By Nazif Muhtaroglu
Although it is common to list several types of kalām arguments for the existence of God in the sense that they are stand-alone arguments that purport to show the existence of God individually, I will challenge this way of reading kalām texts by focusing on al-Bāqillānī’s Kitāb al-Tamhīd.[1] A close reading of the passages in this text where al-Bāqillānī discusses the existence of God will reveal to us that the structure of his argument is quite different from the standard ways of understanding kalām arguments for the existence of God. The details of my presentation can be found in my already-published paper.[2] What follows is a detailed summary of what I suggested in that paper.
In a nutshell, al-Bāqillānī presents a meta-argument for the existence of God that is constituted of many interrelated sub-arguments. These sub-arguments appear in many kalām texts and are usually identified as stand-alone arguments for God’s existence by contemporary scholars. Famous examples of these sub-arguments are also known as the argument from the origination of the world, also known as the kalām cosmological argument (dalīl al-ḥudūth); the argument from contingency (dalīl al-imkān); and the argument from design, also known as the teleological argument (dalīl al-niẓām). We can find all these arguments in al-Bāqillānī’s text, but none of these arguments is used to argue for the existence of God. Each argument, however, has a role to play in establishing the conclusion that God exists. Let us see how al-Bāqillānī uses these arguments with some additions step by step to reach the intended conclusion.
Step 1: Initially, al-Bāqillānī argues that the world (ʿālam) has come into existence out of nothing (ḥādith). In this step, he relies on his atomistic ontology. Beginning with the temporality of accidents, he aims to show the temporality of substances, in which these accidents inhere. From the statement that the universe came into being out of nothing, he infers that there is an originator (muḥdith) responsible for its coming into existence (KT, 22-23). So far, we have the argument from the origination of the world, or the kalām cosmological argument (dalīl al-ḥudūth). Yet notice that the conclusion of this step is that there is an originator of the universe, not that God exists. We need more steps to reach that conclusion.
Step 2: Next, al-Bāqillānī undertakes to show that this originator has a will (qaṣd). To that aim, he appeals to the contingency of the world and the idea of particularization (ihktiṣāṣ)̣. Since objects may possibly (bi-sịḥḥa) take different shapes or properties than they actually have, there must be an agent who determines them in those particular forms via the attribute of will (KT, 23-24). Notice that this argument can be regarded as a contingency argument (dalīl al-imkān), though it aims to show God’s will rather than His existence.
Step 3: Then, al-Bāqillānī ascribes the attribute of knowledge to the originator in question. He draws attention to the perfect order in the universe. He argues that this perfect order cannot exist without knowledge. Thus, the originator must have power, will, and knowledge. In other words, it is a voluntary causal agent (fāʿil) (KT, 24). The argument in the third step could be characterized as an argument from design (dalīl al-niẓām). Importantly, it does not purport to show the existence of God but only His attribute of knowledge.
Step 4: Next, al-Bāqillānī argues that the voluntary causal agent (fāʿil) in question transcends the universe. Whereas the universe is temporally originated, its originator must be eternal (qadīm). After stating the principle that everything that comes into existence (muḥdath) needs an originator (muḥdith), he infers the existence of an eternal originator by denying the possibility of infinite regress (KT, 25). This argument is part of many traditional cosmological arguments and further clarifies the character of the creator in question.
So far, al-Bāqillānī has argued that there is at least one eternal being with the attributes of power, knowledge, and will who created the universe. According to al-Bāqillānī, these attributes also imply the attribute of life. Yet, this being is still not called “God” (Allāh). There might be more than one being with such characteristics. The last step aims to show that there is at most one such being.
Step 5: In this final step, al-Bāqillānī undertakes to show that there could not be more than one eternal voluntary causal agent. To that aim, he appeals to a famous argument among the mutakallimūn, the argument from mutual conflict (burhān al-tamānuʿ). A possible conflict between at least two beings with the characteristics listed above lead to a contradiction. Thus, there is only one eternal being with attributes of will, power, knowledge, and life who created the universe (KT, 25).
With the fifth step, the argument for the existence of God is complete, and the term Allāh is used after this point.
As we have seen, al-Bāqillānī’s argument for the existence of God basically relies upon five steps. Although each step also involves an argument, these arguments do not purport to justify the existence of God alone, independently of others. These five steps altogether aim to show that God exists. In other words, the arguments in these steps are interlocked and unified. When one step is missing, the conclusion changes.
This meta-argument is best characterized as a cumulative argument. Nonetheless, it is not inductively structured like the common cumulative arguments we see in contemporary discussions. Al-Bāqillānī’s cumulative argument is a deductive argument that infers the existence of God from the various aspects of the observable universe. As such, it deserves to be treated with care and analytic rigor. Without projecting widespread categorizations of arguments for God and common ways of identifying them, we need to focus on what really the author aims to suggest. This would offer a fresh perspective to contemporary discussions.