Navigating Deep Premise Disagreement and Manifesting Truth[1]
Aaron Spevack, Brandeis University / Harvard University
What follows is a summary of the state of our ASIPT Working Group discussions between 2020-2021 on Epistemology and connected topics.
Difference of opinion in the branch-topics of a discipline often stems from conflicting premises in the roots. Whether kalām theologians against Peripatetic philosophers, Sunnis against Shi’is, Ashʿarīs against Māturīdīs, Akbarīs against Taymians, or believers against doubters and naysayers, one often finds that the core of many prominent disagreements are rooted in what I call deep-premise disagreements: disagreements whose claims are rooted in forgotten or unmentioned and therefore hidden premises, buried further back in the chain of categorical or conditional syllogisms that preceded the current argument.
Furthermore, long-standing disagreements are often found to be the result of definitional disagreements or the use of the same term for different phenomena. For example, the term ʿayn, which is a standard example of a homonymn in its lexical senses, is also used in a number of different technical nomenclatures depending on context: ʿayn as an essence as opposed to a ʿaraḍ or accidental attribute; ʿayn as an existent possible thing; ʿayn as an extramental existent thing as opposed to an abstract meaning.
Ontologies that take inventory of contingent rather than necessary beings differ in the inclusion or exclusion of various things including material or immaterial substances, universals, unseen worlds, or dark matter. Anthropologies may differ on the psychology and physiology of knowing. The roots of such disagreements are not necessarily always to be found in empirical observation, but also rationalist deductions, scriptural interpretations, or spiritual unveilings.
To get to the heart of these disagreements and really uncover the stronger of two positions, we must first coordinate our terms, methods, and worldviews.
Determining the veracity or falsity of any statement when deep-premise disagreement exists requires an understanding of the foundational assumptions of each party. Epistemology is one such set of foundational assumptions or positions: what is knowledge? How is true knowledge obtained? If there exist differences at the level of epistemology, for example, denying that rational deduction can lead to certain knowledge, then opposing parties will be limited in mutually accepted or granted premises (musallamāt) from which to debate.
However, in exploring the subject of epistemology, the problem of differing ontologies and anthropologies quickly emerges. What are the objects of knowledge? The existent and the non-existent. What, then exists? Necessary and possible beings; among the latter are substances, accidents, atoms, and bodies and maybe non-material atoms. In connecting these existent things to their epistemic channels, we also begin to wonder how the five external senses connect to the intellect with or without the intermediary function of internal senses and to ponder the subtleties of cognitive processes in the spaces between ignorance and conception and between conception and assent. A clearer depiction of the spiritual anthropology of the epistemic agent is in order: what does it mean for the human to come to know something? Can we parse out each of the cognitive steps?
This essay will address some preliminary observations and questions that emerge from a comparative study of Sunni epistemologies, ontologies, and anthropologies in relation to a variety of interlocutors. The plural is used intentionally as we find within Sunni camps there to be differences with regard to the epistemic value of the singularly narrated report, the existence of internal senses, and the materiality or non-materiality of the soul. Then when these epistemologies, ontologies, and anthropologies are put into intra-faith, inter-faith, and inter-disciplinary conversation, we find further nuance and complexity. The aim is to determine if there is a shared core epistemology from which differing parties can agree to work, and if not, to address those issues directly and primarily before wading into the quagmire of never-ending claims and counter-claims whose proofs are rooted in deeply buried premises, hidden in the intellectual histories and ḥāshiya super-commentaries.[2]
Sunni Epistemology According to al-Nasafī and al-Taftāzānī
We begin with a standard kalām-based epistemology outlined in the widely studied commentary of al-Taftāzānī on al-Nasafī.
After establishing the reality of sensory perceptions and the mind’s ability to abstract essential comprehensions and definitions of things, al-Taftāzānī sets out to explain how these two channels of knowledge (the senses and the intellect), along with the truthful report, are the channels through which we come to know what we know.
The epistemology chapter of al-Taftāzānī’s commentary and the plethora of super-commentaries delve into a number of discussions, some relevant ones being:
- The two best definitions of the knowledge
- The inductive reasoning through which theologians limited the causes of knowledge to three
- The occasionalist nature of created knowledge
- The reason for excluding the internal senses from the causes of knowledge
- The five external senses
- The truthful report being either mass-transmitted or a report from a prophet aided by miracles
- The intellect
- The exclusion of ilhām from the causes of knowledge
Before moving to the list of epistemological channels accepted by the People of Truth (ahl al-ḥaqq), al-Taftāzānī and his commentators unpack the terms causes and knowledge. The upshot of the various discussions around the term causes in “causes of knowledge” is that we are looking at an occasionalist theory of knowledge, the view that God creates knowledge in the soul when sensory organs come into contact with sensory objects, not that sight is an actual cause for knowledge of the thing seen.
While al-Taftāzānī will focus on two definitions of the term knowledge, his commentators indicate that there are three opinions regarding the definition of knowledge:
1) That it is axiomatic and immediately perceivable and therefore in no need of definition
2) That it is not immediately perceivable, yet still undefinable due the great difficulty involved in identifying and expressing its quiddative meaning.
3) That through multi-step reasoning, it is definable.
He mentions two definitions of knowledge, one attributed to al-Māturīdī and the other attributed to al-Ashʿarī, however when I refer to “the” Ashʿarī or Māturīdī definition in this paper, such attributions should not be taken as absolute, since they are each quoted as giving other definitions elsewhere.
Knowledge, according to al-Māturīdī, is an attribute by which that which can be mentioned is manifested to the knower. Al-Taftāzānī clarifies that what is meant is to make clear and apparent that which can be expressed whether that thing is non-existent or existent. We can utter terms which, even if imperfectly and generally, indicate a phoenix, a square circle, the sky, or Allah.
Such a definition includes the perceptions of the senses and that of the intellect; the earth can be described based on seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, and tasting, while the Creator of the universe can be mentioned based on rational contemplation (the universe began; it must have had a creator). Furthermore, this definition of knowledge includes singular mental conceptions (taṣawwurāt) such as “universe” and composite logical propositions such as “the universe began.”
Omitted from this essay are al-Taftāzānī’s and his commentators’ expositions of why each term was carefully chosen for this definition, what it includes and what it excludes. However, one point that needs retaining here is that this definition allows for probabilistic propositions in addition to certainty-producing conceptions and assents to be included under the term knowledge.
Another important point that we glean is the order of operations in perception and the status of each variable in that stage. Outward sensible phenomena are first metaphorically perceived by the senses, then processed by the intellect, then actually perceived by the soul. The soul’s perception of universal and particular meanings occurs by means of the intellect. For the soul is the true perceiver and the intellect is rather an internal instrument of perception, and the five senses are the outward instruments of perception.
Discussions of how the external instruments—namely the five senses—reach the internal instrument of perception—namely the intellect—leads to a necessary discussion of the spiritual and cognitive anthropology of the human being. For al-Taftāzānī, the internal senses—common sense, retentive imagination, compositive imagination, estimative power, and memory—are excluded due to their existence being unverifiable the standards of the Sharīʿa.[3]
Al-Ashʿarī’s Definition of Knowledge
Al-Taftāzānī then contrasts al-Māturīdī’s view with al-Ashʿarīs definition of knowledge as an attribute which necessitates a discernment whose contradiction is impossible. That is, al-Ashʿarī, like al-Māturīdī, considered knowledge an attribute—rather than an essence—which was the discernment with certainty of a fact which could not be contradicted. Knowledge is the soul’s necessary discernment of incontrovertible truth. This definition of knowledge comprises the senses since the definition does not stipulate that only abstract and immaterial things (maʿānī muqābilan bi-aʿyān) are the objects of knowledge. It also includes rational conceptions (taṣawwurāt), based on the opinion that conceptions cannot be contradicted, an opinion al-Taftāzānī does not accept. This definition includes those propositions (taṣdīqāt) that are certainty-producing but does not include probabilistic propositions, because while a certain proposition cannot be contradicted, a probabilistic one can.
Al-Māturīdī’s definition includes, however, supposition or probabilistic knowledge (ẓann), under the heading of knowledge (ʿilm), whereas al-Ashʿarīs does not. Al-Ashʿarī’s definition makes knowledge synonymous with certainty in contrast with probabilistic knowledge or supposition (ẓann).
Here we might observe that the definition attributed to al-Ashʿarī leads us to producing an epistemology of certainty via the intellect, senses, and truthful report. However, the one attributed to al-Māturīdī leads us to producing an epistemology of both probabilistic and certain knowledge. However, we must further tease out gradations of acceptable probability because while probabalistic propositions may be included in the first definition of knowledge, al-Taftāzānī tells us that ilhām as intuitive non-prophetic inspiration and kashf as spiritual unveiling are not included in our kalām epistemology; while kashf, ilhām, and other spiritual perceptions might reach the level of certainty for the individual knower, they are not publicly actionable since they do not share a common source that is verifiable by individuals other than the knower.
So, thus far, we have an epistemology of publicly actionable certainty and an epistemology of publicly actionable probability and certainty, omitting channels that don’t reach the threshold of public actionability. However, some include spiritual unveiling (kashf) and non-prophetic inspiration (ilhām) in their taxonomies of epistemological channels despite its being publicly non-actionable.
Ontologies and Kashf
As mentioned previously, if we say that objects of knowledge (maʿlūmāt) include the non-existent impossibilities such as square circles as well as non-existent possibilities such as unicorns along with the Necessarily Existent Creator and all existent created possible things, we may then be inclined to catalog the general categories of existent things and determine through which epistemic channels knowledge of them flows. In other words, we ask, “What exists? And how do we come to know that it does?”
Ontologies[4] are often found in treatments of Aristotle’s ten categories (al-maqūlāt al-ʿashara) which are accepted as extramentally existent among the Peripatetics but not for the kalām scholars, except in cases of quality and place. Another important ontological question regards the question of whether or not universals have extra-mental existence or only mental existence. Related to this question is the subject of the levels of existence (marātib al-wujūd). In short (and possibly an oversimplification), is the mental existence of the conception of a specific horse as real as that horse in extramental reality?
Some ontologies may include inventory derived from spiritual unveiling (kashf), as mentioned previously. Syed Naquib al-Attas’ ontology in his Prolegamena to the Metaphysics of Islam tends towards Akbarian metaphysics and therefore includes terms and concepts ostensibly derived from Ibn al-ʿArabī’s spiritual unveilings. It also includes the internal senses (ḥawāss bāṭina) whose existence is debated and prominently absent from al-Taftāzānī’s epistemology.
That there exist differing ontologies and epistemic channels between various theologians gives us pause. What are we to make of this? And if we are interested in putting a broadly Islamic epistemology into application, whether due to faith commitments or mere academic curiosity, how do we approach this diversity in ontology, anthropology, and epistemology?
Al-Taftāzānī notes that spiritual unveiling is not publicly actionable; that is, kashf along with ilhām and other similar epistemic channels are not proofs that can compel another to believe or act, though they may be convincing to the person who experiences them. This does not entail that they are false, only that they cannot be established for another person as certainly true. They may serve to provide detail (tafṣīl) to ontologies and anthropologies established and confirmed by the gauge of truthful report, but they do not produce certainty in and of themselves.
So, while our ontologies and anthropologies may be diverse composites of propositions derived from truthful reports, empirical observation, rational deduction, and spiritual unveiling, our epistemology of certain knowledge is limited to the first three.
However, there is a value to knowledge transmitted through singular reports or deduced via probablisitic propositions, even knowledge unveiled in states of spiritual witnessing, and therefore we need to keep in mind that the epistemology of al-Taftāzānī and al-Nasafi is likely an epistemology of certainty when ʿilm is contrasted with ẓann and an epistemology of preponderant probability and certainty when ʿilm includes probabilistic propositions, but it is not an epistemology that includes unverifiable channels such as spiritual unveiling or the internal senses. Therefore, we can imagine a separate page which outlines epistemologies of probability, such that when we parse out the details of a given ontology and anthropology, we may find that the epistemic channels for some of these points in our inventory are from epistemologies of probabilistic knowledge, overlaid on ontologies and anthropologies derived from epistemologies of certain knowledge. Just as fiqh includes high-probabilistic and certainty-based rulings, so too are some epistemologies, ontologies, and anthropologies composed of a combination of high probability and certainty.
Conclusion
If we are to find a shared platform rooted in a shared epistemology, in order to avoid deep-premise disagreement and the tangled web it produces, we need to not only coordinate our technical terms, ontologies, and anthropologies but also agree on the epistemic value of each channel through which we come to know truth. Depending on the interlocutor, the inclusion or exclusion of a given epistemic channel or the need to defend and prove the validity of including or excluding that channel takes priority. For the kalām theologian, the three channels of intellect, external sense, and the truthful report via mass-transmission or a prophet aided by miracles are sufficient for in-house debate, but each requires definition and defense when employed in intra-faith and inter-faith discussion. Our working groups aim to calibrate the terminology of kalām and the instrumental sciences of the Islamic tradition, with terms, methods, ontologies, epistemologies, and anthropologies of various other intellectual traditions in order to put these traditions in more robust conversation while buried deep-premise disagreements are brought to light to encourage more accurate assessments of each other’s positions.
Another challenge that has become apparent which makes the resolution of deep-premise disagreement more elusive is that we often struggle to find a perfect one-to-one correspondence between the concepts and terms of the rational sciences of Islam and the English equivalents of their Latin philosophical counterparts, indicating that the two traditions did more than merely transmit an unaltered Greek corpus through different languages and theologies. Add to that terminology from Analytic and Continental philosophy along with modern logic and other overlapping disciplines, and the interpretive work ahead of us remains ample. With these challenges in mind, ASIPT is developing comparative Arabic-English glossaries in the disciplines of logic, dialectical disputation, syntax and morphology, among others.
Footnotes
[1] These reflections grow out of conversations held in ASIPT working groups that have been steadily discussing the epistemology section of al-Taftāzānī’s commentary on the ‘Aqa’id al-Nasafiya since Spring 2020. In addition to dipping into the commentaries of al-Siyālkūtī, al-Bājūri, and others, our discussions have also led to readings in semiotics, Thomist scholasticism, the writings of Sayyid Naqib al-Attas, and other comparative discussions.
[2] These reflections grow out of conversations held in ASIPT working groups that have been steadily discussing the epistemology section of al-Taftāzānī’s commentary on the ‘Aqa’id al-Nasafiya since Spring 2020. In addition to dipping into the commentaries of al-Siyālkūtī, al-Bājūri, and others, our discussions have also led to readings in semiotics, Thomist scholasticism, the writings of Sayyid Naqib al-Attas, and other comparative discussions.
[3] In our ASIPT Working Group discussions, we also explored how certain deep-premise disagreements between the peripatetic philosophers and the kalām theologians also impacted how and why some scholars accepted or rejected them in their epistemologies. The “how” of perception also led us to writings on semiotics, where the granular steps of cognitive processes opened up additional potential steps between sense and conception.
[4] Here we see that Aristotle’s categories, which are so important in the study of the logic of the early logicians and often omitted from introductory treatments of logic of the later logicians, represent conflicting ontologies between Peripatetics and mutakalimīn. For the Peripatetics, substances are material or non-material, the former consisting of form (ṣūra), matter (hayūlā), and the composite of the two in a body (jism). Non-material substances include but are not limited to the soul (nafs). For the kalām scholars, substances are material and are either simple indivisible atoms or composite bodies, not composed of hayūlā and ṣūra but rather material atoms. Al-Ghazālī is a prominent dissenter from this apparently materialistic taxonomy of existent things, positing that the soul is a spiritual substance rather than subtle material substance. Are all created possible existent things material, or do there exist non-material substances in Sunni ontologies? This is a question we continue to ponder.