The climax of the 19th century
Analytic philosophy, the story goes, was heralded with a rebellion: Russell’s and Moore’s rebellion against British idealism espoused by F. H. Bradley (1846-1924) and J. T. McTaggart (1866-1925) embracing instead a crude form of direct realism – the view that we have direct awareness of objects as they really are. This is undoubtedly considered one of the pivotal events in the emergence of analytic philosophy. In the case of Russell, for example, due to his concern for establishing a foundation for mathematics, he rejected the neo-Hegelian doctrine of internal relations (where a thing is partly constituted by its relations to other things entailing everything is related everything else) as well as a monist idea that reality is fundamentally spiritual in nature. He felt a neo-hegelian model would fail to provide an adequate account of mathematics because mathematics relies on relational propositions and Russell argued that relations had to be treated as being real constituents of propositions in order for mathematics to consist of truths. Moore also criticises the monist idea underpinning neo-hegelianism but his main dissatisfaction appears to be with idealism’s denial of mind-independent objects. Moore upheld that reality was composed of ‘concepts’, or meanings that are non-psychological in nature. These concepts are represented by propositions that become the object of our thoughts and are to be sharply distinguished from any mental contents or representations. Moore argued that in our understanding of propositions, we grasp the constituent concepts that the propositions are actually about, hence there is a difference between our thoughts and the reality our thoughts are about. This reality objectively exists external to us. Both Russell and Moore, therefore, came to adopt a crude form of direct (naive) realism, and this was at the heart of their rebellion against British idealism.

Historians have recognised that analytic philosophy was not simply a British affair; there was the German contribution. It is here that Gottlob Frege enters the story and hence historians have acknowledged him as one of the co-founders of the analytic tradition itself. Indeed, it was Frege who created quantificational logic as we know it and only when Russell properly studied Frege’s writings, after his composition of The Principles of Mathematics in May 1902, did he begin to develop his own positions in opposition to Frege, who by that time was already over a decade ahead in articulating and explicating the basis of his logicism – the view that mathematics is an extension of logic. In addition, it was Frege who influenced the young Wittgenstein who took on the framework, ideas and assumptions of Frege (and Russell) in his philosophical deliberations while also critical of them. Based on this fact, Frege must be rightly considered as one of the co-founders of analytic philosophy. Although Moore’s and Russell’s rebellion against British idealism in Cambridge occurred independently of Frege’s own projects and activities in Jena, it is undeniable that both Russell’s subsequent work at the turn of the 20th century and Wittgenstein’s thinking in his early philosophical career were inextricably linked to Frege’s ideas. We could say then that two events were the most significant in the emergence of analytic philosophy: (1) Russell and Moore’s rebellion against British Idealism and (2) Frege’s creation of quantificational logic. These events had ramifications on several ideas, articulations and successes that are associated with the early phase of analytic philosophy including Frege’s treatment of existential statements, the definition and concept of numbers, Moore’s critique of naturalism, Russel’s seminal theory of descriptions and types as well as Wittgenstein’s logical ideas and analysis.

Early marker of analysis
The specific ‘analytic’ dimension of this early phase of analytic philosophy involved, rather unsurprisingly, analysis. However, how analysis figured in the philosophical activity of the four founders was by no means uniform. In the case of Russell, analysis is often identified with logical analysis, especially as it is represented in for example his theory of descriptions first presented in his seminal paper ‘On Denoting’ in 1905 and utilised the quantificational logic of Frege. Here, Russell wanted to address the problem of ‘definite descriptions’ – phrases of the form ‘the so and so’ – that do not refer to anything. Such descriptions are commonly used in mathematical reasoning, as in a proof by reductio ad absurdum that states there is no greatest prime number. The reductio argument consists of deriving a contradiction from the premise

(1) Let x be the greatest prime number,

which contains a description, the greatest prime number, that by hypothesis does not refer to anything. Russell’s novel solution – what philosopher F. P. Ramsey dubbed as a ‘paradigm of philosophy’ is to analyse such descriptions as disguised quantificational statements. Thus,

(1) Let x be the greatest prime number

is analyzed as

(1*) Let x be prime and such that no number greater than x is prime.

The more celebrated example given by Russell’s is ‘the present king of France is bald’. Russell states that

(K1) The present king of France is bald,

Ought to be analyzed as follows:

(K2) There is one and only one King of France, and whatever is King of France is bald.

In logical notation, (K2) is:

(K3) ∃x[Kx ∧ ∀y(Ky → y = x) ∧ Bx].

The problems generated by attempting to analyze (K1) disappear on this kind of decompositional analysis. If there is no King of France, then the subject term in (K1), the definite description the present King of France – would seem to lack a meaning, in which case how could the whole sentence have a meaning? Russell solved this problem by paraphrasing away the definite description. Although the definite description has no meaning by itself, (K1) as a whole does have a meaning, a meaning that is captured by (K2). The meaning of (K2) is then explained through a logical analysis as revealed in the quantificational structure of (K3). Russell thought that in his paper he had inaugurated an interpretive method of analysis that would reveal how many other kinds of philosophical puzzles are actually also embedded logical fictions. For Moore, like Russell, analysis also consisted in decompositionality, i.e. breaking down propositions into their constituent concepts, and this decompositional approach figures in the first chapter of his famous work Principia Ethica, where he argued that the notion of ‘good’ is indefinable, i.e. that what ‘good’ denotes has no analysable parts to which it can be reduced. Historians have noted how this kind of logical and decompositional analysis marking the early phase of analytic philosophy did not consistently run through the philosophy of both Russell and Moore; the development was more complex and less uniform. Moreover, neither undertook philosophical inquiry nor solved philosophical puzzles with quite the same rigour.

Turning to Wittgenstein, a defining aspect of analysis in his philosophical objectives after the publication of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in 1921 under the mentorship of Moore, was also logical analysis. Russell dubbed Wittgenstein’s method as ‘logical atomism’, one that the latter did not identify with. In any case, the Tractatus assumed a decompositional approach. In fact, according to this Wittgensteinian ‘logical atomism’, the reality can be analyzed into fundamentally simple, unanalyzable, indivisible, and mutually independent objects or facts and that these objects and facts are features of logical analysis. The decompositional analysis of propositions into simpler parts would have to arrive at a definite terminus in order to avoid infinite regress. Wittgenstein places this terminus at two ‘atomic’ constituents of all reality: objects, which are actually logical form without content and states of affairs, which are simple and mutually independent facts. Thus, logic is the architectural structure of all reality, it determines the form of all objects.

The ideas of Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein during the early decades of the 20th century helped to form what became known as the ‘Cambridge School of Analysis’ and it was the discussions and writings of this school that was first identified as ‘analytic philosophy’. It was Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that was regarded as the seminal text defining the culmination of this Cambridge method of philosophy but it was also a very dense and paradoxical work; especially in light of Wittgenstein’s notorious statement towards the end of the book proclaiming that the propositions of the Tractatus are to be abandoned and discarded once they have been used to arrive at the correct view of things. What Wittgenstein exactly meant by
this still divides scholars.

Post-War and the Vienna School

Up to and after WW2

The years after the First World War leading up to the Second World War saw the thoughts, ideas and arguments of the analytic four-fathers – Frege, Russell, Moore and Wittgenstein – broadening and ramifying as other philosophers begin interacting and critically engaging with them. It was also helped by Russell and Moore producing new works of their own during the 1930s that provoked further philosophical discussion. One important development during this period was in the Oxford School – sometimes referred to as ‘Ordinary Language’ philosophy – championed by Gilbert Ryle, J. L. Austin and P. F. Strawson who began dominating the emerging analytic dimension of philosophy of language in England. In fact, historians argue that Oxford also had a nascent if not open movement against British Idealism parallel to the rebellion at Cambridge by Russell and Moore. This Oxford ‘movement’ was heavily anti-psychologistic and strongly realist in outlook. It was this movement inherited by Ryle, Austin and Strawson among others merging with the analytic approach leading up to and beyond WW2 that gave analytic philosophy another level of rigour and extension.

However, the most significant development in analytic philosophy came with the establishment of the Vienna School in 1929 that espoused a strong empiricist approach, prioritising scientific knowledge with its warrant based on a conjunction of empirical observation and formal logic (which included induction and confirmation). It also rejected anything that could not be empirically verified (this was called the Verification Principle). Casualties of this verification principle included ethics, metaphysics and theology. This logico-scientific approach was known as logical positivism or logical empiricism. Analytic philosophy in the general imagination became identified with logical positivism.  Members of the Vienna School like Rudolf Carnap and Kurt Godel were shifting the focus and terms of debate, making advances in logic and mathematics respectively and hence the network of mathematicians, scientists and philosophers either directly affiliated to the School or in the orbit of their research agenda and trajectory laid several tracks of influence to different parts of the world. A. J. Ayer championed logical positivism in England and W. V. O. Quine took back positivist ideas to the states after his scholarship sojourn in 1932-1933 where he had his infamous fall out with Carnap over the analytic/ synthetic distinction. Undoubtedly, it was the rise of Nazism in Germany during the 1930s that had a huge impact on the migration of logical positivists, mathematicians and logicians from Europe to different parts of the world influencing a generation of philosophers as a result within those new destinations. For example, Carnap, Alfred Tarski, Hans Reichenbach and many others left Europe for the states and after taking up jobs in various universities, began to slowly embed analytic philosophy within the soil of American discourse. This analytic entry came into contact with existing traditions like American native Pragmatism and there began a deep interaction producing a distinct philosopher within the American Landscape.

Diversification

Most notable in the decades after WW2 was Quine’s writings that sparked a new turn or phase in analytic philosophy. Quine influenced a generation of post-war analytic philosophers who were in sustained engagement over many decades with his works including Donald Davidson, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke. Each of these philosophers and others had a cascading effect on the production of philosophical thinking and its direction. Although Quine’s influence is a key development of the analytic tradition, another major development was how the 1960s marked a shift away from linguistics that dominated the first part of the 20th century with move into philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and a plethora of other domains like ethics, metaphysics, aesthetics and politics. Therefore, from the 1960s and throughout the remaining decades of the 20th century, analytic was applied to just about every area of philosophical inquiry.

Themes

Some of themes that have been associated with the early development of analytic philosophy and beyond include:

● Quantification logic.
● Compositionality.
● Logical atomism.regimentation theory.
● Sense-data and perception.
● The external world.

After the 1950s, some of the themes included:

● Modal logic.
● Modal metaphysics.
● Inferentialism.
● Language.
● Epistemology.
● Naturalism.
● Science.
● Ethics.
● Analytic esthetics.

References

Below is a selection of works helpful for understanding the origins and subsequent development of analytic philosophy.

Beaney, Michael. (ed.) 2013. The Oxford Handbook of The History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Beaney, Michael. 2017. Analytic Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Glock, Hans-Johan. 2008. What is Analytic Philosophy? New York: Cambridge University Press.

Martinich, A. P. and Sosa, E. 2001. Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology. Oxford and Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers.

Martinich, A. P. and Sosa, E. 2005. A Companion to Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology. wiley-Blackwell Publishers.

Potter, Michael. 2019. The Rise of Analytic Philosophy, 1879–1930: From Frege to Ramsey. New York and Oxford: Routledge.

Soames, Scott. 2014. The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy, Volume 1: The Founding Giants. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Soames, Scott. 2014. Analytic Philosophy in America: And Other Historical and Contemporary Essays. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Soames, Scott. 2018. The Analytic Tradition in Philosophy, Volume 2: A New Vision. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Schwartz, Stephen P. 2012. A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls. England: John Wiley & Sons.

* Names marked with an asterisk(*) indicate the dispute among historians of philosophy regarding whether or not they are not to be included as analytic philosophers even if they have written influential works within their respective academic field.