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
Edited by

Aaron SPEVACK

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Mehmet Fatih

Ādāb al-Baḥth Literature: A New Manual for Critical Thinking?

The subject matter of this presentation is to explore possible ways of re-utilization of Ādāb al-Baḥth literature. One of the most underappreciated ancillary sciences of Islamic Rational tradition, Ādāb al-Baḥth (The Protocol of Critical Thinking and Research Methodology) literature remains mostly unexplored due to the scarcity of the context for the study of Ādāb and obscure nature of its utilization in the classical texts. Unlike the logical or the rhetorical terms, Ādāb terms are mostly omitted for sake of simplicity/practicality and presumed easily recognizable by the reader. Furthermore, the nature of modern studies on Ādāb al-Baḥth is generally limited to exploring its utilization in the classical text. However, a closer inspection shows that due to its in-depth classifications and extended coverage, Ādāb al-Baḥth literature can indeed be utilized as a manual for critical thinking. Starting from its meticulous discussion about the definition,

including the guidelines about how to avoid redundant discussions, Ādāb al-Baḥth offers a rich and inspiring framework regarding almost every theme of critical thinking. It is permissible that via a meticulous study of Ādāb al-Baḥth literature, a student of rational sciences can easily build the skills of constructing an indisputable argument, rebutting a counter-argument, and identifying the main defects of reasoning processes. I, therefore, argue that Ādāb al-Baḥth should be considered a practical manual for critical thinking in the modern philosophical context.

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Hamza Karamali

Representing the Modal Logic of Kalam Using Kripke's Possible-World Semantics

In the kalam tradition, the contingency of the world is evidence for the existence of a necessary being. Modern analytic philosophers use Kripke's possible-world semantics to define a necessary being as a being that "exists in all possible worlds". This paper will argue that this definition does not capture the intent of the mutakallimun because it does not distinguish between the necessary existence of God and the necessary facts of the contingent universe. It will use that as a point of departure to explore the extent to which the modal logic of kalam can be represented using modal predicate logic.

Nazif Muhtaroglu

What do we mean by "God?" A Kalāmic Approach to the Meaning of "Allah"

"Allah" is the proper name used for God in the Islamic tradition. Since it is a proper name (not a generic name), it refers to a single individual being. But what do we mean exactly when we utter the term "Allah"? There are two competing approaches in contemporary philosophy that attempt to clarify our intuitions about the meaning of proper names: (1) the descriptivist approach, and (2) the direct referenceview. According to the descriptivist approach,a proper nameis synonymous with a description or a set of descriptions. Thus, the meaning of proper names is given by descriptions. The direct referenceview; however, objects to using descriptions as the meaning of proper names. Rather, proper names refer directly to individual beings. Even if we may use some descriptions in referring to objects, they serve only to fix the reference, but they are not synonymous with proper names. In my presentation, I will try to expose the mutakallimūn's presuppositions about the meaning of "Allah" by examining the implicit maxims guiding their rational methodology in arguing for the truth of religious belief. Although some of their maxims align with the descriptivist approach, I argue that their view could be understood more coherently in terms of a modified view of direct reference.

3

Safaruk Chowdhury

Abū al-Muʿīn al-Nasafī's Critique of Various Definitions of Knowledge in Tabṣirat al-Adilla: A Philosophical Analysis

In this paper, I explore the critique of various definitions of knowledge (ʿilm) by the theologian and jurist Abū al-Muʿīn Maymūn b. Muḥammad al-Nasafī (d.508/1114) in his magnum opus on systematic philosophical theology Tabṣirat al-Adilla fī Uṣūl al-Dīn. Considered one of the most esteemed and methodical expositors of the doctrines of Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d.333/944), Nasafī was a highly autonomous thinker, and was also unabashedly a polemicist for the doctrines of the 'teachers' (mashāyikh) of the Central Asian Māturīdīs. In the first chapter of the Tabṣira, Nasafī sets out the contours of his epistemology that include discussions on (i) the definition, nature and sources of knowledge, (ii) his epistemic realism, rejection of epistemic subjectivism and acceptance of testimonial and historical knowledge, (iii) is direct criticisms of non-discursive sources of knowledge like inspiration (ilhām) and (iv) extensive discussion on the nature of belief (īmān), especially regarding whether or not the belief of a conformist (muqallid) is valid. The epistemological chapter of the Tabṣira reveals intricate assumptions and assertions within Māturīdī theology about what kind of knowers we are, what we can know and what kind of inferential processes and

resources are available for us to draw on for the project of natural theology that Nasafī embarks on subsequent to this chapter. This makes the Tabṣira a highly valuable and significant source for classical kalām deliberations on epistemological themes. After sketching Nasafī's theory of knowledge, I move to the focus of my paper which is a philosophical analysis of Nasafī's objections to the various definitions of knowledge given by his scholastic predecessors from the Muʿtazilīs and Ashʿarīs as well as contemporaries within his own theological School until he reaches al-Māturīdī's definition, which he argues is ultimately the most accurate. Although in many parts the Tabṣira is terse, my analysis will involve logical and philosophical reconstruction but will also be descriptive and comparative in approach.

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Kenan Tekin (Yalova University)

Beginnings or Principles: Commentaries and Glosses on the Notion of Mabādi in Ibn Ḥājib's Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā

In this paper, I look at some debates on the concept of mabādi in the commentaries and glosses on the prolegomenon of Ibn Ḥājib's Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā, a summa of Islamic legal theory. Ibn Ḥājib used this word to designate the first chapter of his book. The word could be understood literally as beginnings or terminologically as

principles. The latter sense was in reference to its conception in the Aristotelian theory of science. According to that theory, each science consists of subject matter, principles, and inquiries. This theory of science was well received in Islamic intellectual history. Hence, the nascent Islamic religious sciences including legal theory,were put into the framework of that theory after the eleventh century. The theory of science was treated in the books of demonstration, a part of the logical corpus,up until the turn of thirteenth century. After that time,however,the core of the theory was either briefly treated in the concluding section of logic books or inthe commentaries and glosses on the prolegomena of handbooks in various fields. The set of commentaries and glosses on Ibn Ḥājib's Mukhtaṣar al-Muntahā, provide an example of the latter. These commentaries and glosses particularly debated the concept of mabādi due to a discrepancy between Ibn Ḥājib's usage of that word and its terminological meaning. The paper closely follows the first and second generation of commentaries on the Mukhtaṣar, and then looks at glosses of Taftazani and Jurjani on Ījī's commentary.

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Dustin Klinger

Where Did ilm al-waḍ Come From？ Aristotelian Logic and Arabic Literary Criticism: An Attempt at a Genetic Story

The science of imposition (ilm al-waḍ)—or perhaps better: semantics , even though it has little in common with what we understand by that term today—is a branch of knowledge peculiar to the Arabo-Islamic intellectual tradition. It seemingly emerged out of the blue to take its place in the scientific canon in the 8th/14th century and became an integral part of the madrasa curriculum. For centuries to come it was a primary locus for the inquiry into the workings of language. Yet since the pioneering work of Weiss decades ago our understanding of this science has not advanced greatly.1 Where did this new branch of knowledge come from? What was its purpose?

It is an oft-remarked topos in the scholarship of the Islamicate world that the Arabic intellectual tradition is particularly obsessed with the ambiguity of language.2 This phenomenon is usually explained, even for arguably remote disciplines, by the centrality of the Quranic text as a contained body of Divine (Arabic) Language that stands in need of exegesis.3 However, there are a variety of sources that might have spurred interest in ambiguity and promoted independent reflections on the nature of language. Besides the Arabic Aristotelian tradition on logic (manṭiq), one such case is the tradition of classical Arabic literary criticism, which in seeking to establish aesthetic philosophy of language, paying particular attention to semantics

and criteria for the evaluation of literary and poetic language engages in what we today would classify as the phenomenon of linguistic ambiguity.4 I suggest that a scientific approach to linguistic ambiguity was the central purpose for the new science ilm al-waḍ , and that—besides the Quranic text—Aristotelian logic and Arabic literary criticism were two intellectual traditions from which the need for this new science arose.

In my paper I attempt to bring to the fore the development and continuity of scholarly engagement with questions of linguistic ambiguity from within logical tradition and the aesthetics of literary criticism. In diachronically—and perforce eclectically—tracing discussions on paronomasia in the specific cases of two figures of speech, tajnīs (roughly: pun or figura etymologica) and its cousin tawriya (roughly: double entendre), the aim of this paper is to bring to light the authors' underlying assumptions about the mechanics of homonymy (ishtirāk), and thereby about broader questions of semantics that are much discussed in contemporary philosophy. The analysis of the linguistic structure of the laf /ma nā dichotomy as it came to be established by logicians and literary critics as a framework to conceptualize semantic questions specifically with regard to polysemy will serve as a stepping-stone for a tentative historical argument about the genealogical connections not only between classical Arabic literary criticism and the formation of the distinct sub-disciplines of Rhetoric (balāgha), ilm al-ma ānī/ ilm albayān/badī, but also to the relatively late formation of ilm al-waḍ in the 9th/15th century.

1 Weiss, 1966, 1976, 1985, 1987.
2 See for example, Alexandre & Charney, 1967; Frank, 1978, Bauer, 2015, Ahmed, 2016.
3 Montgomery, 2009, 46.
4 On this point, Street remarked: "Whereas there is an Arabic term (manṭiq) that equates to 'logic', there is no such term or phrase for 'philosophy of language'. As it happens, philosophers tried to solve problems, which are now taken to be the concern of a philosophy of language, but this they generally did in the midst of either a logic treatise or a treatise on grammar. […] It is a sad fact of modern scholarship that those who study the Greek-derived traditions of philosophy of logic in Arabic are unlikely to have the competence to deal with parallel traditions within the Islamic sciences, and vice versa", Street, 2008.

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Jaleel Fotovat-Ahmadi

Mulla Sadra, True Felicity, and the Intellect

Perhaps most importantly in Mulla Sadra's organically unified philosophical system is the pursuit of happiness, or felicity, as both a fundamental aspect and the ultimate aim of his work. William Chittick's translation of Mulla Sadra's The Elixir of the Gnostics, provides us with Mulla Sadra's take on true felicity, its source, and how it can be obtained. Seyyed Hossein Nasr briefly discusses Mulla Sadra's account of happiness in his "Happiness and the Attainment of Happiness: an Islamic Perspective." These writings show that much like the other aspects of his philosophy, Mulla Sadra's view of felicity is very intellect-dependent. Given that Mulla Sadra's most prominent work, The Four Journeys, is not yet available entirely in English, the relevant primary or secondary literature lacks extensive work on Mulla Sadra's account of felicity. In this paper, I wish to address this gap in the secondary literature: that is, I look to highlight the powers of the intellect in order to shed further light on Mulla Sadra's intellect-based account of felicity. First, I examine what Mulla Sadra writes about true felicity—understood to be associated with the teleological end of any determined thing. Mulla Sadra holds that we (in our constant state of motion) should move from sense-based pleasure to the happiness associated with the intellect, and finally to the ultimate happiness which is the "virtuous soul's meeting with God." This highlights the body-soul distinction for Mulla

Sadra, in which the purpose of the soul is to reach true felicity through an intellective process of obtaining knowledge, and the body is designed to be instrumentally valuable. Then, I provide translations of some passages in The Four Journeys that demonstrate Mulla Sadra's understanding of the powers of the intellect. In doing so, I show that, for Mulla Sadra, we need not obtain knowledge merely for the sake of obtaining knowledge. Rather, we need to obtain the knowledge necessary for the proper use of our intellect. That is, we need to obtain knowledge with the aim of being virtuous and abstaining from evil. Mulla Sadra maintains it is through this means that humans can perfect their knowledge, as a way of perfecting themselves overall. Insofar as we are properly exercising our intellect by obtaining knowledge, then we are nearing ourselves to God. Mulla Sadra contends it is through approaching God that we not only come to know ourselves, but also approach perfection. Since true felicity is the "complete perfection," the means to pursue it would be to eliminate all possible impairments (ignorance) by exercising perfection (gaining knowledge) and thus increasing certainty in the knowledge of God. Ultimately, by doing this, we can "return to" or form a union with God; it is when we do this, that we can attain true felicity.

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Walter Edward Young

Juristic Jadal's New-Old Fallacies and How to Distill Them: An Untapped Treasury of Forms for Modern Critical Argumentation Theory

The detailed dialectic (jadal) of premodern Muslim jurists offers a tantalizing treasure trove of argument types, culled from rigorous analyses and centuries of intense debates. This premodern argumentative wealth—replete with insights, novel forms, and, on occasion, solutions to ongoing problems—

should be of profound interest to modern theorists of critical argumentation. One particularly fruitful domain of contribution is in the identification and rectification of fallacies. Although Muslim jurists, in the main, did not occupy themselves with long lists of fallacies (mughālaṭāt), they did produce systematic hierarchies of dialectical justifications (istidlālāt), accompanied by meticulously detailed sets of objections (iʿtirāḍāt) and responses (ajwiba). These, I will argue, provide the rich material from which a broad range of fallacies and solutions can be distilled and added to the world catalogue of erroneous reasoning and illegitimate moves.

In fact this talk begins with the premise that credible, dialectical objections relate to fallacies in that they are accusations of having committed one. The simple aim here is to demonstrate how prescribed objections and responses of medieval Islamic jadal can yield up distinct, "new-old" fallacy types and solutions. "Old" in that the theories selected for this demonstration date to the 11th century CE, but "new" in that none of the derived fallacies and solutions appear, to my knowledge, in any modern compendia of fallacies or critical argumentation texts.

As an experiment preliminary to a much larger endeavor, the subject material for this talk has been hastily (if not randomly) selected from only three treatises by two authors—namely, the Maʿūna fī l-jadal and Sharḥ al-Lumaʿ of the Shāfiʿī Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083 CE), and the Minhāj fī Tartīb al-Ḥijāj of the Mālikī Abū alWalīd al-Bājī (d. 1081 CE). This is a very limited sample indeed, considering the scores of relevant dialectical theory works, but even so the potential contribution of these three texts is exceedingly rich, and, for our purposes, illustrative.

Following a crash-course in our authors' hierarchies of sources for deriving law, the talk will proceed to a selection of objections and responses drawn from the full evidentiary spectrum. Fallacies and solutions will be distilled from these, and provided tentative names. We will then dwell longer on a particular category of qiyāsoriented objection called kasr, or "breaking," considering the best way to assess such "fallacies in action." With this illustrative bundle of new-old fallacy types, relatively easily retrieved, the talk will conclude with a tentative typology for categorizing distilled fallacies based on who errs, where in the flow of dialectic they do, and whether or not they can defend or rescue their move.

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Ashraf Ponnchethil

Function of ʿIlm al-jadal wal-khilāf (Dielectics) in Uṣūli Discourses; Tāj al-Subki's Jam   al-jawāmi   is delineated

The significance of ʿIlm al-jadal wal-khilāf (Dialectics) in Islamic scholastic tradition in general, and in Sunnī legal tradition in particular, cannot be overlooked. In Islamic intellectual circles the dialectic theories are discussed under the terms of munā ara (Dialectical investigation), baḥth (Dialectical inquiry), khilāf (Disagreement), and jadal (Disputation). In between Hijri sixth and eighth centuries ʿIlm al-jadal wal-khilāf was systematized in to a dialectical theory infusing the theorie of logic, and it moved into question of Istidlāl. Jam   al-jawāmi   of Tāj al-Dīn al-Subki' is one of the widely accepted

works in past and present scholarly discourses within the field of Uṣūl al-Fiqh irrespective of Madhāhib. The text became popular since it discusses all issues of Uṣūl al-fiqh along with other topics in a logical way by which the reader can examine and better understand the historic development of Muslim jurists' justifications and critiques. This paper will discuss the function and form of genre of ʿIlm al-jadal wal-khilāf (juristic dialectics) in Uṣūli discourses with an elaboration on dialectical juristic argumentation theories which are widely used in Jam al-jawāmi of Taj al-Subki.

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Nuruddin Al Akbar

Positioning Islamic Sciences as Instrumental Sciences: Study of the thoughts of Ibn Rushd and Said Nursi

This study attempts to position Islamic science as one of the instrumental sciences in the Islamic philosophical tradition. This study is essential considering that there is an impression that the study of Islamic philosophy touches only on the discussion of metaphysics and theological issues but forgets the discussion of physics. The study of physics is considered not the realm of Islamic philosophy but becomes the "right" of a separate discipline known as modern science. Whereas in medieval Islamic civilization, we can easily find Muslim philosophers in the past such as Ibn Sina, ar-Razi, Nasir al-Din Tusi, Ibn-Nafis, and Ibn Tufayl, who were also great scientists. This separation between metaphysics and physics also gives

the impression of Islamic philosophy as a philosophy that is not grounded and only dwells on speculative matters. This study attempts to reconnect the metaphysical tradition,Islamic philosophy's "traditional study"with physics. This study seeks to examine Ibn Rushd and Said Nursi's thoughts. Ibn Rushd represents the peripatetic tradition in the medieval era,while Said Nursi represents the Irfani(Sufism/Gnosis) tradition in the early modern century. This study argues that a common thread connects the thoughts of the two figures regarding a distinctive methodology in building Islamic science,so it is crucial to study it simultaneously. This study places Ibn Rushd as a vital philosopher who provides the theological justification for the development of Islamic science. For Ibn Rushd,as the science of ushul fiqh,which is positioned as an instrumental science to understand Islamic law in the Quran and hadith, Islamic science is the instrument needed to understand the book of the Universe (proof of God's masterpiece). For Ibn Rushd, the command to meditate and contemplate the Universe is a commandment of the Quran. So, formulating Islamic science as an instrument to ensure this Quranic commandment can be realized is also mandatory. Concerning the connection between the study of physics and metaphysics in Islamic science, it is interestingly explained by Ibn Rushd that the function of science is to provide knowledge about entities by their causes. At the same time,philosophy offers knowledge about hidden causes. In other words, Ibn Rushd believes that our in-depth understanding of physical entities will give us knowledge about unseen entities (in this case,God and His attributes).If Ibn Rushd justifies the existence of Islamic science, this study argues that Said Nursi was a philosopher who tried to

reconnect the metaphysic with physics in science. In his time, science experienced a reduction due to the influence of positivism,which rejected the discussion of metaphysics. For Nursi, materialism as a methodology is an attack on science because science should reveal what is in nature, not "manipulate" data to conform to the will of materialism.

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<center>Moiz Hasan</center>

The Forging of Realism in Post-classical Islam: Jurjānī against the Skeptics

Considered as one of the most influential of the late Asharite textbooks, the Mawāqif fī ilm alkalām of al-Ījī (d. 1355), together with its indispensable commentary by al-Jurjānī (d. 1413), remained relatively unknown among historians of Islamic science until recently. In a seminal article written more than twenty-five years ago, the Harvard historian of science, A. I. Sabra, drew attention to its relevance as an important source for the study of Islamic science and philosophy in the postclassical period. In particular, he brought to light two interesting passages which offer strikingly opposing views of the mathematical astronomy of the time. In the first, Ījī offered a seemingly skeptical characterization of astronomical models, arguing that the orbs are "mere imaginings" and "more tenuous than a spider's web." He held that since the astronomers use mathematical constructions without ascribing any reality to it, there is no need for one to feel religiously insecure due to their conclusions. Ījī's seemingly "instrumentalist" view of astronomy was met with a forceful rejoinder by Jurjānī, who countered that the astronomical

models, despite having no existence in the world, are nonetheless "imagined correctly in accordance with the things themselves" and are not like "ruby mountains" or "ghoul's fangs."

Two subsequent articles that discuss these passages have viewed Jurjānī 's response as evidence of the epistemological confidence of some astronomersin their discipline providing a correct picture of the world as well as insight into God's creation. But, perhaps because so little is known about Jurjānī's intellectual output since it is mostly in the form of commentaries and glosses that are still to be critically evaluated, the task to understand the passages from within his larger context has received little attention among historians or philosophers.

In this paper, I aim to reconstruct, assess, and contextualize the philosophical arguments that Jurjānī deploys against Ījī, thereby extending previous discussions. My larger goal is to situate Jurjānī's remarks within his broader understanding of the mathematical sciences, gleaned from his own philosophical-theological works. I show that in addition to his response against Ījī, he offers another significant defense of the mathematical sciences against a skepticism evinced by an Avicennan philosopher – a defense which, to my knowledge, has not received attention. I argue that it is ultimately Jurjānī's distinctive vision of truth and reality that separates him from those skeptical of mathematics. It is precisely this vision that provides the crucial context for his more positive conception of the mathematical sciences, the status of mathematical objects, and the epistemological confidence in its conclusions.

All individuals to the discussion agreed that mathematical notions

are conjectural and abstract. Unlike the skeptics, Jurjānī, however, possesses and employs the conceptual wherewithal and analysis to demonstrate that they are nonetheless true and real. The interest of the arguments lies in the epistemic and ontological theses Jurjānī formulates marking a radical break from the traditional forms of realism.

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<p style="text-align:center">Mahmood Zeraatpisheh</p>

The Development of the Conception of Predication in the Islamic World

It is known in the Islamic philosophy that the subject of philosophy is "existents". By this it is meant external existence. This is why sometimes they use the word aʿyān instead. But the problem is that we see them discussing mental entities, like ʿilm (knowledge), too, classifying it under quality as one of their ten cosmological categories. Completely aware of this problem some Islamic thinkers declare that ʿilm is an external existence since it occurs in the mind which is itself a mental existent. Here I want to explain how this view could, and indeed did, affect Islamic philosophers' conception of the logical notion of predication. Natural propositions are born in this context and considerations of this kind has led to the emergence of a new predication named essential primary predication, which in turn leads to a much more complex conception of the predication in a late Islamic philosopher like Mullā Ṣadrā.

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Muhammad Shafeeq Vayalpeediyekka

Epistemology as a Primary Tool of Investigation: The Kitābu'l-Uqūl Traditin in Indian Islamic Philosophy after Mollā Mahmūd Juānpūrī.

Mollā Mahmūd Juānpūrī(1606-1651) is believed as the most prolific Muslim Philosopher from Indian Subcontinent since the emergence of Mughal Empire in India. As a reformer in Ptolemy's Moon Spot Theory and Mīr Dāmad's philosophical doctrines,Juānpūrī's philosophical work entitled as "Shamsu'l-Bāzigha, was seemed the fundamental source of 17thto 21st Centuries'Indian Islamic Philosophy. In Scholastic Theology, Mollā Mahmūd Juānpūrī was a follower of Maturidite School of theology and one of his rarest manuscripts produced in theology, which I found last year during my research in the manuscript collection of Dāru'l-Ulūm Library Deoband, was a pure and independent scholium in the classification of knowledge and the theoretical explanation of epistemology and wisdom. After Mollā Mahmūd Juānpūrī, the independent Islamic Philosophical works written in India, have given much more priority to epistemological discussions along with the independent Urdu, Arabic and Persian epistles prepared about the wisdom and knowledge regarding the ancient Indian-Vedic thoughts and philosophy. Known as "Kithābu'l-Uqūl Tradition", most ofthe works were also an investigative instrument in finding the obscure human thinking process, observation of different human capabilities and they could also elaborate the human thinking capacity from other living beings. More inclusively, even the traditional definitions of epistemology from both Islamic theology and philosophy were, most

probably, dependable in all epistemological works, the texts of Mollā Mahmūd Juānpūrī and the generations came after him introduced the new methodologies in epistemological discussions and its classifications. The works of Deoband scholars and other Muslim philosophers including Ashraf AliTānewī, Rashīd Aḥmed Gangōhī, Muḥammed Qāsim Nānewtewī, Ḫalīl Aḥmed Ambetewī es-Sehārenpūrī, Muḥammed Anwar Shāh el-Kashmīrī, Shabbīr Aḥmad Osmānī, Ḥāfiz Muḥammad Ayyūb ed-Dehlewī, Sūfi Nazir Aḥmad Kashmīrī, Maulwī Maḥmūd Ali, Muḥammad Idrīs Kāndhelewī, Muḥibb Aḥmed Badāyūnī, Muḥammad Muḥibbullah, Ḥakim Najību Rahmān, Maulawī Karīmuddīn, Hojā Kamāludhīn, Muḥammad Bādusha Lucknowī, Nawāb Gulam Aḥmad, Ḥakim Sayyid Ali, Maulawī Anwārullah Ḫān, Muḥammad Anwārullah and Maulawī Muḥammad Ali, were considered as the highly authoritative in epistemology and human wisdom.The traditional classification of Islamic epistemology was widely seen in Indian scholars annotations and super commentaries upon the classical Islamic Philosophical texts. Among these, there are plenty of works on the Shamsu l-Bāzigha of Mollā Mahmūd Juānpūrīand other Mughal Muslim Philosophers. Kithābu l-Aql/ Uqūl traditionwas followed in 18thCentury Indian Urdu philosophical texts along with Persian works, and they were later known as the Kithāb-e Dānish . Contextually, it is worth to be noted thateven Indian philosophers, who are mighty Scholastic theologians simultaneously, pedagogically trained in Iranian Islamic Philosophical schools, they were somehow wholly or partially differentiated from Iranian influx of thoughts in epistemology and human wisdom. Some of Indian Muslim philosophers

academically refuted the arguments of both traditional Avicennian Peripatetic/Mashāī and Farabian Noe Platonist methodologies in epistemology. Particularly, the epistles written by Muḥammed Anwar Shāh el-Kashmīrīin Kalam cosmology, was also a pure example in epistemology in means of its contents and methodology.

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Ibrahim Safri

The use of logic in Maghribī tradition in the early modern period

Primary, Aristotle thought that logic is not a formal science but only an instrument used in every science. In this paper, I will try to distinguish among logic as a formal science and as an instrument in North Africa (Maghribī tradition). Some scholars in this side mentioned in the preamble of their works that logic is only an instrument of a number of sciences with an emphasis on philosophical theology, however, they cited some matters which are purely for logic and excluded in e.g., theology, metaphysics, and so on. Moreover, it seems an impact from the permissibility of logic to use it as an instrumental science, because the instrument excludes several matters related to al-Sharī'a as al-Ghazālī's (d.1111) view. In the case of al-Sanūsī (d.1489) who confirmed using logic as an instrumental science "ilm al-āla", he wrote his Mukhtaṣar and its commentary, believing that logical rules are just rational rules as instruments – not formal science – to other sciences, especially philosophical and rational theology. In other words, it provided the most general truths upon which other truths are based which is obviously in their theological works. On contrarily, some commentators on

alSanūsī's compendium added several matters beyond what al-Sanūsī was limited, so how can we explain that? It appears two way to interpret this methodology. It is either instrumental science was in the same value of major science, or they have a specific definition of instrumental science. In this study, I will start from 13th century with al-Kātibī (d.1284) who is considered a turning point in the development of Arabic logic, especially by interpreting additional matters in his works, for reaching to the history of logic as an instrumental science in Islamic tradition with a focus on latter Maghribī tradition since the early modern age (1600-1800) was known by several works in logic.

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Lilian Abou-Tabickh

What Does Ibn Khaldūn Mean by the Term Mādda? On Human Association and Political-Economic Organization

In this presentation I offer a new interpretation of the term mādda (lit. matter) in al-Muqaddima by Ibn Khaldūn based on his philosophy of language, rhetorical style, and historical method. I argue that in the context of ʿIlm al-Umrān, Ibn Khaldūn does not use the term "matter" in a philosophical-metaphysical sense of the four causes of natural philosophy as claimed in the scholarly literature, but in an economic sense to mean money. The examination of the different textual circumstances shows that in his study of human association and political-economic organization, Ibn Khaldūn constructs his rational arguments using worldly and demonstrative reasons, one of which is money. Money is one of the two foundations of the polity.

First, I present Ibn Khaldūn's complete argument on the necessity of human association and show how he only appears to be restating the philosophers' account on the necessity of political organization. Next, I show that the core of Ibn Khaldūn's disagreement with the philosophers is their philosophical concept of the "Intellects" and their system of emanation. These differences in their systems are reflected in their understanding of the human intellect and the process of knowledge acquisition, which underlie their arguments about the legitimate ruler and the knowledge required for the organisation of society. In the third part, I show how Ibn Khaldūn's critique of the philosophers' concept of "Intellects" dissociates him from their philosophical system and reveals his particular understanding of the universe. His statement that the questions that fall within the scope of Aristotle's natural philosophy are irrelevant to his intellectual project, paves the way toward exploring the meaning of the term "matter". Most importantly, this part shows that in the context of Ilm al-Umrān, Ibn Khaldūn uses the term "matter" to mean money. The significance of this reading is that it has the capacity to show the role that choice and agency play in his political philosophy, largely overlooked in the scholarly literature, and promises to offer an alternative view to the popular interpretation of what's been termed as Ibn Khaldūn's cyclical concept of royal authority and history.

This interpretation is guided by the way Ibn Khaldūn uses the language to communicate his ideas. Therefore, unlike preeminent interpreters of Al-Muqaddima, it does not interpret the text using categories established in realism, dialectical materialism, historical anthropology, or

world-systems theory, nor does it situate his thought within ancient Greek philosophy, Islamic theology, or modern sociology. To support their decision to situate Ibn Khaldūn in a particular intellectual tradition, those scholars rely on specific terms and statements in the text, which they associate with those intellectual schools, such as "goal", "matter", "form", "there is no agent but God", and "the conditions of people depend on their ways of making a living". Instead, I attempt to understand the particular meaning that he gives to the term mādda by examining the different textual and contextual circumstances.

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Mukhtar Ali

Philosophical Sufism: The Mutually Providential Relationship between Philosophy and Mysticism

Having just published my latest book, Philosophical Sufism: An Introduction to the School of Ibn al-ʿArabī, this paper telescopes my research on the mutually providential relationship between philosophy and mysticism. While philosophy uses deductive reasoning (burhān)to discover the fundamental nature of existence and Sufism relies on experiential knowledge (ʿirfān), it was not until the school of Ibn al-ʿArabī that philosophy and Sufism converged into a single framework, elaborating spiritual doctrines in precise philosophical language. In philosophical Sufism, philosophy is the instrument of mysticism and not its antithesis; the aim of both is to ultimately comprehend reality.I ndependently though, philosophy cannot attain ultimate realities, but it can serve as the sieve

through which diverse and arcane mystical experience is demonstrated and verified. Even if mysticism relies on unveilings (mukāshifāt) to attain true knowledge, philosophy along with other "instrumental sciences" strengthen the intellect, enabling it to express the verities of the heart. Thus, it is said that the intellect is the "tongue" of the heart, and that faculty whose language is reason and deduction.

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