-Tusi's (1201- 1274) position on the Divine Command. It will explore how Tusi, by introducing the Amr

into Avicennan cosmology, have essentially preserved the divine unity. This paper will critically analyses the role and nature of the Divine command, and its relationship with the creation and the creator with special reference to the attribute and the essence of the latter. One deduces that Tusi, by treating the Divine command as a cosmological hypostasis, seems to accomplish threefold task i.e defending the fundamental principle to Avicenna's cosmogony 'only one from the one' in response to the critique of Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, preserving the Divine Unity, and situating the role of Nizari Ismaili Imam within the cosmological framework. The research broadly aims to structure itself under these questions :

- In what ways have theologians influenced by the Ismaili thought, such as Nasiruddin al- Tusi and interpreted the Divine command of God and situated it broadly in the spectrum of Islamic theological and philosophical positions on creation, creator and their relationship?

- In what ways does the Ismaili cosmological interpretation of the creative Command attempt to elaborate on the transcendental relationship between the creation and the creator?
- In what ways does Tusi negotiate between Ismaili Neoplatonism and his Avicennan commitments respectfully?

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Ibn Rushd before Kant: On the Conditions of the Possibility of Knowledge

Anwar ul Haq

Immanuel Kant argues that knowledge involves objective and subjective universality. The view is endorsed by several contemporary epistemologists as well. According to this view, to say that a subject S knows, for instance, that an object X has a property F implies that all objects relevantly similar to X must have the property F and all subjects relevantly similar to S must know under similar circumstances that X is F. For example, my knowledge that the stone is warmed by the sun implies that all stones, if they were similarly situated as this stone, shall be warmed by the sun, and all knowers similarly situated as I am shall know that the stone is warmed by the sun. In the Critique of Pure Reason Kant starts with the thought that we possess knowledge of reality (which is objectively and subjectively universal) and presents an account of the conditions under which this knowledge is possible for us. The aforementioned conception of knowledge predates Kant. The present paper argues that it was employed powerfully by Ibn Rushd to argue that the aforementioned universality of knowledge presupposes a certain necessity, namely, that the objects and the subject (the human intellect) of knowledge must have necessary or well-defined natures. In other words, he employs the aforementioned conception of knowledge to argue against that the view he attributes to some mutakallimūn, namely, "neither intellect nor existents have a well-defined nature" (Tahāfut 442). The two-sided necessity mentioned above, on the side of



objects and the subject of knowledge, is a condition of the possibility of knowledge on Ibn Rushd's view. In particular, the paper explores Ibn Rushd's employment of the aforementioned conception of knowledge against occasionalists about objects in nature on the one hand and certain materialists about the intellect on the other. Against Ghazālī, for instance, Ibn Rushd argues that objects in nature must have necessary natures (i.e. "essences and attributes which determine the special functions of each thing" (Tahāfut 424)) given that we possess knowledge of them and knowledge is objectively universal. (I defend this reading against Majid Fakhry's (1958, chap. 3) alternate, metaphysical, reading of the relevant passages from the Tahāfut.) On the side of the subject of knowledge, Ibn Rushd argues that "a combination of elements cannot generate the intellect" (LCDA c. 5, 398/314; cf. Ogden 2016, p.33). Such a materialist view of the intellect introduces a certain contingency into the subject of knowledge just as occasionalists introduce a contingency into the objects of knowledge: Ibn Rushd remarks that such a materialist view of the intellect "is similar to the opinion of those who deny agent causes ... these are those who speak of chance" (LCDA c. 5, 398/314). I reconstruct Ibn Rushd's relevant view as arguing that the human intellect understood materially will lack a necessary nature and as a result our cognitive judgments will lack subjective universality and fail to be knowledge. By contrast, the actuality of knowledge entails that "[t]he intellect therefore is not a possible entity which might have been created with other qualities" (Tahāfut 443; cf. LCDA, c. 5, 407/322).

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Philosophical and Materialistic Methods In 'Ilm al-Kalām In Last Two Centuries; A Critical Appraisal On Kubrā Al-Yaqīnīyyāt Al-Kawnīyyah Of Muḥammad Sa'īd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī

Mansoor Ponnechethiyil

'Ilm al-Kalām began by first half of second century to establish Islamic theological doctrines by utilizing dialectical methods of Greek philosophy. This genre of Islamic doctrine was highly discussed in Islamic scholarly discourses by second century of Islamic intellectual history between Mu'tazila and Ash'ari. By late seventeenth century the world witnessed new challenges and problems towards 'Ilm al-Kalām represented by materialism, positivism, Marxism, and pragmatism. It is nearly impossible to encounter these new problems with methodology used by classical 'Ilm al-Kalām. Kubrā Al-Yaqīnīyyāt Al-Kawnīyyah (The Greatest Universal Sureties) of Muḥammad Sa'īd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī is one of widely accepted works in present days in the field of new 'Ilm al-Kalām. The text become popular since it demonstrate incoherence of materialistic philosophy under discussion on existence of god and how it depends to perspect of science and the principles of logic and author adopted a defensive method on presentation of most important modern theories which emerged after French revolution. This paper aims to discuss the functions and forms of genre of philosophy and materialistic methods used by modern mutakallimūn introducing

'Ilm al-Kalām and Muslim theologians' approach toward liberal theories emerged in last Centuries with an elaboration on logic and materialistic philosophical argumentation theories which are widely used in Kubrā Al-Yaqīniyyāt Al-Kawnīyah of al-Būṭī .

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### Physics in Later Philosophical Theology in Maghribi Scholarly Tradition (17th & 18th CE)

Ibrahim Safri

The primarily aim of Kalam is theological, however, in most of later Kalam's books – Post-Razian Kalam, a discussion on physics (al-Ṭabī'iyyāt) had been raised among a couple of philosophical matters. This new approach in which to combine theology and philosophy had been engaged until the modern period. In this presentation, I will try to discuss some crucial points related to the relationship between physics and later Islamic theology in the Maghribī scholarly tradition in the early modern period. Considering the domination of alSanūsī's books in the later Maghribī theologian tradition, I will be focusing on two major figures in the 17th and 18th CE; al-Yūsī (d. 1698) and his student alWallālī (d. 1728). I believe that even with the domination of Sanūsī's works, scholars had been influenced by the later approach involved with al-Razi. Therefore, why, and how those later scholars had engaged with physics in their works? How far has physics contributed to building philosophical theology? In which position those scholars were in front of physics matters? In my position, and regarding their interest in physics, Moroccan scholars took Sanūsī's advanced works only as a manual to interpret some matters without following him in all of his views. Therefore, as theologian scholars went beyond alSanūsī's taught and claims in his advanced works, the domination of these works did not go beyond the theologian and logician scholars. For this reason, as they did not agree with some of al-Sanūsī's theologian claims, those scholars did not only limit themselves to studying physics, but they also deeply discussed its matters in their theologian works.

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### Comparative Assessment of Godlikeness of Man through the Acquisition of Virtues from the Points of View of Plotinus and Mulla Sadra

Setayesh Karami

Plotinus quotes Plato as saying that the soul wants to escape and to separate itself from the evils in the universe of matter, and the way through which the soul can be separated from the world is becoming godlike by means of virtue. Then, he asks who this god is to whom we are struggling to assimilate and what are these virtues properties? There are some virtuous properties like self-control, that God can not possess it, so how having these properties can make us godlike? The concept of becoming godlike has been discussed before in Plato's book (*Theaetetus*) 1 and then in the works of Muslim philosophers such as Mulla Sadra, Sohrevari and Avicenna, as well as by other Neoplatonists. This concept has created many ethical and existential challenges for philosophy of ethics. In this study, I first discuss the issue of assimilation to God as the ultimate virtue from Plotinus 's point of view. Then I present this idea's reception by Mulla Sadra and offer some critical observation.

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## Towards a Contemporary Islamic Environmental Ethics: The Ontological and Moral Status of Animals

Nabil Yasien Mohammed

The question of the ontological status and moral standing of animals is fundamental to the development of any environmental ethic. The moral concern of non-human animals in mainstream contemporary Islamic thought has been given insufficient attention. However, it has not gone totally ignored, sporadic discussions took place in the Islamic philosophical and theological traditions. The theologians, both Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites, mainly discussed the ontological status of animals in considering whether they will receive recompense in the hereafter, but not much on animal welfare. Among the philosophers, such as Abu Bakr al-Razi (d. 935 CE), the Ikhwan al-Safa, Ibn Tufayl (d. 1185 CE), and Ibn Miskawayh (d. 1030 CE), they discussed the ontological status and moral standing of animals. In contemporary environmental ethics, the work of Peter Singer and Tom Regan has dominated the scene. The former gives primacy to the sentience of animals and the moral principle that all interests should be equally considered. In adopting a utilitarian ethical framework, the consideration is not whether animals can talk or reason, but whether they can suffer. Tom Regan defends animal rights on the basis of a deontological ethical framework. Animals have intrinsic moral worth and are "subject-of-a-life," thus, the violation of animal rights is wrong by principle not by virtue of the overall minimization of suffering.

Attempting to overturn the anthropocentric ethics of the Judeo-Christian and classical Western traditions, both approaches aim at moving towards an ecocentric environmental ethics. As we will show, a purely secular approach has its shortcomings in adequately providing us with a holistic approach to our relationship with nature. In the case of Islam, both the anthropocentric and ecocentric elements exist and are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the one hand, Islam considers humankind as a unique creation, divinely honored. Numerous Quranic verses reflect that animals are created to be of service (sakhr) and benefit to humankind, providing them with food, clothes, and aesthetic pleasure. On the other hand, Islam gives sacred value and respect to animals, and encourages caring for them. To reconcile the impasse between anthropocentric and ecocentric environmental ethics, we propose a synthesis between the two, through a theocentric approach to environmental ethics. Drawing on the Islamic philosophical and theological tradition we attempt to develop a contemporary Islamic environmental ethic and establish the ontological and moral status of animals. Theologically, we discuss the necessity of divine command, and also consider the higher objectives of the Islamic law (maqāsid al-sharī'a), and the importance of the preservation of life (hifz al-nafs) and the preservation of the environment (hifz al-bi'a) as part of the legal philosophy instrumental to forming a contemporary environmental ethic.